Letter From the Editors

Times like these make a person want to look up from the daily headlines and scream “Why!?” And then, of course, to look back at the news story, which will hopefully provide an answer. When it comes to social or natural phenomena, journalists tend to be good at corralling experts to provide answers. The apparently abnormal psychology of individual leaders, on the other hand, lends itself to more speculative conclusions.

Sometimes a journalist presents a convincing interpretation of the leader’s behavior, as was the case this week with Mikhail Shevchuk’s article about Turkish President Erdogan, who has ordered the arrest of his chief rival for the presidency and may amend the Constitution to stay in power after this term. “His political instinct is stronger than the voice of reason,” Shevchuk argues. “He would rather tear down the entire political system and plunge Turkey into chaos, with protests and violence, than choose peace and a lawful procedure.”

Shevchuk titled his piece “Why do we need a Turkey without Erdogan?” a nod to a 2018 Putin quote, “Why do we need a world without Russia?” Putin asked this hypothetically as justification for a nuclear first strike, and the “why” in that question is not the usual pochemu, but zachem – the still-contemporary Russian equivalent of “wherefore” – as in “What purpose would the world serve” if Russia loses its leading role (or, for that matter, its current president).

Concerns about nuclear escalation are perhaps the clearest aspect of Donald Trump’s thinking about foreign policy as well as a rare area of agreement with the Europeans. Regarding the hesitancy to retaliate against Russia for acts of sabotage, former US defense official Seth G. Jones explained: “Both the Americans and Europeans have certainly been very careful about escalation” given Russia’s nuclear posture.

But according to Julius Ceasar (well, according to the HBO series “Rome”), “If I cannot punish you, I must reward you, else I would seem weak.” Thus Trump chose to reward Putin with a second one-to-one phone call. Which naturally unleashed another wave of speculation.

Sky News analyst Michael Clark set the gustatory tone of commentary on the exchange: “There’s an old saying in diplomatic circles: ‘If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.’ And believe me, Ukraine is on the menu.” Zelensky spoke in a similar vein, telling journalists “I don’t want us to be on the menu for Putin. We are not a salad or compote for this person, despite his appetite. And we can see what [his appetite] is like.” Medvedev expanded on the same metaphor (and forgot the English name for “chicken Kiev”), tweeting “there is only Russia and America in the dining room. On the menu: light appetizers – Brussels sprouts, British fish and chips, and Paris rooster. The main course is a Kiev-style cutlet. Enjoy your meal!”

Which brings us to the biggest “Why?” story of this week – as Ukrainian forces retreat from Sudzha, what led them to invade Russia in the first place? As pointed out by sources as divergent as Meduza and Sovetskaya Rossia (reprinting from The American Conservative), the official justifications of the offensive – establishing a buffer, diverting Russian forces from Pokrovsk, creating leverage for negotiations – were dubious from the start. What’s more, the campaign reactivated and lengthened the northern front beyond Kharkov to Sumy Province. That leaves one more motive: In the words of Daniel DePetris, “The offensive elevated the Ukrainian Army’s morale for a time, but morale only holds up as long as the troops aren’t getting pummeled by the enemy and aren’t losing ground.”

Judging by this week’s raids on Belgorod Province, however, I would say Ukraine’s leadership continues to see a morale advantage in taking the initiative on Russian soil. In any case, more advantage than in keeping up the fight in Ukraine in 2023. And far more than being devoured.