From Republic.ru, June 3, 2025, https://republic.ru/posts/115804. Condensed text:
The latest round of talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations on peace memoranda has taken place in Istanbul. Every detail of these meetings is immediately blown up into a separate sensation, but all of this fuss appears affected and indicates that the participants aren’t really striving for their declared goal. Moreover, it’s not entirely clear why they would even strive for it.
Moscow and Kiev try to disagree a priori on any issue, even technical ones. For example, the Russian side refused to submit its memorandum draft in advance, stating that it would only present it in Istanbul on June 2. As for Ukraine, it gave the Russians its version, which says that it is ready for a full and unconditional ceasefire and further diplomatic work.
Every disagreement provokes an eruption of statements and claims, as if the point of the process isn’t to find a compromise, but to accuse the opponent of disrupting negotiations. The fruitlessness of these talks was demonstrated to their audience at the very beginning, when the Russian delegation renewed its demand that Ukraine cede the four regions [i.e., Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhye and Kherson Provinces – Trans.], while Ukraine refused. An attempt to force Russia to agree to a 30-day ceasefire also came to nothing. The talks are only continuing because US President Donald Trump is insisting on it – and neither Russia nor Ukraine wants him to exit the process. More specifically, they don’t want him to switch to the opponent’s camp, which could happen if Trump decides that either one is deliberately torpedoing the peace process, thereby ruining its credibility.
The talks are a burden for the Kremlin: Russian leaders are constantly underscoring that Russia doesn’t have any problems with manpower or weapons, and that it is prepared to fight indefinitely. And with growing support from Europe behind him, Vladimir Zelensky doesn’t feel like he’s on the verge of catastrophe either. At any rate, he’s not contemplating capitulation. To be on the safe side, the parties pointedly exchanged strikes during the talks: Russia fired missiles at Kiev, and, in response, Kiev attacked Bryansk and Kursk Provinces, blowing up several bridges and derailing a passenger train, causing dozens of casualties.
That same day, drones attacked strategic Russian air bases in Murmansk, Ryazan, Ivanovo, Amur and Irkutsk Provinces and burned a number of airplanes (Ukrainian sources are reporting that 40 airplanes were burned, but it was not possible to verify this). Just the day before, the patriotic media had written that a large number of these bombers had been moved to these bases to deal an especially powerful blow to Ukraine on the eve of the talks.
It seems fair to say that each side wanted to use its attack to gain an edge in the talks and show that it still has plenty of strength. But, generally speaking, this is not the behavior of people seeking to sign a memorandum. It is the behavior of people who couldn’t care less.
But let’s say that Donald Trump keeps at Putin and Zelensky and somehow pushes them into signing some kind of declaratory document. Or that, after seeing these attacks, both delegations conclude that things aren’t that simple and it’s time to somehow wrap it up. This is naturally hard to believe, but either option would still seem to be a step forward. Even so, the process of moving toward an agreement has not elicited sympathy or support. Even people who do not support the special military operation [in Ukraine] or Russia’s forced disconnection from the Western world haven’t welcomed the talks.
This sounds strange, of course, and even paradoxical. Haven’t opponents of the hostilities been calling for peace since the very beginning? Arguments in favor of peace seem self-evident and do not need to be repeated. And, from a generally humanistic point of view, they will undoubtedly remain so. However, the situation in the spring of 2022 [right after Russia invaded Ukraine, see Vol. 74, No. 8, pp. 9‑13 – Trans.] is significantly different from the current situation three years later. What happened is that motivation has slowly faded, and it has become harder to understand why peace is needed and should be pursued. I mean, aside from the argument that the loss of life is a tragedy. But all that is needed to end the loss of life is a truce, a ceasefire.
As soon as it started, the special military operation looked like an incident; an admittedly large-scale one, but still not fundamentally different from [Russia’s] campaign in Georgia in 2008 [see Vol. 60, No. 31, pp. 1‑8]. Russia suffered absolutely no consequences for its Georgia escapade, and the speedy conclusion of peace agreements [with Ukraine] would have led to a similarly rapid and almost painless return to life’s usual rhythms. That’s exactly why it was worth demanding peace.
But now the signing of memoranda and treaties won’t lead to that result. Many continue to believe by inertia that a peace treaty will somehow “nullify” the global conflict, no matter on whose terms. But there are no signals of this. Throughout the conflict, no Western leader has ever said that all the sanctions and all the closed borders are only due to the fighting and [will last only] as long as it continues: No one has ever said that everything will be lifted once a peace treaty is signed. “The end of the Russian [unprovoked and] unjustified aggression in Ukraine and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the entire territory of Ukraine would be one of the main preconditions to amend or lift sanctions,” the European Commission said in March.
So, first of all, not a peace agreement but an unconditional withdrawal. And, second of all, only as a precondition for further discussions. (And, third of all, what does “one of” mean?) As for opening borders and restoring trade operations, that will have to be negotiated anew, returning not to 2021 or even 2013, but to 1991, with the caveat that this time Russia will be viewed warily from the get-go. Too many words have been said by both sides to do otherwise. The Finnish border, for example, is officially closed not because of the special operation, but because of the threat of an influx of migrants from third countries. And that threat could either dissipate overnight or, on the contrary, continue for any length of time; there is no official connection with peace agreements here.
Europe is not counting on there being an anti-Putin or antiwar community in Russia that could change the situation within the country, and it is not publicly expressing any interest in resuming 30 years of integration processes. Big businesses that left Russia and are, according to Vladimir Putin, dreaming of returning have yet to confirm this intention. Moreover, Putin himself keeps repeating more and more assiduously that he won’t simply allow them to return without additional payments and conditions [see Vol. 77, No. 20, p. 13].
When it calls on Russia for peace, Europe is not trying to explain to Russians what tangible benefits they will gain from that peace, show them the difference between the two conditions or somehow motivate them to resist. War is bad, but how would peace be better? Is it the hope that hypothetical Russian oppositionists will seek to defeat the regime only to end up paying for Putin’s crusade for years to come? Is that how this is supposed to work? Will this even be peace at all, and not simply a tense state of nonwar? Yes, Russia’s economy is facing problems. But no one has yet to promise that these problems will be solved if the special operation ends.
Three years ago, many hoped that Europe would fight Putin for Russia. That didn’t happen. There was no battle. And herein lies the difference between spring 2022 and spring 2025. In this sense, Putin has won. At one time it was popular to compare Russians to hostages of a paramilitary state, but the most discouraging thing is for a hostage to hear “Go to hell!” from the audience instead of receiving support.