RUSSIAN-AMERICAN relations are in a turbulent period marked by unpredictable turns. After three years of brinkmanship in hybrid warfare mode, the first signals have emerged that suggest that our countries may be able to at least partially overcome the severe crisis that began more than a decade ago and peaked under the Joe Biden administration. Of course, comprehensive long-term efforts are needed to stabilize this dialogue and steer it in a positive direction – and what we are witnessing now is only the start of this process. Moreover, this involves more than just resolving the crisis in Ukraine, although this conflict – during which many thousands of Russians have become victims of NATO-supplied munitions delivered to Ukraine – will long remain a painful reminder not only of the illusory nature of any “resets” with Washington but also of a broader range of issues.
The previous US administration’s focus on inflicting a “strategic defeat” on our country, its attempts to destabilize Russia from within, and to severely weaken it with sanctions and psychological warfare (possibly for decades to come) have deprived Russian citizens of faith in the potential for dialogue with the West – particularly since there remain many questions that neither the Trump administration nor, especially, its NATO partners have been able to answer clearly. What is the ultimate fate of the Ukraine project, which under Biden became the main stumbling block in dialogue between Moscow and the Euro-Atlantic bloc? Are Kiev’s patrons prepared to meet the conditions outlined by President Vladimir Putin at the expanded meeting of the Russian Foreign Ministry Board in 2024? Finally, is the American side genuinely open to dialogue on European security issues, including Russia’s concerns regarding NATO expansion? Much also remains unclear with respect to the sanctions against Russia, which were easy to impose but extremely difficult to lift – especially in light of the constraints the White House imposed on itself during Trump’s first term (e.g., the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which became the foundation of US sanctions policy and significantly expanded Congress’s authority on this issue1).
Moreover, the American establishment still contains numerous advocates of a hard-line anti-Russian stance. These individuals can be found on Capitol Hill, in various government agencies, and, of course, in the media and NGOs. Just as in the second half of the 2010s, they will do all they can to disrupt any groundwork for restoring dialogue between the two countries.
This distinctive picture, despite the positive tone of initial contacts at the presidential and ministerial levels, may give the impression that it is futile to hope for long-term and stable agreements with Washington. But the reality is much more nuanced and ambiguous. Yes, one must not harbor inflated expectations about contacts with the US. For many representatives of the Russian leadership – as well as for broad segments of the population – the experience of post-Soviet communication with the US has been quite sobering. Nevertheless, such communication remains necessary. Of course, at the core of this dialogue must be issues of strategic stability. Chief among them is the issue of arms control, which the American side seems to have consistently ignored for a long time (the first Trump administration contributed to the deterioration of the situation in this area). The last remaining pillar of the corresponding treaty system, the New START treaty, is soon to become a thing of the past. Meanwhile, with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, we are witnessing stronger voices of support in the US for an arms race, spurred on by the lobbying efforts of the military-industrial complex (including entities close to the Trump team). For several years now, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the two countries – one that, even in theory, would inevitably escalate into a catastrophic exchange of nuclear strikes – has been discussed and considered in all seriousness.2
For many Americans – including influential Republicans – the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” seems to have lost its former relevance and inviolability. We are not in a position to reverse this trend, especially since Trump’s proposals to significantly cut military spending triggered an extremely wary response even within his own party, and any attempts to implement them will face fierce resistance. Nonetheless, maintaining constant communication channels that could steer the world away from the brink of a fatal scenario – one that could result from an accident or a misunderstanding – is of vital importance.
Sooner or later, especially as China’s nuclear arsenal grows (if, indeed, Beijing has set such a goal, which Western observers believe to be the case3), the issue of a framework for agreements on strategic weapons – not necessarily their elimination, but at least their limitation – may return to the international agenda. We must be prepared for such a development and for the resumption of serious discussions on strategic stability, even if this occurs only in the distant future, by regularly checking for changes in opinion and monitoring relevant debates across the ocean.
It is equally important to have the ability to engage [with the US] on the resolution of regional crises. The conflict in Ukraine, which is far from over, was provoked by the unwillingness of the Obama administration and the first Trump team to take seriously the issue of Kiev’s compliance with the Minsk agreements. The situation seemed to be deliberately driven into a dead end, even though there were numerous opportunities for a diplomatic resolution. As a result, under Biden, the Ukraine conflict for the first time in a long while made discussions about a direct military clash between Russia and NATO seem realistic. This is hardly accidental.
The path to global catastrophe can begin with minor or seemingly localized processes. Effective de-escalation requires the parties to have mechanisms for the immediate exchange of information. Moreover, new flashpoints could emerge in various parts of the world. Consider North Korea, which Trump ultimately failed to pacify: Any hypothetical crisis involving this state could escalate exponentially, and given the treaty obligations between Moscow and Pyongyang, Russia’s involvement in such a conflict would become a matter of time. The situation around Taiwan is no less explosive, especially given that many in the new administration support a maximal military buildup to counter China. Some in the administration seriously hope that Moscow and Beijing can be artificially split,4 following a scenario reminiscent of 50 years ago, but such views are profoundly mistaken and shortsighted. If there is ever a real possibility of direct confrontation between the US and China, Russia will clearly not be a neutral party and will not forget the helping hand extended by China after the start of [Russia’s] Special Military Operation [in Ukraine].
Other volatile situations are also possible. Take the Middle East: Significant elements of the pro-Israel lobby and right-wing Republicans have long sought to push Trump toward launching a direct strike on Iran. These efforts may now intensify, especially amid the euphoria of the anti-Iran “hawks” following events in Lebanon and Syria. A potential US-Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities has every chance of destabilizing the Middle East entirely and testing the strength of the Moscow-Tehran relationship. If we look at the Cold War experience, we can see how quickly Middle Eastern crises brought nuclear powers to the brink of confrontation. Similar threats arose during the events of both 1956 and 1973. If anyone in Washington assumes that Russia would remain indifferent to the fate of a key regional partner, then such illusions are fraught with the emergence of highly risky situations.
Troubling developments may also arise in other parts of the world – in Africa, where competition among the great powers over the control of natural resources is intensifying; in Latin America, which is slipping out from under Washington’s umbrella and where new crises akin to the Venezuela scenario, artificially instigated by the US, are likely; or, for example, in the Arctic, whose growing strategic importance prompted Trump to raise the “Greenland question.” In each of these cases, de-escalation will require a clear set of understandable and tangible mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms will need to be created literally from scratch, even despite the extremely amicable tone between the two leaders.
Of course, even in the most difficult times, official diplomatic channels play the leading role. Despite all the dramatic events of recent years, interaction between embassies and foreign ministries – though limited – has been preserved. Unfortunately, as the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio has admitted, the current conditions do not allow diplomatic personnel to function fully. Both sides – the American side deliberately and proactively, and ours in reciprocal response – have reduced the work of ambassadors and their staff to technical matters related to the functioning of diplomatic missions. It must be noted that to tackle more complex tasks, diplomats must operate in an entirely different atmosphere. The harassment, expulsions of personnel, humiliating restrictions, and the unlawful seizure of property that the Russian Embassy in the US faced were designed to create absolutely unbearable working conditions, accompanied by the constant hyping of Russophobic hysteria in the media.
Even during the Cold War – for instance, in 1962, when our countries came closer than ever to nuclear confrontation – it was Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who had access to the highest levels of American power, who helped de-escalate tensions and guide both sides toward constructive engagement.5 He also helped break the deadlock during the Reagan administration, which pursued a highly confrontational anti-Soviet policy in the early 1980s. The ambassador’s ability – and that of his subordinates – to maneuver within the American political space helped to find unconventional solutions to the most acute situations, in part thanks to the willingness of lawmakers, officials, and journalists to listen to diplomats from the Soviet Union.
In today’s environment, where employees of our embassy have for years been constrained by various discriminatory measures, and where any interaction with them has been rendered toxic by anti-Russian forces, a swift breakthrough is unlikely. And without real, practical changes – not just words – Washington should not expect any gratuitous goodwill gestures regarding American diplomats in Moscow.
There is another important point. Although the results of high-level agreements will naturally take priority, it is up to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department to implement them – and many opponents of de-escalation remain within the American foreign policy establishment and other government agencies, including entrenched anti-Trump elements. These actors will do everything they can to sabotage the restoration of diplomatic missions in the hope that in four years an antithesis of the current president will come to power in Washington.
At the same time, the emerging window of opportunity could be used to revive other forms of dialogue. The goal is not to achieve grand accomplishments or to transform world politics, but rather to change the extremely heavy, negative atmosphere in bilateral relations (anti-Russian sentiment in the US remains exceptionally high). For example, for the first time in a long while, contacts between civil society organizations – so-called “people’s diplomacy” – might be revived. While its potential is admittedly limited, in difficult periods of the 20th century it allowed channels for exchanging ideas and positive signals to remain open.
By the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, bilateral cooperation between NGOs had been paralyzed by aggressive US actions, to which Moscow was forced to respond accordingly. It was Washington that practically shut down joint scientific, cultural, and sports events – initiatives that, even amid the sharpest ideological confrontations, had always helped to revitalize communication between our countries.
An exchange of initial visits by relevant delegations (with the understanding that in the US, Russian representatives will face a smear campaign coordinated by the Ukrainian-Baltic lobby) would help the citizens of both countries stop viewing each other solely through the lens of geopolitical confrontation. It is important to note that the ball is entirely in the American court in this matter – it was Washington that for years promoted the idea of “canceling Russia and Russian culture,” organized sanctions against sports federations, and demanded that scholars cease all contact. Without a willingness from the US to lift the blockade in these areas, they will remain frozen, a condition to which the Russian public has already adapted.
Expert dialogue remains a separate area – one that for many years served as the backbone of so-called Track II diplomacy between our countries. More than half a century ago, international affairs specialists from the USSR and the US began targeted exchanges of opinion on the parameters for “détente” and a way out of the deadlock on strategic stability. A pivotal role in these processes was played by the unique team of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for US and Canadian Studies, led by Academician Georgy Arbatov. His successor, the recently deceased Academician Sergey Rogov – under whose leadership the authors of this article had the honor of working – became a key figure in unofficial contacts with American analysts during the post-Soviet period, producing particularly valuable results in preserving the arms control system.6
Rogov, together with other Russian scholars, played an outstanding role in promoting among Washington elites the idea of a “reset” and, more specifically, the ratification of the New START treaty, despite opposition from the military-industrial lobby. Following in Arbatov’s footsteps, he nurtured a cohort of prominent experts on all aspects of American political life, many of whom were held in high regard by the US academic community – even when they took sharply critical positions toward Washington. Of course, subsequent events have pushed the dialogue back by years, but the ties between Russian and American experts that had been built since Soviet times continue to serve as a kind of foundation from which Moscow and Washington can try to halt the hybrid war.
Formally, experts have much more room for creative maneuver than official representatives and a significantly broader range of topics they can discuss, but this dialogue is effective only when its participants engage in trusted interactions with government authorities. Unfortunately, the American side has done much to limit this effectiveness. Many US think tanks have turned into overt lobbies funded by military-industrial corporations and sometimes by foreign states and individuals – including Ukrainian oligarchs.7 Their reports and articles have increasingly become either propaganda aimed at justifying the White House’s Russophobic stance or political manifestos calling for increased pressure on Moscow, including steps toward provoking the disintegration of Russia.
Naturally, any discussion with such pseudo-experts has lost its meaning, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has rightly imposed restrictions on many of them. At the same time, American specialists who remained moderate and relatively objective have faced ostracism from colleagues, politicians, and journalists, and have been accused of “working for the Kremlin.” They have lost the ability to present their views to Congress, the White House, or the broader public.
For their part, Russian experts were labeled toxic, and any willingness to interact with them automatically rendered potential American interlocutors “unreliable.” As a result, all expert communication has been reduced to isolated, sporadic contacts, mostly maintained by veterans of the field, including the late Rogov and his long-standing American counterparts. With the passing of Sergey Rogov – whose personal enthusiasm sustained much of this area – the last threads of such communication, stretching back to the 1960s and 1970s, have come to the brink of breaking.
The change of administration in the US has created an opportunity to turn the page. As the position of Trump supporters has strengthened within the American expert community, a new layer of specialists espousing unconventional approaches to global processes has begun to emerge. Gradually, these figures – unlike the old guard – are gaining access to brainstorming sessions in the National Security Council and the State Department. The most prominent think tank of this kind is the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), a key intellectual platform that generates recommendations for the Trump team. It was there, in fact, that the so-called Kellogg-Fleitz plan for Ukrainian settlement appeared last year.8 While the document itself was underdeveloped and failed to take Russia’s position into account, the willingness of the future president’s circle to begin crafting even preliminary proposals for resolving the issue could cautiously be seen as a positive sign.
Today, one of the co-authors of that plan, Keith Kellogg – who, incidentally, cannot be described as a dove or sympathetic to Russia – has been appointed Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine. It is clear that he will rely on the groundwork of his former team, in which a key figure remains Fred Fleitz, former NSC chief of staff who now oversees the foreign policy division at AFPI. Although neither he nor his associates are guided by Russian concerns and instead proceed purely from the self-seeking national interests of the US, their views could be considered a breath of fresh air compared to the globalist mantras of liberal think tanks.
Other organizations are also of interest, such as American Compass, another project supporting Trump in developing original initiatives and solutions. This institution is more focused on domestic and economic policy and analyzes foreign policy issues through the lens of those domestic concerns. Its consultants include former attorney general Jeff Sessions and former US trade representative Robert Lighthizer from Trump’s first administration. Since the previous Trump presidency, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies has also enjoyed a certain degree of authority within his team. Known for its hawkish positions, this institute nonetheless strongly opposes the liberal interventionism of Democratic policymakers and experts who support them.
The Marathon Initiative, founded by Elbridge Colby, the new deputy secretary of defense for policy, will likely acquire significant influence. Along with his associates, Colby is promoting the idea of redirecting American presence toward the Asia-Pacific region.9 Older Republican think tanks like the Heritage Foundation – which continues to engage with the administration – should not be discounted either, though they do not enjoy the same level of trust from the White House as the aforementioned institutions, and they tend to focus more on domestic issues without offering fundamentally new approaches to international affairs.
It is essential to clearly understand that if contacts with any American experts are to be resumed, they must be conducted with the utmost caution and be based on the a priori awareness that there are no pro-Russian forces among the influential figures on the other side. Nevertheless, exchanging views, conveying objective information about each side’s perspectives and intentions, and holding frank discussions about the fundamental problems in the relationship – this is the sort of dialogue that can help puncture the information bubble into which the American political class has been driven for many years by opponents of Russia.
Expert-level interaction may be difficult and fraught with setbacks and disappointments, but it is necessary – at least to partially restore conditions that would allow Moscow and Washington to return to constructive dialogue. Just as in the 1960s, this work will, in many ways, need to start from scratch. But it is our duty – including in honor of our distinguished predecessors who believed in the creative potential of bilateral cooperation – not to stand still but to seek out options for the safe and peaceful coexistence of the two superpowers.
NOTES:
1 Timofeyev I.N. “Politika sanktsy v zakonoproyektakh Kongressa SShA,” RSMD, December 12, 2023.
2 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the US. Hearing Held November 15, 2023.
3 Shizuka Kuramitsu. “Pentagon Says Chinese Nuclear Arsenal Still Growing,” Arms Control Association, January/February 2025.
4 “Trump said he will divide Russia from China. It’s a tough bromance to break,” November 7, 2024, Business Insider.
5 “Pamyati A.F. Dobrynina (1919-2010),” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 4 (2010).
6 Lukin V.P. “Iskra ISKRAN,” Kommersant, February 11, 2025.
7 “Big Ideas and Big Money: Think Tank Funding in America,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, January 3, 2025.
8 “America First, Russia, & Ukraine,” AFPI, April 11, 2024.
9 Colby E. The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. Yale Univ. Press, 2023.