Abstract. The year 2023 has seen a noticeable intensification of Russian-North Korean interaction, confirmed by the active exchange of mutual visits. In summer 2023, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Pyongyang; in September, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Vladivostok and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin; and in October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov went to the DPRK.

After a pause due to the coronavirus pandemic, representatives of both countries met in person again to probe ways to develop bilateral relations under new political conditions. Both Moscow and Pyongyang are worried by the prospect of the emergence of an alliance of the US, the Republic of Korea, and Japan in Northeast Asia. Moreover, practical cooperation must be raised to a level conforming to the level of interaction of neighboring countries that have close foreign policy positions. The parties also continue to think about what forms their further political communication may take.

Today, Russia complies with the sanctions imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council but strongly opposes the introduction of any new restrictions. The search for accessible and beneficial cooperation formats will evidently be quite difficult and may include projects related to logistics, tourism, and other areas. At the same time, it is highly improbable that Russia is receiving or planning to receive weapons from the DPRK, as Western countries are claiming.

Now, in an atmosphere of growing confrontation, the DPRK is striving to achieve consolidation with its traditional associates, but this does not mean that the country would not further diversify its ties with the outside world, given the opportunity. Russia should use the opening window of opportunity to give substance to relations with its close neighbor.

The year 2023 was marked by a noticeable intensification of Russian-North Korean contact at the highest level. Amid the DPRK’s political support for Russia’s actions, this became a natural continuation of the progress that emerged in 2022 in the traditionally friendly relations of Moscow and Pyongyang.1 Nevertheless, it was somewhat unexpected that North Korea lifted some of the strict restrictions introduced as far back as 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic2 and allowed the arrivals and departures of delegations.

Even before the direct contacts, the sides continued exchanging words of support in their public statements. For example, in early 2023, the Russian press widely quoted the statement of the North Korean leader’s sister Kim Yo Jong3 that the DPRK would always “stand in the same trench” with Russia.4 Military language is typical of North Korean political discourse, but the words must not be taken literally: This is not about any direct military assistance or the transfer of ammunition to Moscow. It is primarily an expression of support, and the DPRK has a right to expect Russia’s gratitude, but at the same time, one should keep in mind that the statement implies inviting Russia to the North Korean “trench.”

The most remarkable events in bilateral ties occurred in the summer and fall of 2023. In July, Pyongyang was visited by high-profile delegations from Russia and China for the celebration of the “70th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic Liberation War,”5 which is what the DPRK calls the armistice in the Korean War of 1950-1953. The Russian delegation was led by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, and the Chinese delegation’s leader was Li Hongzhong, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee.

Although the North Korean press observed the rule of formal parity in the number of articles devoted to both delegations, there was nevertheless an impression that more attention was garnered by the visit of the Russian minister than the arrival of the main Chinese guest, who had a higher status.

The authorities of the DPRK did not fail to use the chance to demonstrate their new military inventions and research findings. For example, the North Korean leader led Shoigu around an exhibition of armaments.6 The foreign delegations also attended a military parade, where North Korean missiles were shown.7 Certainly, the very fact of the delegations’ presence cannot be considered a consequence of the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s “abolition,” much less a recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status, as some observers hastened to announce.8 Otherwise, the visit by American experts to North Korean uranium enrichment plants in 2010 should also be interpreted as recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status by the US.9

Nonetheless, the presence of high-level guests from major powers at the military parade was a significant political achievement for the DPRK and another occasion to demonstrate the country’s new inventions and research findings to the outside world. Among exhibits shown during the event were the newest unmanned aerial vehicles and the new Hwasong-18long-range solid-propellant missile.10 The missile was demonstrated in 2023 and tested again two weeks before the celebrations.

Shoigu’s visit precipitated another outburst of groundless speculations about “clandestine” military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. In particular, the Western press and officials started accusing Russia of allegedly receiving artillery rounds from the DPRK. The main political purpose of such statements is to foster the impression that Russia is failing to achieve the planned goals and, in violation of the imposed sanctions, requesting assistance from odious states (in the West’s opinion). It is astounding that in Russia, badly informed individuals who associate themselves with patriotic circles repeat these speculations, fueling them further.

The makers and disseminators of such insinuations ignore the obvious facts: The DPRK is not planning to enter the European conflict, and Russia also opposes its internationalization. Pyongyang can hardly afford to “give away” weapons, especially given the acute situation on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, North Korean armaments are mostly outdated (incidentally, this is the reason for Pyongyang’s nuclear experiments), and new weapon models are not tested in combat; they are hardly produced on a massive scale and are too valuable for North Korea itself.

The logistical aspect remains unclear: Until recently, Russia’s border with the DPRK was tightly closed. Cargo rail service between Russia and the DPRK was resumed only in late 2022, and in very limited volumes.11 Even assuming that Russia needs such deliveries, they would take too long to get to the combat zone – the Russian military-industrial complex could manufacture and deliver its own products in the same amount of time or less.12

The explanations offered by those leveling the accusations have been changing for the last two years. At first, there was talk about direct deliveries of artillery ammunition13; then, about deliveries via third countries in the Middle East14; and then, about deliveries to a private military company.15 It followed from statements made in August-September 2023 that Russia was only “negotiating” about deliveries during the exchange of high-level and top-level visits, although both before and after the contacts those same foreign observers claimed that the deliveries had been made long before.16 For example, in November, South Korea announced that there had already been “10 deliveries.”17 Such discrepancies prove that those making these statements do not possess any credible information. The goal of such publications is purely political – maintaining a constant backdrop of condemnation without caring much about its coherence.

Historically, the DPRK has been a recipient of Soviet and Russian assistance, not a donor. Today, the situation has not changed: President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials emphasize that Russia may render military assistance to North Korea if South Korea starts supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine.18 This diplomatic lever of influence is quite important and much more valuable than any hypothetical deliveries from the DPRK.

Demonstrating the potential for military cooperation is beneficial to both Pyongyang and Moscow, and in this sense, the exchange of visits is a timely, effective, and impressive diplomatic step by both sides, causing their regional opponents to give it some thought. Among other things, this may be perceived as a distinctive response to the visit of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to Kyiv this summer.19

In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un went to Russia on his first visit abroad following the coronavirus pandemic. The current period is an opportune time for strengthening ties with Moscow: Russia is grateful to Pyongyang for political support, and the DPRK, while emerging from its “self-isolation,” may get new opportunities in the international arena.

Indeed, the tone of the relations has changed. For example, for the first time after the collapse of the USSR, North Koreans started using the word “comrade” when addressing the leader of our country. Diplomatic protocol of the DPRK “reserves” this term exclusively for leaders of socialist states,20 whereas the adopted form of address to leaders of “capitalist” states is “Your Excellency.” The traditional exchange of gifts contained a clear allusion to the rumors being spread regarding the “arms deal”: The leaders gave each other carbines produced in their own countries.21

Kim Jong Un’s trip to the Russian Far East, where he had met Putin back in 2019,22 may have been aimed at finding a response to the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo “triangle” that is being established. This grouping has been strengthened in recent years and is oriented not only against China, but also against North Korea, while being at least unfriendly toward Russia. In August 2023, shortly before the North Korean leader’s visit, Joe Biden, Yoon Suk Yeol, and Kishida Fumio made a joint statement at Camp David about their countries’ close trilateral cooperation on security ranging from economic to defense security. The text of that statement mentions Russia, China, and the DPRK among the threats that the “triangle” is to counteract.23

In this connection, it is difficult to believe that during the Russian-North Korean negotiations there could be talk about concluding a military alliance. Moscow and Pyongyang have been allies from 1961 until the early 1990s, and by the 2000s, the ties were reformatted into friendly and good neighborly relations without obligations to render military assistance.24 Present-day Russia is not inclined to conclude bilateral treaties of alliance (even in case of quite close Russian-Chinese relations) and proceeds from the premise that broad collective security formats are preferable (for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). The DPRK, on the contrary, is trying to avoid joining collective formats and attending collective meetings where Pyongyang would be not the main character but one of the participants. It is worth noting that the Russian-North Korean summit conference was held almost at the same time as the Eastern Economic Forum, but Kim Jong Un did not attend the forum. As for the military alliance with China, Pyongyang has retained it since 1961, and these relations are unlikely to be reformatted, despite periodic uncertainty in these bilateral ties.25

In September 2023, Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia’s stance toward the sanctions has not changed. This does not mean that Moscow will stop implementing them, but it will oppose any new restrictions on Pyongyang.26 Judging by the voting sessions in the UN Security Council, this decision was actually taken in the spring of 2022,27 but it was for a good reason that it was officially announced for the first time just before the arrival of the North Korean guest. During Kim Jong Un’s visit, Putin emphasized that in regard to the sanctions already imposed, Moscow intended to behave as a responsible member of the UN Security Council, whereas the documents already adopted left some room for cooperation even in the military field.28

This is in fact the case. For instance, joint military exercises are not prohibited by the UN Security Council sanctions. Cooperation on satellite technologies is not limited, either, despite the ban on launches of North Korean ballistic missiles. In this respect, it is significant that Kim Jong Un visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome, where he became acquainted with and showed a keen interest in Russian space inventions and research findings.29 It should be noted that Seoul has heeded the arguments put forward by Moscow, although South Koreans are monitoring the development of the Russian-North Korean ties with some caution.

In October 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Pyongyang and met his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui and the leader of the DPRK.30 The visit was aimed at continuing political dialogue, which might also include a return visit by Putin to North Korea.

The Russian minister’s statements in Pyongyang included words about the importance of negotiations without any preconditions on the Korean Peninsula.31 The South Korean press used this inoffensive phrase and came to the preposterous conclusion that Russia was thus declaring its recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status and calling for talks with due account of this factor.32

Nevertheless, this statement by Lavrov appears quite significant. Although the Global North and Global South do not need any mediators for communicating, forcing our country out of broader discussions of the situation on the peninsula is inadmissible. A peaceful settlement of disputed issues by the neighbors is in our vital interest. A very alarming signal is the words by North Korean Defense Minister Kang Sun-nam about the inevitability of a nuclear war on the peninsula – the question is only who will start it and when, the minister said confidently.33 Russia is hardly interested in a nuclear conflict near its borders.

At the current stage of evolution of the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem, negotiations have receded into the background, while the North and the South have entered a new phase of confrontation.34 It is clear that denuclearization (whether of the Korean Peninsula or the DPRK), which was declared a goal during the talks of the 1990s and 2000s, is not a realistic objective under present-day conditions. But it is by far not the only option for further discussions. It is quite possible to hope for talks on the nuclear problem to transform into a dialogue on arms control.35 Such a model is beneficial to Russia, since it implies a reduction of the regional military potential of an alliance that is unfriendly toward our country.

After the bad experience of communicating with Donald Trump, Kim Jong Un grew disappointed in the idea of negotiating with the US.36 But this does not mean that bilateral US-North Korean contacts will never resume; they will, if Washington changes its stance (for example, in mid-2023, Biden unexpectedly proposed to Pyongyang to conduct direct negotiations without preliminary conditions37) or if Trump returns to power in 2024. Today, this may seem paradoxical, but one should not forget that the long-term foreign policy goal of North Korean diplomacy since the 1990s has been to establish relations with the US, and this goal has hardly changed.38 And if, contrary to expectations, such discussions really start, Russia must not stay on the sidelines.

Now one of the main objectives for the Russian side is to find opportunities to develop economic ties with the DPRK. The resumed meetings of the bilateral intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation are devoted to searching for possible options in this respect.39

Over the past several decades, the international isolation of North Korea has deepened as the sanctions regime imposed on Pyongyang because of its nuclear activity intensified. And then, during the coronavirus pandemic, the DPRK “isolated itself” by tightly shutting its borders.40 At the moment, North Korea has retained practical cooperation in any significant volume only with the PRC – and this situation is hardly considered beneficial by Pyongyang. Revitalization of North Korean diplomatic activities with Russia may be a sign of attempts to change the situation.

At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that the volume of our mutual trade was steadily declining even before sectoral sanctions were imposed in 2016. The experience of the early 2010s shows that even the interests of the state and business are not enough to drive the cooperation from the deadlock.41 To begin with, consideration should be given to returning to at least the prepandemic level. Here there are enough tools even within the framework of strict sanctions. In particular, it is necessary to pay attention to infrastructure projects – the construction of a vehicular bridge across the Tumen River and the intensification of the operation of the Khasan-Rajin (aka Rason) logistics corridor.42

So-called people-to-people exchanges are also extremely important. Tourism can be both a beneficial economic sector (which incidentally is beyond the scope of the sanctions) and a tool for bringing the people of both countries closer together, and the DPRK has rich recreational resources. Another important aspect is exchange visits by students and scientists. Although such visits were quite frequent before the pandemic, restoring this practice is still out of question. In 2023, North Korea’s airline company resumed direct flights from Vladivostok,43 but so far this relates more to evacuation flights for North Koreans. The impression is that for now the coronavirus restrictions are lifted only for exchanges of official delegations.

* * *

North Korean diplomacy is extremely pragmatic, despite featuring strong ideological components. Now, amid the growing confrontation, Pyongyang is striving to bolster ties with its traditional associates, but this does not mean that North Korea will not use an opportunity to further diversify its ties with the outside world, should such an opportunity arise. Historically, North Korean ideological commitment has never worked against pan-Korean pragmatism, even in harder times.

Diplomats in both North and South Korea are clearly monitoring the situation on the peninsula and not forgetting about the ongoing inter-Korean confrontation (which could be called a rivalry in more peaceable times). In this sense, Russia, which maintains relations historically with both Pyongyang and Seoul, is in an advantageous position. It is important for Russia to develop ties with all of its neighbors for its own benefit, especially now when it is necessary to use all possible tools to protect Russian national interests.


1. For more detail, see: I.V. Dyachkov, “Russia’s Relations with the Korean Peninsula States in the New Reality,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2023), pp. 1-16.

2. For more detail, see: I.V. Dyachkov, Bor’ba s pandemiyey koronavirusa v Respublike Koreya i KNDR [Struggle Against the Coronavirus Pandemic in the Republic of Korea and the DPRK]. Vostochnaya Aziya: proshloye, nastoyashcheye, budushcheye [Eastern Asia: Past, Present, and Future]. IKSA RAN [Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences], Moscow, 2022, pp. 287-297.

3. Hereinafter, Korean words are written following practical transcription rules.

4. 김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화발표. 조선중앙통신 [Press statement by Kim Yo Jong, Deputy Department Director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea]. CTAK. January 27, 2023. URL: http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/ 520f9be9dfa8657c0a077ee1f62103543 fe15e8dec5c66d60987040 649347413fb8c173485025826288cb316ac36096ab95f0b7 2df99c0407009667a986c251b.kcmsf (retrieved on November 19, 2023).

5. A gala concert took place on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic Liberation War. Esteemed Comrade Kim Jong Un, together with missions of friendship visiting Pyongyang, watched the gala concert. Uri Minzokkiri. July 27, 2023. URL: http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?lang=rus&ptype=cforev&stype=2&ctype=3&mtype=view&no=48352 (retrieved on August 19, 2023).

6. 경애하는 김정은동지께서 전승 70돐을 맞으며 로씨야련방 국방상 쎄르게이 쇼이구동지와 함께 무장장비전시회장을 돌아보시였다 [On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Victory, Beloved and Esteemed Comrade Kim Jong Un Examined the Exhibition Together with the Russian Defense Minister Comrade Sergey Shoygu]. Uri Minzokkiri. July 27, 2023. URL: http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype= crevo4&stype=4&mtype=view&no=10558 (retrieved on November 14, 2023).

7. 위대한 조국해방전쟁승리 70돐경축 열병식 성대히 거행 [A Military Parade Was Ceremoniously Held on the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic Liberation War]. Uri Minzokkiri. July 28, 2023. URL: http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=crevo4&stype=4&mtype=view&no=10579 (retrieved on August 20, 2023).

8. A. Lankov, Conspicuous Cooperation: Why Shoigu Made a Show of Buying Arms from North Korea. NK News. August 1, 2023. URL: https://www.nknews.org/2023/08/conspicuous-cooperation-why-shoigu-made-a-show-of-buying-arms-from-north-korea (retrieved on August 20, 2023).

9. I.V. Dyachkov, “Nyemirny atom” Severo-Vostochnoy Azii: koryeyskiy uzel [“Non-Peaceful Atom” of Northeast Asia: The Korean Knot]. MGIMO University, Moscow, 2016, p. 185.

10. Brief on July 27, 2023 Parade of the DPRK. Open Nuclear Network. August 8, 2023. URL: https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-27-july-2023-parade-dprk (retrieved on November 14, 2023).

11. Russia’s Ambassador to the DPRK Refutes Allegations about Pyongyang Supplying Weapons for the Wagner Private Military Company. RBC. February 8, 2023. URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/02/2023/63da4ad59a7947eb59f1c579 (retrieved on November 14, .2023).

12. The Issue of Military Deliveries to Russia Will Not Be Discussed in Vladivostok. IKSA RAN [Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences].September 7, 2023.URL: https://www.ifes-ras.ru/ru-RU/news/1558 (retrieved on November 14, 2023).

13. Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to US The New York Times. September 5, 2022. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html (retrieved on November 15, 2023).

14. North Korea covertly supplying Russia with artillery rounds, US says. The Washington
November 2, 2022. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/02/ north-korea-russia-weapons-ukraine (retrieved on November 15, 2023).

15. N. Korea has offered arms to Russia’s military group Wagner: US Yonhap News. December 23, 2022. URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AENo.20221223000651325 (retrieved on 15.11.2023.)

16. North Korea provided Russia with weapons, White House says. The Washington Post. October 13, 2023. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/13/ north-korea-russia-weapons-ukraine (retrieved on November 15, 2023).

17. North Korea sends Putin tons of ammo. Europe can’t do the same for Ukraine. Politico. November 2, 2023. https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-russia-pyongyang-beats-brussels-to-a-million-ammunition-rounds (retrieved on November 15, 2023).

18. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Prezident Rossii [President of Russia]. October 27, 2022. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 (retrieved on November 20, 2022).

19. Yoon makes surprise visit to Ukraine. Yonhap News. July 15, 2023. URL: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AENo.20230715001251315 (retrieved on November 15, 2023).

20. Official Dinner Given in Honor of Kim Jong Un, President of the State Affairs of the DPRK. Prezident Rossii [President of Russia]. September 13, 2023. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72266 (retrieved on November 20, 2023.)

21. Peskov Reported on the Gifts Exchanged by V. Putin and Kim Jong Un. RIA Novosti. September 14, 2023. https://ria.ru/20230914/podarki-1896321173.html (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

22. A.V. Torkunov, Sovremennaya Koreya: metamorfozy turbulentnykh let (2008 – 2020gg.) [Contemporary Korea: metamorphoses of the turbulent years (2008-2020)] / A.V. Torkunov, G.D. Toloraya, I.V. Dyachkov. Prosveshcheniye Publishers, Moscow, 2021, pp. 347-353.

23. The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. The White House. August 18, 2023. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

24. A.V. Torkunov, Koreyskiy poluostrov: metamorfozy poslevoyennoy istorii [The Korean Peninsula: Metamorphoses of the Post-War History] / A.V. Torkunov, V.I. Denisov, Vl. F. Li. OLMA Media Group, Moscow, 2008, pp. 273, 446-450.

25. see [9], pp. 113-114.

26. Response of S.V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, to a Question from the Program “Moscow. Kremlin. Putin” Asked on September 13, 2023. MID Rossii [Russian Foreign Ministry]. September 13, 2023. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/video/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/1904163 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

27. K.V. Asmolov, Vperyod, k opasnoy cherte? Ili v novy miroporyadok? [Forward to the Red Line? Or to a New World Order?] NEO. June 14, 2022. URL: https://ru.journal-neo.org/2022/06/14/vpered-k-opasnoj-cherte-ili-v-novy-j-miroporyadok (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

28. Putin: The Russian Federation Abides by the UN Sanctions against the DPRK, But There Are Prospects for Military Technological Cooperation. TASS. September 13, 2023. URL: https://tass.ru/politika/18741163 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

29. Visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome. Prezident Rossii [President of Russia]. September 13, 2023. URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72264 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

30. On the Official Visit of S.V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. MID Rossii [Russian Foreign Ministry]. October 19, 2023. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/ press_service/vizity-ministra/1910209 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

31. Speech and Answers to Questions from the Mass Media by S.V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Press Conference for Summarizing the Results of the Visit to the DPRK, Pyongyang, October 19, 2023. MID Rossii [Russian Foreign Ministry]. 19.10.2023. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/vizity-ministra/1910193 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

32. 러 외무 “한반도 협상 지지”…’북핵 불가역성’ 우회 인정 우려 [The Russian Foreign Minister: “We Support Holding Talks on the Korean Peninsula…” It Causes Concern That He Implicitly Admits the “Irreversibility of the North Korean Atomic Capability”]. Yonhap News. October 19, 2023. URL: https://m.yna.co.kr/view/ AKR20231019138500504?section=international/all (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

33. Pyongyang Is Convinced of Inevitability of a Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula. RIA Novosti. August 15, 2023. URL: https://ria.ru/20230815/voyna-1890258337.html (retrieved on August 20, 2023.)

34. Strany Vostoka vo vneshnyey politike Rossii [Oriental Countries in Russian Foreign Policy] / edited by D.V. Streltsov, K.A. Yefremova. Aspekt Press Publishers, Moscow, 2023. pp. 298-301.

35. Park Jongchul. Characteristics of the Korean Peninsula Arms Control Model and Its Gradual Implementation. The Journal of East Asian Affairs,Vol. 33, # 2, 2020, pp. 109-112.

36. G. Toloraya, Otvyetny khod Kim Chen Yna: poslaniye opponentam [Countermove Made by Kim Jong Un: Message to Opponents]. RSMD. April 15, 2019. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/otvetnyy-khod-kim-chen-yna-poslanie-opponentam (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

37. Biden Trying to Meet North Korean Leader Without Preconditions: Official. Kyodo News. August 18, 2023. URL: https://english.kyodonews.net/ news/2023/08/2de97424290e-update1-biden-trying-to-meet-n-korean-leader-without-preconditions-official.html (retrieved on August 20, 2023).

38. G. Bulychyov, Koreyskaya problema v treugol’nike SShA – Kitay – Rossiya [The Korean Problem in the USA – China – Russia Triangle]. RSMD. July 27, 2021. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/koreyskaya-problema-v-treugolnike-ssha-kitay-rossiya (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

39. Mass Media: Co-Chairpersons of the Intergovernmental Commission of the RF and the DPRK Hold Talks in Pyongyang. TASS. November 16, 2023. URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19297449 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

40. “Aziatskiy povorot” v rossiyskoy vnyeshnyey politike: Dostizheniya, problemy, perspektivy [“Pivot to Asia” in Russian Foreign Policy: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects] / edited by A.V. Torkunov, D.V. Strel’tsov, Ye.V. Koldunova. Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2022, pp. 74-75, 77.

41. P. Leshakov, A. Solovyov, Serdechno, no muchitel’no. Rossiya – KNDR: perspektivy ekonomicheskogo vzaimosyeystviya [Heartily, but Painfully. Russia – DPRK: Prospects of Economic Interaction]. Rossiya v global’noy politike [Russia in Global Politics], # 2, 2023. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/serdechno-no-muchitelno (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

42. K.V. Asmolov, L.V. Zakharova, Reshitel’nost’ i akkuratnost’ [Resoluteness and Carefulness]. Rossiya v global’noy politike [Russia in Global Politics], Vol. 21, # 4, 2023, pp. 203-224. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/reshitelnost-i-akkuratnost (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

43. The DPRK Returns the Flight from Pyongyang to Vladivostok – for the First Time after a 3.5-Year Interval. Novosti Vladivostoka na VL.ru. [Vladivostok News at VL.ru] August 21, 2023.URL: https://www.newsvl.ru/vlad/2023/08/21/218973 (retrieved on November 20, 2023).

Translated by Igor Putintsev