Abstract. This paper covers issues of Russia’s national security in the Arctic as viewed from the military perspective. It examines the trends in the development of a reliable defense system for this country. It postulates the importance of greater defense capacity in the Russian Arctic, as NATO relentlessly builds up its military forces next to Russian borders, and the US military infrastructure continues to develop.

The Arctic is part of Russia’s territory that incorporates the Polar Basin and the Arctic Belt including the outskirts of the continent and the adjoining shelf with continental islands.1 The continental dry land segment of Russia’s Arctic Zone (RAZ) totals 4.9 million km2. Islands take up 0.2 million km2. The RAZ shelf and inland seas approximate 4 million km2. The regions of the Russian Arctic are an area of transportation and economic influence of the North Sea Lane (NSL) pushed inland, for several hundred kilometers as a rule, depending on the configuration of the river network and other communication routes connected with the existing and potential NSL freight flows.2

Most populated localities in the RAZ are on the shores of Arctic seas or in their immediate vicinity, and also in the lower reaches of the rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean. A faulty work of sea transport, and of the Arctic transportation system as such, delays in fuel, food, and other supplies to the Arctic owing to a short navigation season can be socially and economically disastrous and so jeopardize people’s existence in the region.3

The RAZ dry land area takes up 29 percent of the RF territory. The RAZ regions have a lot of features in common, including an inclement climate, low population density, remoteness from economic and cultural centers, an underdeveloped transportation network, a raw materials economic bias, and environmental vulnerability.4 At the same time, they differ substantially in terms of economic development levels and creature comforts.

Ensuring national security is the key task that determines the need for Russia to increase its presence in the Arctic Zone. Nature abhors a vacuum, and if the Russian Federation slackens its presence, its place will soon be filled by other more active rivals. And national security is not just about countering military threats; its also has a socioeconomic constituent.5

In order to counter external threats in the Arctic sector the state should conduct the kind of policy that would make for, on the one hand, a system of reliable protection of the country in the area, while on the other, a system of multilateral cooperation with our neighbors.6 It is imperative to raise defense capacity in the Russian Arctic because NATO countries’ military forces continue to gradually build up by the Russian borders, and the United States continues to develop its military infrastructure there. One can view in the same context further deployment of the AMD systems, both ground – and sea-based, next door to Russia’s borders. At the same time, the demands to review the status of the Arctic, list it among the universal heritage of humanity and make it a global resource are increasingly vocal and numerous. Nor can one underestimate the possibility of subversive acts against Russia’s Arctic assets (above all those related to oil and gas extraction) on the part of both terrorist organizations7 and rival countries that can use the consequences of similar acts as a pretext for violating Russia’s sovereignty.

Aware of these threats, Russia should hardly put on a besieged fortress act. Moreover, the Arctic sector can help promote a new detente. Over the last few years, Russia concluded a good few agreements on cooperation in the Arctic in all kinds of spheres – political, economic, and environmental.8 These documents typically make for stabilization and normalization of bilateral or multilateral relations. It is necessary to move away, little by little, from the policy of mutual deterrence with the United States in the military sphere, however zealously our so-called partners might be trying to pursue it; we should propose broad cooperation in Arctic projects, considering Russia’s leading role in the region. This can only be achieved by assiduous work on raising the level of military trust in the Arctic in various sections (e.g., by limiting patrol zones).

Military and diplomatic activity in the Arctic is at present a paramount objective. However, a truly reliable guarantor of national security in the region can only be socioeconomic and infrastructure development, the appearance of efficiently working economic and social assets. It is necessary to provide the kind of conditions in the Arctic Zone that would be enticing for investors and state-private partnership. One of the more attractive trends in this manner of partnership may be activity to create infrastructures ensuring national security and simultaneously developing economic activity.9 For example, nowadays military, transport, and mining companies alike are in need of advanced development and improved systems of space communication, radio communication, and other types of communication and navigation systems. Among the more promising trends can also be a set of issues related to the environment – a cleanup of the Arctic territory, doing away with numerous radioactive waste sites, organizing a system of accident prevention at oil and gas extracting facilities. We should outline such technological trends where both military and civilian organizations could work with a synergistic effect pooling their efforts.

Russia has become the third Arctic power to have developed and presented its own Arctic strategy. The program Basics of the National Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 was approved by the RF President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008 and officially published in 2009.

In 2013, the RF President Vladimir Putin approved a new Development Strategy for the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Provision of National Security until 2020, which is currently the main government document defining Russia’s objectives and tasks in this region. The document, among other things, clearly states the initial postulate of Russia making no space concessions and giving no competition advantages to other states when defining external borders of the Arctic continental shelf.10

In 2009, two more states of the Arctic G8 settled for their northern national priorities. In January 2009, the George Bush Jr. Administration in the United States approved the Homeland Security Presidential Directive on the Arctic Region Policy. That first US state program focused on matters of environmental protection and sustainable economic development of the US Arctic territories (i.e. in fact, the State of Alaska).

In its turn, Iceland’s Foreign Ministry presented an official report-cum-pro-gram Iceland in the Far North in September 2009. Eventually, both these Arctic Council member states devised complementary strategic documents on the Arctic. The United States did so in May 2013, when the new President, Barack Obama, approved the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. US Strategy 2013, named as its three key priorities protection of national interests and provision of the U.S.A. security, responsible management (of Arctic territories), and encouragement of international cooperation.

As for Denmark, its geopolitical prospects in the Arctic in the foreseeable future seem fairly uncertain. The matter is that its formal status of a no-nonsense Arctic state is primarily due to the presence of Greenland within the Kingdom of Denmark (and of the Faroe Islands, but rather less so).

However, Greenland’s political establishment that is known to have made extraction of natural resources the pivot of its long-term plans of becoming an economically independent player in the international arena is unequivocally campaigning for full political independence from Denmark in the long run. Similar separatist trends, as it were, are displayed by the Faroese, but the local authorities, unlike their Greenland counterparts, cannot boast a wealth of mineral resources and have to keep a considerably lower profile, accordingly.

The first few years of the new autonomous self-government authority in office since June 2009, following the referendum held in the previous year, by and large coincided with the positive price dynamics on the world commodity markets. Yet, the program of Greenland politicians promising a mass lease out of bits of continental shelf and several dry-land deposits for a long term, as of 2014. quite soon came up against lack of enthusiasts once the oil market (and other raw material markets in its wake) suddenly crashed.

It is worth noting the official expert report by the leading US Arctic research center published early last year. Its general title is fairly tell-tale: Dark Clouds Gather over Greenland’s Mining Ambitions. The report said that even if the global market situation developed in the most favorable way for Greenland (and for other raw-material producers), the commercial stage of developing its hydrocarbon deposits should not be expected before 10 to 15 years from now. Slightly better prospects, according to US analysts, seem to await Greenland’s ore mining. The local authorities have especially radiant hopes for two rich deposits of rare-earth metals.

But the most serious European player in the Arctic is certainly Norway, and will remain one for a long time to come (many foreign analysts actually give it an honorary second place after Russia in terms of general geopolitical and geoe-conomic importance for the region).

Nor should one overlook the fact that, apart from a fairly large territory of Norway proper located beyond the Polar Circle, the country also has a crucial strategic bridgehead halfway to the North Pole, the Spitsbergen Archipelago. Norway is also awash with hydrocarbon resources contained in its territorial waters; moreover, it is unquestionably the world leader in the area of industrial technologies of oil and gas extraction.

For quite some time, one of Norway’s Arctic policy vectors was building close economic relations with Russia; besides obvious common interests in developing and extracting rich hydrocarbon resources (Norwegian oil and gas and oil servicing companies have long been involved in the work on Russia’s Arctic continental shelf), and in fishing (above all in the Barents Sea), the two countries have joint environmental and infrastructure projects, their frontier trade is developing apace, etc. Largely thanks to Norway Russia, and other Scandinavian countries, started interacting within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). However, following the worsening situation in Ukraine and international sanctions against Russia, the bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia was virtually frozen.

The Arctic is a geopolitical region that borders America, Europe, Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans; it is a vast territory, and the world’s least populated part that has been blessed with considerable strategic reserves of mineral wealth.11 It boasts 30 percent of undiscovered gas reserves, 13 percent of undiscovered oil reserves, and over 30 percent of the world reserves of fresh water. All of that has to be protected by the countries of the Arctic Region.

The Arctic has become a center where the interests of Arctic and non-Arctic states cross. In the last five to ten years, many countries in the region have been displaying a gradually increasing attention to the Arctic on the part of military departments and those in charge of security. This refers not only to the states that are traditionally regarded as Arctic powers (Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway), but also to other countries eager to get a foothold in the area.12 Obviously, as the player-states feel increasingly concerned over the economic and resource prospects of the Arctic Zone, its military and political significance is growing and partly changing as well.

Over the last two to three years, Russia has, therefore, stepped up its presence in the Arctic in various areas. The RF Ministry of Defense, Emergency Situations Ministry, and Federal Security Service are consolidating their position in the Arctic. A new military entity, the North United Strategic Command, was established on the basis of the Northern Fleet and came into operation as of December 1, 2014. Ten combined search-and-rescue Emercom centers were set up within the framework of the Comprehensive Security System for the RF Arctic Population and Territory.

Undoubtedly, the region’s significance for national security has always been considerable. One can single out several factors that make the region so important.

The military-strategic significance of the Arctic stems primarily from the ongoing rivalry between Arctic powers. In particular, Russia and the U.S.A. are still in a state of mutual strategic deterrence (including nuclear). The importance of the region is determined by the following indicators.

Deployment of Russia’s military potential. The Arctic is the base of the Northern Fleet, the most powerful in Russia, that can carry out combat assignments in any part of the world. The Arctic allows the fleet to covertly move into the Ocean. It also houses a considerable portion of the RF nuclear arsenal. The Arctic is more important to Russia in military terms than to any other state because concentrated there is one of the country’s major military potential constituents.

Location of major military-industrial facilities. The Arctic is the site of industrial entities that are strategically important for Russia’s defense capacity, especially in the area of shipbuilding and repairs, complex ore processing, and transportation infrastructure. In the same part of the globe, on Novaya Zemlya, is the nuclear testing ground.

Resources. The Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation is a treasure-trove of both mineral and biological resources. Their protection is vital because there is awareness on the government level that if Russia in the circumstances proves unable to develop the Arctic efficiently, this will have a deeply adverse effect on its economy.

It is, therefore, obvious that the matter of national security in the region is not confined to the military constituent alone, but also includes the social and economic ones. These constituents are closely interconnected.

Nowadays and in the near future, the position of Russia in the Arctic will most likely remain fairly difficult and controversial. Russia does not have allies in the Arctic, nor will acquire any in the foreseeable future. And this country has the longest and insufficiently protected borders, particularly east of the Urals, on the one hand, while on the other, the country’s leadership views the economic development of the region as one of its priorities. This means that building up the potential of economic interests protection, shielding the northern strategic sector, including the North Sea Lane, has practically no alternative.

Alas, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the presence of Russia in the Arctic was reduced several times. Today, as the country is returning to the region, this unnerves our Western partners and provides a pretext for certain members of the Western right-wing political circles and military establishment to cash in on the Russian threat. For example, US National Intelligence chief James Clapper in his 2016 annual report to Congress on global threats to the country’s security mentioned Russia and its growing presence in the Arctic as a major threat to the region.

However, members of other circles, in particular diplomatic ones, tend to be far less alarmist. Thus, the Department of State Special Representative for the Arctic Admiral Robert Papp said, quite rightly, that after Russia’s substantially diminished activity in the Arctic they witnessed after the Cold War, any activity would look like a buildup. Russia was improving its bases and communications, attracting resources. Admiral Papp conceded that this was a legitimate action; after all, one had to have auxiliary infrastructure in one’s own territorial waters. Indeed, Russia was reorganizing its North and Pacific Fleets. But this was its strategic resource, which could be used anywhere in the world. So he didn’t detect any signs of destabilization in the Arctic.

So, our Arctic “partners” are displaying a diversity of views on Russia’s restoring its military potential in the Arctic. The Russian Federation would, therefore, be wrong to take the bait cast by the hawks and increase that potential beyond the necessary level, experts believe, for that might result in the region’s militarization and emergence of critical and acute conflict situations. “In conditions of higher geopolitical status of the Arctic, there is evidence of a dangerous trend toward remilitarizing the region. Russia and other states and international organizations must prevent further escalation of negative trends.”13

The reason why containment is necessary is, first and foremost, Russia’s economic significance and plans of developing the region. Developing the Arctic will take broad international cooperation in all kinds of areas – investment, resource mining technologies (which is one of the things our country is wanting), communication and navigation systems. Among other cooperation areas can be named search-and-rescue systems in the Arctic latitudes, especially in the polar night conditions, and joint resource development in cross-border areas. An important cooperation line is environmental security. This is doubly crucial owing to the specific features of Arctic ecosystems. And of course the kind of cooperation that is economically and strategically topical for Russia is furthering the North Sea Lane – international transit will create a more advantageous economic situation.

And therein lies a basic contradiction. On the one hand, it is necessary to build a system of the region’s protection, but on the other, we must build up cooperation. This contradiction requires a balanced search for an optimum approach to national security issues in the Arctic.

The overall military and political situation in the Arctic is exacerbated by a number of other serious factors.

1. In fact, there are today three groups of countries in the Arctic that are in a state of fierce rivalry, both among themselves, and externally, on an inter-group level.

  • The first group is littoral Arctic states, or the so-called Arctic Five – Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark, and Norway. All of them are directly entitled to develop the shelf where all the currently accessible riches are concentrated. Yet the snag is that there are unsettled disputes concerning the borders (e.g., between the US and Canada over the Beaufort Sea, and so on).14 The second point in the list of contradictions between the same duo is the Arctic shelf northward expansion.
  • The second group consists of sub-Arctic states (with no access to the Arctic Ocean), which are nevertheless members of the Arctic Council. They are Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. They have no right to the shelf, but are eager to obtain maximum powers and authority in decision-making within the Arctic Council and raise their status in their interests.
  • The third group is made up of non-Arctic states that are geographically remote from the Arctic but would still prefer to take part in resource development there, in particular energy resources. These are first of all China, Japan, Singapore, Brazil, India, EU countries, and so on. In 2012, some of them received the status of permanent observer in the Arctic Council. The point of their activity is likewise to raise their status and try to influence the Arctic agenda.

The most active among them is China, which is establishing bilateral relations with all littoral states, and attempts to act via the Arctic and sub-Arctic group members (consider the well-known episode of China actually trying to buy land on the Iceland coast through a Chinese businessman, which would have given that country control over northern routes).

This group of countries is interested in revising the status of the Arctic making it a global/common possession of humanity. China is bringing up this term increasingly often. Naturally, lobbying such tectonic changes is a long and laborious process, yet the trend must not be overlooked. China’s activity on the whole merits the closest attention. From the first, Beijing has been acting in the Arctic via Norway having located its polar station and research icebreaker at Spitsbergen. Since 2008, making use of the economic crisis, China has shifted its efforts to Iceland. In 2012, China and Iceland concluded a free trade agreement, the first of its kind to involve the People’s Republic of China and a European state. After that Iceland’s President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson announced that China was to join the Arctic Council on a permanent basis since the Arctic ceased to be a regional issue, but had now become a global one.

2. Another thing that is making the Arctic political situation more complex is the curious business around the US. On the one hand, the US is a littoral state, but on the other, it has not ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for internal political reasons. The main hurdle is the mood of the conservative circles that demand guarantees of seafaring freedom for US vessels. As a result, the United States, albeit at the head of the Arctic Council, cannot make maximum use of its right to shelf expansion. To be sure, the United States will not tolerate encroachments by any other country, but the problem still restrains progress in this direction.

On the other hand, being in the situation it is in, the United States can easily work toward changing the status of the Arctic within the framework of international law so as to have the “common property” regime extended to a maximum degree for its rivals, and only minimally for itself. This creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust in the relations of Arctic states. Besides, since the US is unable to control the Arctic Council failing to achieve a consensus profitable to itself, it endorses the establishment of parallel entities. In particular, of the Arctic Circle mentioned above, which operates in Iceland and whose work benefits both the US and China. That parallel entity is intended to take over control of the regional agenda from the Arctic Council. One fine day, these plans may well come true. At the same time, the United States is advocating a forum status for the Arctic Council instead of that of an official international organization, which sets the same rules for its participants. This stand also rests on a clear-cut pragmatic interest and in a way runs counter to Russia’s interests.

3. A difficult item on the agenda of Arctic security and geopolitics is the legal problem. The status of water areas and sea bottom north of the exclusive economic zone, i.e. beyond the 200 nautical mile zone, is yet to be defined. This creates legal vagueness and increases the chance of the player (or players) that will be the first to start active development work there obtaining the most influence in the Arctic.

4. Quite a few ambiguous issues are related to territorial disputes. In the case of Russia, it is the still difficult relations with Norway, even though the two countries signed a Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean in 2010. Experts differ as to who profited more from this signing, Norway or Russia. In fact, the result of the move was confirmation of Norway’s sovereignty west of the delimitation line. This directly contradicts the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, which provides for open economic activity for all parties on a nondiscriminatory basis in all adjacent waters, bar the waters of Spitsbergen itself. As to the 2010 Treaty on Maritime Delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, the Spitsbergen Treaty is not mentioned there at all, which may give Norway a chance to have it pronounced null and void in court. Besides, the Bering Sea delimitation line between Russia and the United States is yet to be settled definitively. Russia has not ratified the U.S.S.R.-U.SA. agreement on maritime delimitation, but the US has, so this is another unsettled territorial problem.

On February 10, 2016, Russia submitted to the UN a renewed application for continental shelf expansion in the Arctic Ocean. According to the UN News Center, Russia claims a section of the sea bottom beyond the 200 nautical mile zone within Russia’s entire polar segment including the North Pole zone and the southern extremity of the Gakkel Ridge. This is 1.2 million sq km of expanded continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean with some 4.9 billion tons of prognosticated reserves of reference fuel.

Lately, Russia has concluded a whole series of agreements on cooperation in the Arctic in all kinds of areas – political, economic, and environmental. These documents are typically conducive to stabilizing and normalizing bilateral or multilateral relations. The more important of them are the following.

  • Declaration of Political Cooperation in the Arctic, which confirms the signatories’ intentions to resign force methods;
  • International Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, which actually forms the infrastructure and methods of coordinating actions by search-and-rescue operation participants;
  • Agreement on Arctic Oil Spills, which is extremely important to Russia, since it is the North Sea Lane where the risks of similar emergencies are the most probable. Work on the Polar Code regulating international seafaring is also proceeding with sufficient success.

Threats to Russia’s security in the Arctic are not only military. Yet the military sphere is certainly a priority.

The trend toward militarizing the Arctic. In particular, NATO does not at present claim an expanded responsibility zone in the Arctic for itself. However, despite so reserved a stand, the Alliance has invigorated military exercises on the territory of Arctic and sub-Arctic states. This is happening precisely next door to Russia – in the Baltic States, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Observers do not doubt that, as a rule, scenarios of these exercises have an obvious anti-Russia bias. By way of example one can cite the 2009 Cold Response exercise in Norway.

The scenario said that a big undemocratic state named Nordland claimed the oil deposit in the territorial waters of a small democratic country, Midland. Yet, allies joining in hostilities results in victory. According to domestic experts, the exercise was aimed at rehearsing protection of Norway’s interests and those of other NATO countries in the Arctic. Besides, the buildup of NATO military forces continues under various pretexts next door to Russia’s borders. If the buildup becomes more powerful, this may pose a serious problem to Russia’s security.

The US global ABM (antiballistic missile) defense system. Among the negative scenarios is further deployment of surface-to-air and seaborne ABM systems as the fourth stage of the US ABM defense system in Europe. This final stage, many experts believe, is the most dangerous for Russia. In particular, the leading domestic ABM experts point out that the existing US ABM system on board Aegis-equipped vessels in northern seas cannot threaten Russian ground-based ICBM. The flight trajectories of R-3bM, Topol, Topol-M, and Yars ICBM toward the United States from the Strategic Missile Forces position areas located in Russia’s European part are at a distance of 3,600 km to 4,500 km and altitudes of 800 km to 1,200 km from the likely location of Aegis-equipped ships, i.e. outside the hitting range of modern CM-3 antiballistic missiles.15 However, at the fourth stage of deploying upgraded information-driven and fire means of this system in accordance with the new ABM defense architecture approved by the Obama Administration, the system ought to possess strategic potential. So, in theory it should not be ruled out that ICBM military loads could be intercepted within the passive section of the trajectory. The issue has so far been mothballed till 2020.

Subversion against technological infrastructures. The well-known incident when Greenpeace activists stormed the Prirazlomnaya oil rig highlighted the urgency of measures to prevent subversive acts in the Arctic. Another aspect that should be touched upon in connection with the activists’ attempts at penetrating into the territory of producing platforms proper is the danger of subversive and terrorist acts. It cannot be ruled out that other interested personalities might sneak into the station in the guise of organization activists with a view to committing subversion, for example, members of terrorist organizations. Then, the magnitude of the disaster will be catastrophic for the environment, and the consequences will remain irreparable for years to come. Besides, it is not too improbable to suppose that subversive acts will be committed at oil pipelines, similar to what is happening in the Middle East and in Nigeria, with a serious damage to the environment, apart from affecting the oil production rate. So, the issue of providing security in the areas where producing platforms and their infrastructure are located should be more strictly regulated by the state together with energy companies, and it is inadmissible to meet halfway the activists wishing to hold demonstrations at Arctic shelf deposits. The same issue was discussed by Vice Premier Dmitry Rogozin who said that active development of the Arctic shelf would inevitably result in a conflict of interests between countries. Settling those conflicts may well go beyond strictly diplomatic limits. Quite probably, Russian oil and gas extracting facilities may become targets of covert subversion by rival countries.16

A look at the infrastructure in the Arctic will reveal several vulnerability points, in particular the transportation infrastructure (bridges, tunnels, etc.), pipelines, freight terminals, extraction infrastructure (platforms, etc.), liquefied natural gas terminals, military-industrial entities, and energy infrastructure facilities.

It appears expedient to analyze the experience of building systems of subversion prevention and countering. It is important to assess the stability and security of assets that can become targets for subversives. It is necessary to introduce more actively modern information technologies to control and protect information about these assets and their operation. It should be stated legislatively that the state must monitor these facilities. Carrying out these proposals will help significantly reduce the risk of subversion.

Challenges in the area of Russia’s national security provision are of both external and internal origin. As for external threats to economic security, this is the interest of many states in revising the legal status of the Arctic. This is no simple matter. Yet, the lobbyists of this idea can start with a less daunting task, reviewing the status of the Northeast Passage. The United States is trying to obtain the right to uncontrolled passage along the North, including for military ships. Simultaneously, the US is offering itself as the guarantor of justice in relations between potential users of the “common” NSL thus overtly seeking unilateral advantage for itself.

Drawing parallels between the Arctic and the Antarctic, which yields the suggestion of recognizing the Arctic as common property of humanity has no real geographical, physical, or legal grounds. The Antarctic is a continent devoid of permanent population and rightly has the status of common property. The Arctic is no continent, but a region; moreover, most of its territory is taken up by the ocean. As for the shores of the Arctic Ocean, they have a distinct state and national ownership in each case.

However, the thing that merits far more attention is Russia’s internal problems related to security in the Arctic. It is important to provide the kind of economic support of Arctic development that would in practice help create attractive conditions for investment, and for private-state partnership in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. To be sure, this is no trivial task, but it is of crucial importance to the functioning of the national security system in the Arctic.

At the moment, Russia’s actions in the Arctic in military terms are perfectly justified – provision of strategic deterrence, protection of defense-industrial assets in the Murmansk Region, protection of economic activity in the Arctic waters, creation of a network of border detachments and air bases to cover the northern coast, interaction with civilian search-and-rescue services.

However, the development and improvement of space communication, radio communication, and other similar systems and navigation means ought to be speeded up. This is the infrastructure without which neither proper military nor proper civilian activity is possible.


1. Agranat, G.A., Rosstyskoye severovedeniye v postsovetskiye gody [Russian North Studies in the Post-Soviet Years], Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Geography Series, #4, 2007, p. 31.

2. Kuzyk, B.N. and Yakovets, Yu.V., Rossiya 2050. Strategiya innovatsionnogoproryva [Russia 2050. The Innovation Breakthrough Strategy], Ekonomika Publishers, Moscow, 2005; Leonov, S.N., “Osobennosti postroyeniya i problemy realizatsiyi dolgosrochnykh prognozov razvitiya Arktiki Dalnego Vostoka Rossiyi [Certain Features of Constructing and Implementing Long-Term Development Forecasts for the Arctic in the Russian Far East],” Izvestiya Irkut-skoy gosudarstvennoy ekonomicheskoy akademiyi [Bulletin of Irkutsk State Economics Academy], #5, 2013, pp. 50-57.

3. Leonov, S.N., Op. cit.

4. Slavin, S.V., Promyshlennoye i transportnoye osvoyeniye Severa S.S.S.R. [Industrial and Transport Development of the Soviet North], Economic literature Publishers, Moscow, 1961.

5. Tikhookeanskaya Rossiya-2030: stsenarnoye prognozirovaniye regional’nogo razvitiya [Pacific Russia 2030: Scenario Prognostication of Regional Development], Ed. by Minakir, PA., RAS Far Eastern Branch Press, Khabarovsk, 2010, pp. 148-168; Selin, V., “Sovremen-noye geoekonomicheskoye pozitsionirovaniye v rossiyskoy Arktike [Present-Day Geoeconom-ic Positioning in the Russian Arctic],” URL: http://institutiones.com/ (Retrieved on November 1, 2016.)

6. “Ob Arkticheskoy zone Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi [On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation],” FL draft. Approved by the RF Ministry of Regional Development on January 23, 2013, URL: http://docs.pravo.ru/docuent/view/29693690/30396019/

7. Kroyalo, I.V., “Sotsial’noye izmereniye gosudarstvennoy arkticheskoy politiki Rossiyi [The Social Dimension of Russia’s National Arctic Policy],” URL: http://rosnord.ru/strategy/stand point/77-sotsialnoe-izmerenie-gosudarstvennoj-arkticheskoj-politiki-rossii.general/2046-geoeko-nomicheskoe-pozicionirovanie-v-rossijskoj-arktike.html (Retrieved on November 1, 2016.)

8. Zberya, V.A., “Kanado-amerikanskiye otnosheniya v arkticheskom regione. Rossiya i Ameri-ka v XXI veke [Canadian-US Relations in the Arctic Region. Russia and America in the 21st Century],” URL: http://www.rusus.ru/?act=read&id=236 (Retrieved on November 1, 2016.)

9. Zberya, V.A., Op. cit; Leonov, S.N., and Sidorenko, O.V., Zarubezhniy opyt regionalnogo upravleniya [Foreign Practice of Regional Management], Khabarovsk Territory Print Shop, Khabarovsk, 2011; Sergunin, A. and Konyshev, V., “Strategiya Kanady v osvoyeniyi Arktiki [Canada’s Strategy in the Development of the Arctic],” URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/ inner/?id_4=835 (Retrieved on November 1, 2016.)

10. “Ob Arkticheskoy…” FL draft.

11. Kroyalo, I.V., Op. cit; Zberya, V.A., Op. cit.; Leonov, S.N. and Sidorenko, O.V., Op. cit.; Sergunin, A. and Konyshev, V., Op. cit.

12. Zberya, V.A., Op. cit.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Zberya, V.A., Op. cit.; Leonov, S.N. and Sidorenko, O.V., Op. cit.; Sergunin, A. and Konyshev, V., Op. cit. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=835 (Retrieved on 01.11.2016.)

16. Report by Ragozin, O.D. at the 4th International Technological Development Forum Tekhnoprom 2016 (Novosibirsk).

Translated by Margarita Kvartskhava