From Nezavisimaya gazeta, Aug. 10, 2026, p. 1. Complete text:
“Economic pessimism” among young Russians has been risen sharply in recent years. At present, almost 40% of young people are convinced that their work will not be adequately rewarded in Russia. The unwillingness of younger generations to work within an unfair system reduces the country’s economic potential and increases social tensions, according to the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociopolitical Research. Weakening security guarantees or deepening social stratification could bring pent-up discontent out into the open and trigger destabilization in Russia.
“Young people do not want to work, especially in industry or in responsible positions” – this opinion is widespread among middle-aged and older generations of Russians. However, the refusal by younger generations to work hard or to seek professional self-fulfillment is not only the result of their personal qualities. It also has deep-seated socioeconomic causes, pollsters said in their report, which was published by the [Russian] President’s Academy of [National Economy and] Public Administration.
The Russian authorities describe our young people as “the main driver of the country’s socioeconomic competitiveness.” However, there are major problems with the realization of young Russians’ labor potential today. There is a glaring gap between official rhetoric and young people’s actual attitudes toward their professional self-fulfillment. This gap is not only reducing young specialists’ willingness to become involved in labor processes, but is also creating potential for social tensions, say the report’s authors – Viktor Levashov, Oksana Grebnyak and Olga Novozhenina.
They are citing polls conducted over the years showing that 30% to 40% of the younger generation believe that the existing state of labor relations in Russia is unfair. In choosing between two alternative assertions – “Today everyone who can and wants to work can ensure their material well-being” and “No matter how hard you work, you cannot achieve material well-being” – from 36% to 59% of young Russians have agreed with the first one at different periods.
Fluctuations in young people’s labor optimism and pessimism show that the “rally around the flag” effect sparked by the beginning of the special military operation [in Ukraine] proved short-lived and that toward 2024 it had begun to give way to structural pessimism.
The profile of young people who are convinced that labor does not ensure material well-being reveals several specific features. Young people who have such pessimistic attitudes are predominantly female (60.9%) and have vocational and technical backgrounds. Pessimists account for 28.1% of those studying at vocational-technical colleges or specialized schools, which is 16 percentage points more than the share of optimists (12.1%). There are practically no individuals among pessimists who feel financially secure or identify themselves as upper-class.
Class identification among pessimists points to a deepening subjective feeling of social exclusion, with one in five (22.7%) identifying as lower-class, pollsters said. At the same time, 64.1% of pessimists identify as middle-class, while 78.2% of economic optimists identify as middle-class.
Despite their skepticism about economic realities, pessimistically minded young people are still very loyal to key state institutions, especially the president and the Army. For example, 80.5% of economic pessimists say they trust the president, compared to 77% of optimists.
It is noteworthy that distrust of work as a means of achieving material well-being does not translate into a radical rejection of the political system. The share of pessimists who are entirely happy with the political system is 28.9%, which is 6.2 percentage points below that of optimists (35.1%), with 45.3% of pessimists saying they believe the system has “many shortcomings, but these can be eliminated through gradual reforms,” whereas the share of radically minded young people is minimal and practically identical in both groups (10.9% among pessimists and 9.2% among optimists). Therefore, there is reason to say that economic pessimists are not a source of institutional nihilism or political opposition. Political loyalty compensates for economic pessimism, maintaining the system in a state of situational stability (latent discontent), pollsters believe.
These polls highlight the necessity of rethinking the core of the “social contract” in modern Russia: Its economic component (“Work and you will be financially secure”) is losing its legitimacy. This loss of legitimacy is especially pronounced among women and those with basic vocational backgrounds. At the same time, the political component of the social contract (“support the ruling establishment and get stability”) remains thanks to consolidating patriotic identity and the fear of uncertainty.
A key barrier to the fulfillment of young people’s labor potential is not a shortage of qualifications, but the erosion of faith in fair remuneration for work. The spread of economic pessimism is creating potential for instability: Current trends and a lack of measures to restore trust in the institution of labor could [not only] destabilize the system of work incentives, but young Russians’ latent discontent may also translate into forms of social protest, experts warned. To avert these risks, the researchers propose institutional reforms: ensuring a fair minimum wage, strengthening labor rights protection mechanisms and ensuring transparent career growth trajectories for younger generations.
Low official unemployment rates in Russia are hiding growing problems, as well as the younger generation’s discontent, experts believe. State youth policy should shift emphasis from nominally increasing employment rates to creating conditions whereby hard work can really meet material and spiritual needs. Pollsters advise restoring the connection between work and well-being for the public.