From Argumenty i fakty, June 25, 2025, p. 4. Complete text:) Editors’ Note. – Fyodor Lukyanov, research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, stopped by the AiF stand at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum [see Vol. 77, No. 24-25, pp. 3-7] and spoke about squabbles in Donald Trump’s team, the impact of the events in the Middle East on the [Russian] special military operation [in Ukraine] (SMO), and prospects for talks between Moscow and Kiev.
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Question. – Trump has publicly avowed that he is not going to start wars – he is going to end wars. But then he started bombing Iran. Why?
Answer. – This is a very important moment for the US, because Trump faced a dilemma when he had to make an ideological choice. Indeed, he has come to power largely thanks to slogans such as “no more wars,” “no more senseless meddling in other nations’ affairs throughout the world” [and] “America first.” Most of Trump’s team and his core electorate share this opinion. However, a different reality has emerged, one connected not only to the conflict between Iran and Israel, but also to the Ukraine issue. Trump, who proudly announced that he would end all that within 24 hours or so, was predictably and very quickly confronted with the fact that international relations are not business deals.
To the US, the Middle East is largely a domestic issue, considering the influential “Israel lobby” that comprises far more than Jews. There is also a very powerful group of fundamentalist evangelists who view Israel as a religious shrine. They constitute a very important segment of Trump’s electorate. This is where the contradiction arose: On the one hand, he promises not to start wars but to end them; and on the other, a significant part of his entourage believes that the Israel issue is a fundamental one, and that [the US] must not give in to Iran.
Q. – If there is a split within Trump’s team over Iran, would it affect Russia?
A. – Relations with Russia are a separate subject. As we can see, although Trump has changed his stance on the Iran issue, he has not budged on the Russia issue yet. And he refused to endorse a Group of Seven statement condemning Russia. He believes that it would only do harm.
There is a wing within Trump’s team that stands for minimal involvement in foreign affairs. [This wing] is trying somehow to normalize relations with Russia. It is important to note that these are not pro-Russian forces. It’s simply that these people believe that America does not need a conflict with Russia – it is nothing but a headache. Trump generally agrees with them, but there are also others in this entourage.
Even if we imagine a scenario (although not the most likely one) in which “America first” recedes into the shadows, that does not mean that the US administration would resume active support for Ukraine, as was the case under [former US president Joe] Biden. There is already a more or less general perception in the US that Ukraine will not win this war. What is America’s interest in becoming actively involved in it, then?!
There is also another line of thinking where Ukraine must not lose completely and should be supported somehow or other. However, that support would still not be what it was two or three years ago. US resources are not the same, especially taking into account the Middle East conflict and the obsession with China on the part of Trump and his like-minded associates. So there will be nothing like what we saw during the first two and a half years of the SMO.
Q. – Western media are reporting that Russia stands to gain from US involvement in the conflict with Iran. Is that so?
A. – A host of convincing arguments can be made regarding both the diversion of US resources in the Middle East and the oil prices that will now go up – all of that is playing into our hands. However, these are very tactical considerations. Strategically, a change of government in Iran is not beneficial to Russia, because any new ruling authority there would be less oriented toward [building] relations with Moscow than the present one.
There should be no illusions: Iran is not our closest ally. It is a unique country with a unique worldview. And its attitude toward Russia has always been complicated. Any conversation with the Iranians has usually started with an enumeration of their historical grievances against the Russian Empire, the USSR and Russia. If the political system changes, I believe that would only intensify.
Furthermore, a cataclysm such as the destabilization of Iran’s entire statehood is fraught with consequences that cannot be foreseen. It is a country that has a significant impact on the entire Middle East, where a difficult situation has arisen since Israel took tough measures to crush Hezbollah, Hamas and others. There is also the South Caucasus, where Iran has served as a stabilizing factor in recent decades. It has been the only window to the [outside] world for Armenia, whose relations with Azerbaijan have been complicated, but balanced. Therefore, if this entire regional balance is disrupted, the consequences could be unpredictable.
Q. – What is Russia to do in this situation?
A. – For starters, it is essential to bear in mind that our diplomacy has always avoided the prospect of breaking off relations with Israel. Israel is a very important regional country. Its importance is currently growing, and despite serious disagreements (which have deepened during the SMO period), [our] relations have remained positive. Still, I believe that in this situation, Russia should support Iran diplomatically, politically, and perhaps also militarily and technically – to the extent that Iran supported us during the SMO. We should be grateful to [Iran] for the assistance it has provided to us, although, of course, Iran has never intended to become directly involved in the Ukraine conflict as North Korea has.
Q. – Peace talks with Kiev have ended up in limbo. We have exchanged memorandums informing each other about conditions, but we seem to have said nothing new. Is there light at the end of the tunnel?
A. – From my perspective, there is no tunnel, i.e., no road that would lead to some results. Yes, talks picked up due to the US position. However, the impression is that now the US will indeed shift its attention to the Middle East. Let’s be honest: This entire negotiating process was started primarily for Trump’s benefit. There is not much sense or incentive for either party to negotiate without pressure from him.
It seems to me that currently, neither party wants to call it quits. Our goals have not been achieved; neither have Ukraine’s. And as long as [both] parties believe that they can achieve more, the confrontation will continue. Ukraine is headed for a more difficult situation, since attention to it is flagging. However, one should not expect [everyone] to ditch Ukraine and say: “That’s it, we’re sorry, but we have other things to worry about.” And there are lobbyists in the US who will push for continued support for Ukraine. As for Europe, it is totally fixated on Ukraine. So at this point, there is no light at the end of the tunnel or even a tunnel at all. We have not entered it yet.