From Izvestia, Sept. 4, 2025, p. 3. Complete text:
[Russian President] Vladimir Putin’s visit to China to participate in the SCO summit and Victory Day parade has given plenty of cause for speculation. Even before the final declaration was adopted, Tianjin had unquestionably become the main talking point for the media, and that was largely thanks to Donald Trump. As was the case during the BRICS summit in Kazan, his colorful remarks and equally controversial actions with regard to SCO member countries generated unprecedented interest in the association and the Russian leader’s visit on the part of foreign media outlets, politicians and experts. Let’s highlight some of the main takeaways from Putin’s Chinese tour.
First, the president’s visit to China has produced agreements and deals of various kinds. The RDIF and China Railway Estate Group have signed a partnership agreement on building a Chinese-Russian trade, economic and cultural center. Furthermore, the RDIF and the Hainan Eco-Software Park have reached an agreement to build a strategic partnership to support Russian companies seeking to enter the Chinese market. The cooperation agreement envisions the creation of an industrial and commercial interaction center in Hainan [Province] tailored to the needs of Russian businesses. The SCO member countries have also supported the Russian initiative to create a Greater Eurasian Partnership and integrate the potentials of the Eurasian Economic Community, the SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as reflected in the declaration.
The Russian delegation led by the president held productive negotiations with their Chinese counterparts, resulting in the signing of more than 20 documents, including a legally binding memorandum on building the Sila Sibiri 2 gas pipeline across Mongolia. Speaking at the final press conference, Putin stressed that the Sila Sibiri agreement was not timed to coincide with his visit to China, but that it was the result of long negotiations. Global energy needs are growing, including in China. But perhaps the most long-awaited and talked-about document was an agreement to introduce a trial 30-day visa-free travel policy for Russian citizens on an internal passport.
The next big takeaway is that the Tianjin SCO Summit is a logical conceptual continuation of the BRICS summit in Kazan – a similar geopolitical context; an impressive international lineup of participants; and the tone of the leaders’ statements, the agenda and the commitment to reconfigure the global security, trade and financial architecture are largely synonymous with those of BRICS. Just as a year ago in Kazan, in their final declaration, the parties spoke out against unilateral coercive economic measures (read: sanctions and trade wars) and called for the protection of the multilateral trade system and compliance with WTO principles.
Although the parties did not directly mention the US, hardly anyone would doubt the anti-Western thrust of such wording. However, in the passage on the Middle East, the parties did not hold back, openly and strongly condemning Israeli and US attacks on Iran and accusing Tel Aviv and Washington of undermining not only regional, but also global security.
Another takeaway is that, unlike BRICS, the SCO is a full-fledged international organization, but it still regularly receives its share of criticism for its excessive flexibility, institutional inertia and forum-like nature. The present summit will likely open a new chapter in the association’s gradual institutionalization and will improve its unflattering image. The decision to create an SCO Development Bank is probably the most far-reaching and potentially groundbreaking one. China has been harboring this idea for more than a decade, but it has been basically torpedoed by some SCO members, including Russia.
There is still no clarity on the time frame for implementing this project, but the consensus as such is symptomatic. This overshadows several other important agreements, specifically on establishing a universal center to counter security challenges and threats [to be based] in Tashkent and an agreement to create an SCO antidrug center, headquartered in Dushanbe.
As was the case during the 2024 BRICS summit, similar juggling of participants’ legal status was observed in China. In the end, the [SCO] countries agreed to merge the “observer” and “dialogue partner” categories into the uniform status of SCO partner. The honor of savoring the innovation went to Laos, which was officially granted the status of an [SCO] dialogue partner.
The final takeaway is that the SCO summit placed a hefty bet on economizing. Apart from the aforementioned decision to create a Development Bank, the SCO Interbank Consortium could gain new impetus and strengthen its functionality thanks to China’s pledge to provide $1.4 billion in loans over the next three years. Furthermore, in a clear response to the Donald Trump administration’s tariff policy, the SCO members agreed to simplify trade procedures. These considerations also largely account for the member countries’ desire to stimulate mutual investments and continue the transition to [mutual financial] settlements in national currencies, which was also recorded in the final declaration.