From Republic.ru, July 2, 2026, https://republicmag.io/posts/117757. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky demanded that [Belarussian President] Aleksandr Lukashenko turn off signal repeaters for Russian drones and promised not to drag Belarus into the war. After that, Lukashenko went on a trip. He spent more than 24 hours in closed negotiations with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin at Valdai, then immediately flew to Beijing for a meeting with [Chinese President] Xi Jinping, from whom he received words of support for Belarussian sovereignty. Does this mean Minsk is trying to distance itself from the Kremlin’s war plans, or, on the contrary, to jump into military operations? Belarussian political analyst Valery Karbalevich has analyzed the limits of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s resistance to pressure from Moscow and Kiev.

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Question. – Recently, against the backdrop of Zelensky’s demands to Lukashenko about signal repeaters for Russian Shahed [drones], the topic of Belarussian involvement in Russia’s war with Ukraine again became relevant. What do you think about this situation?

Answer. – We’re seeing changes: Ukraine is building its resources and creating a situation where Russia’s chances of winning the war are decreasing. That’s how I would cautiously phrase it. Lukashenko also sees this. In a recent interview with Al Arabiya, he said openly that Belarus senses its vulnerability to Ukraine. It is vulnerable because Ukrainian drones are able to cause very serious damage to strategic targets in Belarus. Not only oil refineries, but also other businesses.

And it is most unfortunate for both Belarus and Lukashenko that Russia can’t come help, since Russia can’t even defend itself. We see how the situation is unfolding around the Crimea; in Russia there is now a fuel shortage due to Ukrainian drones [see the first feature of this issue]. Belarus is far more exposed – it’s closer than Russia. And its air defense system is worse than Russia’s.

So if Ukraine suddenly decides to carry out a major drone strike primarily on Belarus, the damage will be enormous. Not only economically, but politically and in image terms. Because Lukashenko has created this picture of himself as the guarantor of peace – as long as he’s in power, Belarus won’t be dragged into the war. So now he’s behaving what you might call very cautiously toward Ukraine. He begged Zelensky’s pardon, he understandably agreed to turn off those confounded signal repeaters that kicked off the whole brouhaha. Since Zelensky’s ultimatum, Belarussian generals halve become oddly peace-loving: Defense Minister [Viktor] Khrenin and Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Volfovich are now declaring in unison that Belarus doesn’t want war at all – that Belarus is for peace.

It’s worth noting one more important moment from Lukashenko’s Al Arabiya interview. Up until then, he’d only been calling on one side to agree to peace – Ukraine. You might phrase it as, “If you want peace, capitulate.” But now, he’s calling on both sides to end the war and agree to peace. Not just Ukraine, but also Russia. That’s an important change.

From the other side, Ukraine has started feeling confident when dealing with Belarus. It is acting from a position of strength. For about half a year, official Kiev has become quite tough toward Belarus. The attack is diplomatic, political and psychological. Zelensky has switched to open threats and even insults toward Lukashenko. He’s functionally issuing ultimatums. Kiev has allied itself with the Belarussian opposition. Kiev welcomed [2020 Belarussian presidential candidate and protest leader] Svetlana Tikhanovskaya at a high level. Thus, Kiev is acting from a position of strength and apparently thinks this is a way it can, you might say, weaken Russia’s chief ally – Belarus. The Belarussian regime is the weak link in that alliance. . . .

Q. – Since Kiev has managed to push Minsk around like this once, its appetites might suddenly start to grow. The next demand [might be] to stop gasoline deliveries to Russia during the fuel crisis there. Do you think such a thing is possible?

A. – I think there are limits to how far [Lukashenko] can bend. It’s one thing to beg pardon and call for peace, or to turn off four signal repeaters, which, honestly, isn’t very cumbersome to Minsk in political terms and won’t much influence the course of the war.

But it will hardly be possible to refuse to deliver supplies of military products or fuel, since a lot of money depends on them. Hundreds of Belarussian factories are at work in the military-industrial complex. Also at work is the Russian money that goes toward filling those orders. Belarus makes good money from fuel, which significantly supplements the budget. So Lukashenko will hardly compromise with Zelensky on the fuel issue.

Furthermore, it would be hard for Zelensky to explain to Europe and the global community why he’d attacked Belarus. “We attacked Belarus for supplying fuel to Russia” – Really? The signal repeaters are one thing – they’re an element of warfare that Russia uses to guide drones. But Belarus supplying fuel to Russia is something else. Fuel doesn’t just go to the Army. Fuel goes to regular people, to consumers. So it’s hard for me to imagine Zelensky starting to strike Belarussian refineries because they’re supplying fuel. I think there’s a red line there that Lukashenko won’t cross.

Q. – You described a change in Lukashenko’s behavior. But still, what are the chances Belarus will get dragged into the war? Maybe it has nothing to do with signal repeaters or fuel, but what are the chances on the whole.?

A. – I think the likelihood of such an event has increased. But nothing more. Russia would probably have an interest in Belarussian soldiers taking a more active role in the war, but by all appearances, Lukashenko has managed to convince Putin it would be better [for them] not to. Lukashenko could present the following arguments. The Belarussian Army is defending the Union State’s border against Western countries, against Poland and Latvia, against NATO as a whole. If NATO suddenly wants to start a war, the Belarussian Army is there and will defend Russia – it won’t permit them to strike it. That’s one thing.

Another thing is that the Belarussian population is against the war. Participation by Belarussian soldiers in the war could cause an acute political crisis on the level of 2020 [the disputed presidential election; see Vol. 72, No. 33, pp. 3-7 – Trans.]. There’s a different attitude in Belarus than there is in Russia. Russia’s population supports the war, but Belarus’s does not. The whole society is in consensus on the issue, both Lukashenko supporters and opponents. Does Russia need a political crisis in Belarus at such a tense and critical moment? Furthermore, there have been no rocket or drone attacks from Belarussian soil since the fall of 2022. . . .

So the situation is currently status quo. And, of course, if Belarus is suddenly dragged into the war, Belarussian society will take it very poorly. If in 2022, for example, Ukraine had responded to Belarus when rockets and drones were launched against Ukraine from Belarussian territory, it would have been clear in the public’s mind that this was a counterstrike. But more than four years have now passed. If today Ukraine suddenly started a war against Belarus, that would of course mean serious strain both on Belarussian society and on the political regime. Furthermore, it would be a serious challenge for the Belarussian opposition. It would be a very painful development of the situation.

I still don’t think it will come to that. If only for the simple reason that, if an exchange of strikes between Ukraine and Belarus began, it would mean the war was getting closer to European countries. The war would already be on the borders of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

I don’t think this would elicit a positive response from the political elites of Belarus’s neighbors. . . .

Q. – What can you say about a recent report by the Institute for the Study of War, which says that the Kremlin is putting pressure on Lukashenko to more actively involve Belarus in the war against Ukraine? The Kremlin is threatening Minsk with cutting off financial support if these demands are refused. At the same time, they note that the Belarussian president is seeking to keep Russian support. The report says that “Minsk is instead trying to balance maintaining Russian support for Belarus while maintaining what remains of Belarus’s degraded sovereignty.”

A. – For my part, I haven’t seen any indications of pressure on Minsk from Moscow demanding entry into full-scale war. In that regard, there has been no change. Two weeks ago, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov came to Minsk. There, he expressed one notable phrase: “Belarus is our closest ally, but it is not actively taking part in the war.” I believe that is the first time since the start of the war that a Russian official has made such a statement. So whatever is happening behind the scenes, how much pressure there is, if any, is all speculative. In any case, if such pressure exists, it hasn’t risen to the surface.

And overall, what sense is there in dragging Belarus into the war? Experts estimate that the Belarussian Army’s combat strength is 15,000 to 20,000 troops. Will they do any good if they arrive in the Donetsk Basin, for example, and try to make an advance there? I don’t think so. And the consequences for the Belarussian regime could be negative. Because Belarussian society, as I said, has a bad impression of this war. So I don’t see any likelihood in a scenario of Belarus getting involved in the war.

Furthermore, what is the sense in joining the war now, when it’s clearly not going Russia’s way? I could understand if it was at the start of the war, when people thought “[Russia will take] Kiev in three days,” when they opened a dry-land route to the Crimea. Back then, you could have thought that Russia would eventually bring down Ukraine in an extended war, a war of annihilation. Back then, you could have joined the winner to obtain the corresponding dividends. Now, though, joining a war where the outcome is doubtful would be political suicide for Lukashenko. Furthermore, it’s clear that if that happens, Ukraine will start bombing Belarus’s refineries, its military targets, Belaruskaly [Belarussian Potassium]. By the end, Lukashenko’s own palace, too. Putin’s palace is well defended, but Lukashenko’s is not. So I see such a scenario as unlikely.

Q. – You spoke of Lukashenko committing political suicide. Isn’t that the objective of the Belarussian opposition? At the very least, wouldn’t it benefit [the opposition], even if they don’t cause it to happen?

A. – Let me put it this way. The whole Belarussian opposition, all of Belarussian democratic society, supports Ukraine in this war. They believe Ukraine is fighting for a just cause. They condemn Russian aggression and Belarus for complicity in that aggression. This issue is entirely unambiguous: The opposition is against Belarus taking part in this war on Russia’s side.

As for what happens if Ukraine implements some force scenario against Belarus, as is currently being quite actively discussed on social media, that is another matter. How does the opposition see such a situation? There are different points of view. Some people think that if Ukraine attacks Belarus, most of the population will perceive Ukraine’s actions negatively, with all the consequences that come with it. So that is a bad scenario for Belarussian democracy, for the potential for democracy in Belarus.

Q. – How do you assess the situation for Lukashenko’s regime overall?

A. – I don’t see any indication of a threat to the regime. The regime is consolidated; the regime has laid down the concrete and the asphalt for everything. But at the same time, while everything is stable inside the country, the regime is trying to wage a fight against the opposition abroad. People are disappearing there, secret operations are taking place, there are attempts to blackmail or recruit people.

Furthermore, the regime has found another escape. That is the negotiations process with the US that started when [US President] Donald Trump came to power. For a long time, there was a successful process of the US canceling sanctions in exchange for the release of political prisoners. Granted, a pause has been taking place recently, and it isn’t very clear what will happen further. But I still think that Lukashenko has a strong interest in this dialogue. He thinks that it offers him some potential on the Western track

As for potential threats, the military situation Russia has found itself in has turned it from an asset factor into a problem factor. Granted, this is potential. We can’t say today that it’s exactly like that. But still.

Another thing is Lukashenko’s health. Everything in a personalist regime relies on one person, and if something happens to him, we can expect major changes. But that is also undefined potential.

As for the current status quo, everything here is stable and we can observe no threats aside from those we have already spoken of.

Q. – Lukashenko looks to the future with optimism. Or at least he pretends to. He recently said at a meeting with [Russian] Federation Council Chair [Valentina] Matviyenko: “Russia, Belarus – this is, as I say, our common Fatherland. It isn’t your fault or mine that two states were formed here, but they are very friendly, brotherly states. I don’t think there is any force that could break our unity.*** I’m confident – and I recently told this to Zelensky’s representatives – that no matter what, our nations will be together.”

That’s how he sees the future. How do you see future relations among the three countries?

A. – As for Russia and Ukraine, their relations are spoiled for decades. They will be each other’s main enemies for a long time to come. . . .

As for Belarussian-Ukrainian relations, I wouldn’t judge them so harshly. If, for example, there is a change of power in Belarus, if Belarus starts to distance itself from Russia and tries to adopt a policy of closer ties with the West, then Belarussian-Ukrainian relations could stabilize. There could be good potential. But that, of course, is without Lukashenko and without Putin.

Q. – And what will they do with the Union State of Russia and Belarus? Will they have to dismantle it? And overall, can Belarus simultaneously be Russia’s ally and get closer to the West?

A. – I think that Belarus would be heavily dependent on Russia under any government. It would be hard to distance itself from Russia or break off Belarussian-Russian economic ties or any of the many other ties even after Lukashenko goes. Even if his successors try to somehow increase their distance from Russia and normalize relations with the West, that will happen slowly, gradually, step by step. Some people even propose the idea of Finlandization for Belarus.

In any case, dependence on Russia is currently very heavy. Although any new authorities will try to increase Belarus’s independence. How far will they succeed? Many factors will impact that: how the war ends, what state the region is in and so on. So far, it’s hard to make long-term predictions.