From Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 6, 2026, p. 3. Complete text:

[US President] Donald Trump’s ultimatum to Iran is expiring. “Remember when I gave Iran ten days to MAKE A DEAL or OPEN UP THE HORMUZ STRAIT? Time is running out – 48 hours before all hell will rain down on them,” the American president recalled on Saturday, April 4 – as usual, on his social media network Truth Social. He repeated the same threat there the next day.

If we go by what Trump said earlier about the progress of the Middle East war (many of the American president’s enemies consider him just a cynic who does not believe his own words, but we should actually not follow their example), then everything is logical. The US is the stronger side in this war. The side that is winning. The American-Israeli coalition has convincingly demonstrated its capabilities. The previous Iranian leadership was destroyed (several people at once); the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, according to some reports, has been wounded. Even if we believe that the Pentagon’s estimates of enemy losses are exaggerated, there is no doubt that the Americans and Israelis hold the advantage. An American landing on Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil terminal, looms on the horizon. Trump believes that the Iranians were given the opportunity to reach a “good” agreement while saving face. They refused. That means it’s time to use the language of ultimatums. Which Iran will eventually accept – not in a matter of days, but in a week or two. Where can they go?

However, if we look at what Iranian officials are saying these days, and if we assume that they are not cynics either, then the forecast is different. They see themselves as the winning side. Trump did not achieve his goal: The regime did not collapse due to a change of personnel in power. There are no uprisings in the ethnic outskirts, no revolution in Tehran. On the contrary, the protests that had been raging since December [see Vol. 78, No. 1-3, pp. 11-14] have died down. One can argue about why this happened (which is what many Iran experts are doing these days), but the fact remains. The American strikes were not perceived by Iranian opponents of the current regime as a signal that it was time for a change of power. There appears to be no split among the regime’s functionaries themselves. In this, apparently, Trump “helped.” By killing both supreme leader Ali Khamenei and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, who was considered a centrist or even a reformist by the standards of the Iranian elite, the American president showed everyone who rules the country: You are all in the same boat. American and Israeli missiles will not discriminate between who among you is a moderate and who is a radical. If anything happens, everyone will die.

But the Iranian authorities, as they have reason to believe, have found the enemy’s weak point – the Strait of Hormuz. The key to global oil prices, which Trump can’t do anything about yet. Stopping the American president by raising prices at American gas stations seems like a completely feasible task. At the same time, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has also proved to be an effective way to drive a wedge between the US and its NATO allies. It is no wonder that the Iranian parliament is now seriously discussing the introduction of divided passage through this body of water for tankers from different countries of origin. Oil will not be allowed through to countries that supported the US, while for others – who knows? If the Strait of Hormuz gambit doesn’t work, there’s the option of expanding the geography of the conflict. Increased attacks on neighboring countries. From the first days of the war, Iran has made it clear that it views as enemies anyone who provides its territory to Israeli or American troops. This is a worse bet than the Strait of Hormuz (after all, Trump listens more to his voters than to his friends from the Persian Gulf monarchies), but it exists.

Let’s leave aside discussions about religion and ideology. It is hardly possible to determine from the outside to what extent either is guiding the actions of the contemporary Iranian ruling elite. From the outside, it appears that those who rule Iran (whether it be Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei or the well-known, in-the-know functionaries of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) are currently in a state of a wild mixture of euphoria and desperation. Desperation – because it’s clear that they have nowhere to retreat. Euphoria – because it seems that hope has appeared: Iran in 2026 will not be a repeat of Iraq in 2003. This is the hope of victory. It is also supported by the increasingly credible assumption that Trump, despite polls unanimously indicating the American public categorically rejects a land invasion of Iran, has nevertheless decided to launch a ground operation. And if there is a landing on one island, there will be a long war – one in which American losses will be in the thousands, not dozens, as they are now. Granted, even more Iranians will die, but who’s counting them? Those who send them into battle couldn’t care less.