Letter From the Editors

On Sept. 10, Poland announced that it had shot down suspected Russian drones over its territory with support from NATO aircraft and that it had invoked Art. 4 of the NATO treaty, which calls for consultations with other member states. This marked a major turning point in Russia’s war against Ukraine – or not, depending on whom you ask. In an interview with Novaya gazeta Europe, International Crisis Group’s Olga Oliker says that many Western analysts believe Russia launched the drones to gauge NATO’s reaction to them. The fact that the drones were shot down, she says, is the “correct response” and a “serious action,” because drones have appeared in NATO skies before without being shot down. Experts that NG spoke with, however, say that the “situation was coordinated by the Ukrainian special services” and that the West is beginning to “better understand” that, in dealing with Ukraine, it is dealing with “provocateurs, bandits and terrorists.” And expert Oleg Karpovich even goes so far as to tell Izvestia that Poland is in a “state of internal divide” and that “[t]he fight against a perceived Russian threat will help Polish political actors score extra points.”

This idea of a divide within the elites is also being deployed by the ruling parties in both Kazakhstan and Turkey, where leaders are attempting to find ways to retain power. During his annual address to the nation, Kazakh President Tokayev announced his intention to create a unicameral parliament. While it is true that Kazakhstan’s Senate has long offered little more than a cushy landing spot for senior officials, expert Dosym Satpayev believes the announced change is not about democratization, but about “preparation for a new transfer of power.” According to him, this will make it difficult for opposition parties to form and will leave Tokayev with “ample room for maneuver” ahead of the 2029 presidential election.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government is working to create a rift within the country’s largest opposition party – CHP. According to expert Ikbal Durre, the government is using criminal cases and court rulings “to create animosity within [the party], so that it won’t be able to participate in the next elections as a unified structure.” To protest these actions, demonstrators took to the streets on Sept. 8. The rallies rapidly devolved into clashes with the police, causing the authorities to impose a three-day ban on public events and block social media.

Russia is another country that wields social networks as weapons. Now, following the banning of several messaging apps, ostensibly to prevent fraud, some Russian cities are being allowed to hold their first authorized demonstrations in years, with protesters complaining that “the bans violate their constitutional right to free communication.” However, according to NG, only small left-wing groups have been granted the right to protest because they have no chance of making it into the State Duma in 2026. At the same time, establishment State Duma parties understand that they may lose their “place in the sun” if they protest the bans, and this place “is now independent of normal, natural contacts with voters.”

If establishment parties were to have any “normal” contacts with voters, they would learn pretty quickly that many are feeling the pinch in terms of personal finances. As NG reports, Romir researchers say that the amount of spare cash in Russian wallets has dropped precipitously in recent years, mainly due to inflation and higher prices for essential items and utilities. In fact, the state of affairs has become so dire, that, as Meduza describes, many families in Chechnya, one of Russia’s most impoverished regions, are resorting to sham divorces to access the benefits they so desperately need to survive. Perhaps, then, the best way for politicians to stay in power is not to resort to desperate schemes to hold on to it, but to, in fact, have “normal, natural contacts with voters” and generally just be better public servants.