From Rossiiskaya gazeta, April 11, 2025, p. 6. Complete text:
US President Donald Trump was not joking. As promised, he announced a revision of trade policy toward practically all [countries]. The imposition of tariffs, designed to even out the US balance of trade with other countries, has unsettled markets, prompting talk about a global recession or even depression. And even though Trump quickly began to maneuver, indicating that everything was flexible, no one can predict the outcome. Opinions and forecasts are generally not in Trump’s favor: Commentators are convinced that at the very least, the US will suffer as much as others. Whatever positive effects there are for the US economy will come in the long term. In the short term, [this will] hit consumers and most producers, [drive] inflation, reduce [market] capitalization, and so on.
Trump has a reputation as a stubborn person who lets nothing stand in his way. I’ll leave it to [economic] experts to speculate on economic consequences, but I can try to predict political ones.
During Trump’s first presidential campaign in 2016, an essay [“The Flight 93 Election”] by Michael Anton, a conservative essayist, caused an uproar. The author compared Trumpists to the passengers of the fourth plane hijacked by terrorists on Sept. 11, 2001 [United Airlines Flight 93]. It crashed, failing to reach its target (purportedly the White House), because those on board attacked the hijackers and foiled their plans. Anton described the policy pursued by the US, which by that time had been seized by liberal globalists, as catastrophic. He called on the patriots who understood this [situation] to stop [the country] from plunging into an abyss, even at the cost of their (political) lives and fully aware that their attempt was doomed.
Anton then worked in the first Trump administration and became disappointed in [Trump], but has returned in the second Trump administration, and is currently even participating in talks with Russia as director of policy planning at the US State Department.
Trump’s current behavior is extending the metaphor, as it were, to the whole world (at the time, Anton was referring to America’s domestic politics). The White House believes that the international system that has evolved is not only detrimental to America but driving the US into a dead end by deepening the imbalance. [This system] must be dismantled immediately to create prerequisites for [a] different [path of] development. Otherwise, sooner or later (but not that much later), the foundations of American might will start to crumble under the weight of unresolved problems.
Many agree with the way the issue is being framed. However, there is no certainty that the chosen tactics will lead to its resolution. Trump believes that other countries, which heavily depend on the American market, will rush to accept [his] new conditions, and that Washington will be able to dictate its terms. This is precisely the case with several countries: They do not want to and cannot wage a trade war with the US. However, there are two main targets of the US measures that cannot agree easily and quickly: China and the EU. In each case the reasons are different.
China is comparable to the US in terms of scale and global weight, and it is laying claim to a role on a par with the US. Not [the role of] a hegemon – that position in the world is being phased out – but a counterweight (let’s call it that for the sake of clarity, even though China’s perception of its role in the world is more complex). There is no reason to expect that a [great] power with such self-esteem will easily agree to somebody else’s demands. Especially given that Beijing feels quite confident, believing that the US will suffer great losses and will have to back down (here China may be underestimating its opponent).
The EU has a different problem. Its trade policy is the prerogative of the European Commission, a supranational body, while the American moves are hitting individual countries, primarily Germany, Europe’s largest exporter. Yes, the commission acts under the mandate of [EU] countries, but on a consensus basis. This clearly inhibits the flexibility of response – a characteristic that allows an individual state to quickly take unilateral measures, if necessary. Coordination of positions has never been easy, and it is all the more difficult to keep national interests in check in a force majeure situation: After all, in this case they are [part of] the survival instinct.
There is also another factor that China does not have to contend with. The EU is the US’s main ally, heavily dependent on it in military and political affairs. This has never precluded competition, but it has given the Americans an edge in any dispute. Right now, the situation is contradictory. Trump actually perceives Europe as an adversary (explicitly in terms of economics, implicitly in terms of security). For its part, Europe cannot perceive America the same way, since it is not certain it can independently ensure its military-political existence.
The way things stand today on the US-China track, we are likely to hear increasingly loud battle cries and see a show of intransigence in the hope that the opponent’s state will worsen faster. Then, based on the logic of relations between the two countries, this will be followed by a bargaining phase – but this time, [bargaining] will be harder. The situation on the US-Europe track is less clear: Trump is expecting the EU to capitulate (more unconditionally than in China’s case). Europe is traditionally inclined to obey, but this time meeting [the US’s] demands would mean surrendering all ambitions – and it is not clear in exchange for what.
Trump is going to come down hard on global trade, deal with Iran, [and] resolve the Ukraine issue – quickly and all at once. The Flight 93 pilot has a very tight schedule.