‘Fear Is the Best Cement for the System’

From Republic.ru, June 25, 2026, https://republicmag.io/posts/117738. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – Could Putin face mutiny again? If so, where might it come from? How do the elites respond to drone attacks against Russian cities and economic problems? How do ordinary people respond to the same? Since mutiny is the theme of this week’s issue of Republic Weekly, our correspondent Yegor Senchin discussed these and other questions with political analyst and lawyer Boris Pastukhov.

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Question. – [Wagner private military company founder Yevgeny] Prigozhin’s mutiny in 2023 [see Vol. 75, No. 26, pp. 3-8] exposed how vulnerable Putin’s regime is. Since the situation in the economy and on the battlefield is even worse today, is it possible that something like that might happen again?

Answer. – Personally, I think our key takeaway from Prigozhin’s mutiny should be as follows: While the masses in Russia are very inert – I would even say extremely inert – and thus very loyal to the authorities, this does not mean that they are ready to support Putin personally. Analysts often say that what we have in Russia is a personalist authoritarian regime and a leader cult, but I don’t completely agree with that.

What Putin created in Russia – or recreated –is a combination of fear, indifference and helplessness that forces people to accept that, in order to survive, they have to do as they are told by those in power. They will listen to Putin as long as Putin has power. But once Prigozhin with his thugs, or someone like him, takes power, even if only on a local scale, people are willing to be equally loyal to that new leadership – at least until the old leadership reasserts itself.

The past three years have proven this. The authorities were unable to get the heavily militarized economy and ideology to run purely on enthusiasm. As a result, they have to control the masses by maintaining a semblance of normal life in the major cities, intimidating people and paying huge sign-on bonuses to new recruits in underdeveloped provinces. Overall, the situation is not terrible, but it is a lot less stable than the Kremlin would have preferred.

At the same time, the recent drone attacks on Russian cities, including Moscow, have demonstrated that we should not overestimate the effect these attacks have on ordinary people. I mean, for sure, there were some people who were impressed and scared. For others, however, this is just another reason to dig in their heels and “make those Ukrainian bastards pay for it all.” Similarly, when Ukrainian forces invaded Kursk Province in 2024 [see Vol. 76, No. 32, pp. 3-8], there was a spike in the number of men interested in enlisting in the military in Russia. Likewise, these strikes deep inside Russia produce this kind of unintended reaction – primarily among the ordinary people and less so among the elite.

Q. – Who poses the biggest threat to the regime right now? Who is the number one enemy?

A. – A regime that has completely removed people from politics has two allies – and, contrary to what radical patriots say, these are not the Army and the Navy [in the words attributed to Emperor Alexander III – Trans.]. The two allies are bread and circuses. Hence, the regime’s primary enemies are those who ruin the show at the circuses and those who take away people’s bread. The Kremlin is right: The Ukrainian Armed Forces are its number one enemy.

At the same time, I think Putin’s calculus is as follows: Yes, the Russian military may be suffering some temporary setbacks on the battlefield but, on the other hand, Russia has enough staying power to ride out the storm. Putin is convinced that sooner or later Russia will win, and I don’t see anything that could make him change his mind in the foreseeable future.

Q. – Putin said recently that he would be willing to engage in peace talks, as long as Ukraine agrees to return to the preliminary agreements reached in Istanbul [in 2022] and “accepts the current situation on the ground.” Does this imply that Putin himself is tired of this war?

A. – I don’t think Putin gives in to panic. He is convinced that, in the medium and long term, the Russian military is well able to outlast the enemy. That’s why he acts so confidently and even brazenly.

Q. – What about the so-called “elites,” though? Are there any signs that they are ready to rise up? For instance, we hear increasingly critical remarks from some members of the State Duma. In a veiled way, they are criticizing Putin and people close to him.

A. – I think that these rumors about dissent brewing among the Russian elite are no more than wishful thinking on the part of some opposition activists who have fled Russia.

I mean, for sure, there are murmurs among the elite. You may see a few cracks appear here and there. As the economic situation worsens and the pie gets smaller, there is some cannibalism, and a business owner may wake up one day to find that their company has been taken over by more rapacious rivals. But the key principle remains the same. People close to Putin know that if they remain loyal, they may lose some of their wealth – in fact, they are likely to; but they also know that if they turn against Putin, they will definitely lose everything. Ironically, this dilemma is not entirely a product of Putin’s clever strategy; in part, it results from the restrictions and sanctions imposed by the so-called “West.”

For now, it is the economic elite that have suffered the most. These people viewed the status quo we had in Russia from 2003 through 2022 as a kind of social contract they had with the government: We don’t interfere with the way you run the country, and you don’t interfere with the way we make money. But the authorities clearly viewed this situation differently; to them, it’s just that they have been so busy they never got to deal with these tycoons properly – an oversight they absolutely intended to fix.

If there is indeed a plot brewing somewhere, it is in the very heart of the system, within the security apparatus, where the largest gear wheels grind against each other, creating friction and internal tension.

Q. – Since you mentioned the security apparatus, what do you think about the shape they’re in? For example, the FSB [Federal Security Service] announced recently that they decided to lower fitness requirements for potential recruits. Does it mean that the situation is so bad that they are willing to accept anybody?

A. – I don’t think it’s that important whether FSB agents are fit or not. As the saying goes, “God created men strong and weak, and Colonel Colt made them equal.” The FSB’s repression machine will run pretty smoothly even if their agents are obese.

What is more important is that tensions between the military and the intelligence services are continuing to mount. A triumphant military would be a real contender capable of dethroning the FSB, but a military that suffers one defeat after another is fuel for FSB generals’ career growth.

Q. – What are the regime’s weakest points?

A. – The weakest point remains the same: the long-term strategy, or the lack thereof.

Russia has no strategy; unless the West decides to self-destruct sometime soon, Russia doesn’t know what to do. For the time being, the Kremlin’s strategy is isolation. Yes, the situation in Russia is pretty bad, but if a fire breaks out and the rest of the world is ablaze, things will be bad but at least stable in Russia, which is an achievement in and of itself. But if there is no fire, nobody has any idea how Russia is going to catch up with the rest of the world.

As far as I can tell, the Russian leadership harbors no illusions on this matter. It does not believe – and never did – that Russia can outpace the West economically or technologically anytime soon. Their hopes are based on the assumption that Europe is decaying, the dollar will soon go belly up, and the West will either collapse on its own or it might need a little push, but its end is imminent either way. And when the rest of the world falls apart, Russia will look pretty decent by comparison; all it has to do is survive until the world unravels.

For the elites, too, strategy is extremely important. Preserving one’s economic, political or social capital while living on an active volcano is a tricky business. They want guarantees; they want an acceptable scenario for their future.

Q. – What can help the regime survive until 2036?

A. – Fear. As long as repression targets only a select few, loyalists know that they have a chance at survival and that, conversely, there will be no mercy for traitors. Considering that I don’t really think the current leadership in Russia can be replaced by some forces outside the elite, fear will remain the best cement for the system in the foreseeable future.

Q. – Everything has a shelf life, and fear is no exception. We see how economic difficulties make some people bolder – and some are even ready to go berserk.

A. – I still think that fear will win – at least for the time being.

It seems to me that the regime should be able to dial repressions up a notch or two if necessary.

In addition, our people have fear instilled in their DNA. What Stalin did cannot be easily undone. There’s not too much time left before 2036. I think that a combination of fear with the propaganda formats that are being used today would be the most reasonable policy for the Kremlin. On the other hand, we all know that, in an effort to stabilize the situation, the Russian authorities sometimes come up with exotic ideas that can backfire in a massive and unexpected way. . . . .

Q. – So, how might the regime end eventually?

A. – I doubt that Putin will live until 150, so the regime is doomed to fall sooner or later. Could it happen before the “leader” dies of natural causes? Edvard Radzinsky has an expression he used in his history lectures about the monarchs who ruled Russia after Peter the Great. Quite often, Russian monarchs genuinely thought that Russia was a monarchy, forgetting that there was a very real parliament in their country, and the name of this parliament was the Imperial Guard. This “parliament” had its special way of “impeaching” the rulers it didn’t like, and once a ruler was “impeached,” the decision could not be reversed. I think that if we see a change at the top in Russia in the foreseeable future (which does not seem likely), it will probably happen in a similar fashion – through an intervention by this “parliament.”

Q. – What is your forecast for the next few months? Both Putin’s “elite” and the masses are wound up. Many people think that something is about to happen, because things can’t stay as they are for much longer. It seems that the economy is stalling and the “special military operation” has hit a dead end. On the other hand, Putin can’t just backpedal, because he has this idea that “Russians never surrender.”

A. – If you want me to pick from a list of available moves (ruling out the option of making no moves at all), I’d say that escalation seems a likely scenario, with the Kremlin upping the ante by opening new fronts – either externally (perhaps attacking a Baltic nation) or internally (launching new rounds of repressions and deprivatization).

On the other hand, with Putin, the most likely strategy has always been inertia – just doing whatever he’s doing.