Letter From the Editors

The ranks of soldiers marching through Red Square on Victory Day were outshone only by the ranks of pro-Kremlin propagandists who preceded them. This double issue of the Digest is replete with glorifications of military valor, the defeat of Nazism, and the importance of “historical memory.” Along with these words of praise are condemnations of those who might rain on the parade.

For example, here’s the title of a Vedomosti article that came out as Russia was gearing up for the celebration: “Kiev Rejects Short-Term Ceasefire and Threatens Guests of May 9 Parade in Moscow.” In objective terms, Ukrainian officials did indeed take issue with the idea (proposed by Putin in late April) of scheduling a three-day ceasefire for the May 8‑10 weekend. But let’s look at what they said in their own words. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrei Sibiga wrote on social media April 30: “If Russia truly wants peace, it must cease fire immediately. Why wait until May 8?” The same day, President Zelensky posted on Telegram: “[W]e don’t need a short-term ceasefire just for a few days, after which killing will resume. We need an immediate, comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days.”

What about Kiev’s “threat” against Victory Day guests in Moscow? Zelensky said, as cited by Interfax Ukraine: “Our position is very simple for all countries traveling to Russia on May 9: We cannot be held responsible for what happens on the territory of the Russian Federation.” He elaborated: “Because we don’t know what Russia will do these days.” Specifically, Moscow could orchestrate provocations like “arson, bombings and so on, only to blame us.”

Not surprisingly, Moscow took this allegation as a provocation in itself. Federation Council speaker Valentina Matviyenko even called it “criminal.” Ex-president Dmitry Medvedev – who in his present incarnation as deputy Security Council head can be counted on to serve up Kremlin rhetoric in its rawest form – warned Zelensky that “in the event of an actual provocation on Victory Day, no one will be able to guarantee that Kiev will see May 10.”

Expert Dmitry Suslov expressed this idea more moderately, suggesting that Zelensky’s words were intended only to pressure potential top-ranking guests: “Zelensky understands that an actual attack on the parade or a serious provocation will not end well for him or for Ukraine.”

Sure enough, the Moscow parade came off with no violent incidents to spoil the photos of Putin flanked by Xi Jinping, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and other luminaries. However, most of Europe seemed to heed Zelensky’s warning and stayed away. Or, more likely, they harked to the warning of European Commission Vice-President Kaja Kallas, who said at a mid-April press conference that “any participation in the . . . celebrations in Moscow will not be taken lightly on the European side.” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was the only EU leader who bucked the trend.

The West’s refusal to stand with Putin (literally and figuratively) is a sign of a fundamental change for humanity, according to Fyodor Lukyanov. It marks the end of the “Nuremberg consensus” – i.e., “the generally accepted moral and ideological interpretation of World War II as the fight against an absolute evil, which eclipsed even the deep disagreements among its opponents.” In the 21st century, Lukyanov argues, the West has come to believe that the war was unleashed not just by the Hitler regime, but by “two totalitarianisms” – and putting these on an equal footing undermines the liberal world order that brought stability for generations.

It’s hard to find a political analyst more persuasive than Lukyanov, although we can imagine this counterargument: What’s messing up the world order is not the idea of “two totalitarianisms,” but the growing evidence that the one that survived is emulating the one that it buried.