Abstract. As China has become a global economic and political pole, political stability and effective state governance have come to be seen as key sources of Chinese success, alongside comparative economic advantages and favorable external conditions. An analysis of China’s state institutions and their potential for improvement is especially important against the backdrop of growing socio-political instability in the US and Europe, caused by interethnic conflicts, the migration crisis, differences between representatives of traditional and non-traditional identities, and the overall decline in the effectiveness of political institutions in Western democracies. An important role in shaping the political institutions of contemporary China is played by elements preserved from the period of the revolutionary wars: interparty cooperation between the CCP and small democratic parties, the work of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as well as the historical experience of “small” and “great democracy,” consultative democracy, and the mass socio-political campaigns of the 1950s-1980s. A new stage in China’s political development began after Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee. Alongside the concentration of a significant amount of power in the hands of the party and state leader, institutions of democratic participation by the population continue to develop. The fight against corruption and the creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) have contributed to the emergence of a new form of political participation related to the exercise of oversight functions by the public. A concept of whole- process democracy is taking shape as the main direction of political development, contributing to the evolution of the notion of representative democracy.

The primary shortcoming of authoritarian systems is typically considered to be the absence of democratic procedures – universal elections, separation of powers, multiparty competition – which provide mechanisms for the renewal of power and ensure the people’s participation in state formation and administration. Democratic elections and the separation of powers in democratic systems, in turn, help maintain social stability and enhance the quality of governance by means of competitive selection of political leaders and senior officials, as well as public oversight of government agencies.

After the reforms began, China established a system of institutional authoritarianism that eliminated many of the shortcomings of traditional authoritarian systems. By creating a system of orderly power succession, the Chinese state found a way to ensure political stability while maintaining a high pace of socio-economic development. Another reason for success – the significance of which became evident later – was the political institutions retained from the revolutionary war period and revived after the end of the Cultural Revolution. These include the system of oversight and consultative bodies, primarily the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and the system of multiparty cooperation, which complemented the oversight institutions of the party (the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)) and of the executive authority (Ministry of Supervision), allowing for the formation of a comprehensive system of public and state oversight.

With the start of economic reforms, the role of representative bodies, small democratic parties, and mass public organizations steadily increased. This occurred against the backdrop of the CCP’s reduced directive-based involvement in public life, consistent with the policy of separating party and administrative functions proclaimed by Deng Xiaoping at the onset of the reforms. The push for the division of power was a natural reaction to the practices of the Cultural Revolution period. All political reforms of that era aimed to overcome the negative consequences of the cult of personality and to prevent the recurrence of the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual.

Gradually, there emerged not only an understanding of the need to correct specific mistakes, including collective ones,1 but also a demand for profound transformations of the socialist system. In the course of reforms, a new concept of socialist development began to take shape, which entailed changes in all areas of life. The field of political reform also expanded.

In the mid-1980s, especially on the eve of the 13th CCP Congress, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasized that “without reform of the political system (政治体制改革), there will be no economic reform; they depend on and correspond to each other.”2 All political and administrative transformations of that period established a stable trend toward the democratization and humanization of the regime. This process accelerated after the announcement of the course toward building a socialist market economy. The strategy of political transformation fully aligned with the strategy of economic reform and aimed to create conditions for the voluntary participation of the population in public and economic life – as opposed to the previous period, which relied primarily on methods of ideological and political mass mobilization.

In the 1990s, the Western political science community closely examined the prospects of China’s political regime and assessed the democratic discourse surrounding its development. It must be acknowledged that there were certain grounds for this. The experience of political transformation in Taiwan demonstrated the fundamental possibility of democratizing a political system that was monopolized by a party that was typologically similar and initially non-parliamentary – the Kuomintang – which over the course of a decade evolved into a parliamentary one.

Since the 1980s, the Western experience of political development was also closely studied in China. Despite criticism of democratic socialism, one of the main areas of political reform was seen to lie in expanding political participation by strengthening feedback between the public and the government. This approach corresponded to the CCP’s view of the people as the source of power (“the people as masters”) and found theoretical expression in the system of consultative democracy.3 It was regarded as a Chinese path to state-building, significantly influenced by perceptions of political development trends in the modern world, from which many economic achievements were acknowledged and adopted.

The financial and economic crisis of 2008, which exacerbated a number of problems in the social development of Western countries (the migration crisis, growing interethnic, racial, and interreligious conflicts) and in the longer term contributed to the deterioration of relations with China, intensified negative perceptions of the West and led to more critical views of Western experience in general and of its state-building practices in particular. However, the decisive factor in the change of China’s political development trajectory was domestic issues. By the time Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee, there was a pressing need to find a new economic model, along with the emergence of other domestic and foreign challenges.4 In addition to the slowdown in growth and the shift to a “new normal,” it became increasingly necessary to focus on socio-political stability, issues of social justice, and the social dimensions of development.

Gradually, in the characteristically confident spirit of the new era and amid a process of “re-Sinicization,” the PRC leadership began to search for a new model of political participation, carefully studying and synthesizing its own experience.

“Small Democracy” and “Great Democracy”

After the founding of the PRC, the process of state-building passed through several stages. The beginning of the first may be considered the convocation of the National People’s Congress (1954) and the Eighth CCP Congress (1956). After the official conclusion of the period of acute class struggle, new solutions were needed to resolve social tensions, including in the relationship between the state and the intelligentsia. The tasks of modernization and industrialization, and the need to involve the scientific, technical, and humanities intelligentsia in this process, led Mao Zedong in 1956 to proclaim the policy of “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.”

The principle governing the CCP’s relationship with the eight small democratic parties – cooperation and mutual supervision – under which these parties accepted the leadership of the CCP but did not become independent and equal participants in the political process, determined the format of the Communist Party’s approach to the intelligentsia in the mid-1950s. The theoretical basis for such interaction was the shift at the Eighth CCP Congress from viewing the principal contradiction of socialism as class struggle to the contradiction between underdeveloped productive forces and the growing material and spiritual needs of the people. The possibility of expressing opinions on a broad range of issues and engaging in discussion without participating in political struggle – so-called “small democracy” – became the main form for implementing the “Hundred Flowers” policy. At its core was the notion that the fundamental formula of party life – “unity-criticism-unity” – could, under socialism, be extended to society as a whole. This course was substantiated by Mao Zedong in several works: On the Ten Major Relationships, the Political Report to the Eighth CCP Congress, More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, and others.

However, during the unfolding campaign, a critical attitude quickly emerged among a significant portion of the intelligentsia toward communist ideology, the CCP’s leadership role, and socialist construction as a whole. Mao Zedong’s notion that tensions among the people under socialism could be resolved according to an intra-party model was not borne out.5 Nor could it be, as the nature of a political party as a voluntary association of like-minded individuals and the relationships within society are fundamentally different.

The authorities responded immediately to the intelligentsia’s freethinking. In June 1957, at Mao Zedong’s call, a dazibao [big-character poster] campaign began in support of the CCP and in criticism of antisocialist forces, rightists, and “capitalist-roaders,” during which the masses expressed their attitudes toward socialism and the Communist Party. To facilitate the campaign among the popular masses – who, unlike the intelligentsia, lacked specialized skills and education – the “Four Great Freedoms” were officially proclaimed: “extensive expression of opinions, full airing of views, wide-ranging debate, and dazibao” (大鸣，大放，大辩论，大字报). The support of socialist construction by workers and peasants mobilized by the CCP predetermined the campaign’s outcome. It became clear that socialist society was not unified; deep differences and contradictions remained within it. A trusting dialogue with the intelligentsia and its unconditional support for socialist construction could not be achieved. The intelligentsia found no independent role in socialist construction and was left with only two alternatives: to become part of the people voluntarily or by compulsion. In September 1958, a campaign for the re-education of the intelligentsia through labor began, coinciding with the launch of the Great Leap Forward and the construction of people’s communes.

Mao Zedong and part of the CCP leadership interpreted the intelligentsia’s independent position as a continuation of class struggle, which, along with the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956, contributed to a revised overall assessment of the situation in socialist construction. In 1957, at the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, class struggle was once again recognized as the principal contradiction of socialism. The theoretical justification for its return to the center of public life was the Marxist argument that class struggle occurs not only in the areas of economics and politics but also ideology. After the completion of the socialist transformation of property, the only potential opponents of the CCP were the former exploiting classes and the intelligentsia that had not shed its old worldview. Class struggle in the early 1960s resumed in the form of a succession of ideological-educational campaigns, relying primarily on methods of persuasion.6

Despite unsatisfactory economic results, the policy of the “Three Red Banners” and the subsequent campaigns for the ideological re-education of peasants and the intelligentsia proved effective as a method of mass mobilization and created an atmosphere conducive to the next stage. Following the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of people’s communes, the Cultural Revolution was intended to complete the entire set of socialist transformations through processes in ideology and culture. In 1966, Mao Zedong, Chen Boda, and other active proponents of leftist ideas, led by Jiang Qing and later formalized as the “Gang of Four” after the 10th CCP Congress (1973), shifted from education to revolutionary methods. The intelligentsia, including a significant portion of cadres (ganbu), was labeled “black,” “bourgeois,” and became the primary target of struggle. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was entrusted with the historic task of “completely eliminating the old ideology, culture, and customs, and creating an entirely new proletarian ideology, culture, and customs.”

As a result, the whole of society was drawn into a political campaign devoid of political or legal constraints, which led to it being called “great democracy.” “Great democracy” emerged directly from “small democracy,” becoming the first experience of uncontrolled political participation by the masses – destructive in both nature and outcome. Ultimately, the initiator and chief inspirer of the campaign himself was forced to restrain the popular upheaval. Mao Zedong did not oppose the revolutionary movement of the masses but sought only to limit its negative impact on the economy and to prevent the most extreme manifestations, using the army for these purposes.

During the Cultural Revolution, the broadest democracy of the revolutionary masses – primarily young people, unbound by the norms of traditional culture – destroyed all institutions of state power. Nevertheless, it failed to establish lasting order: social order and revolution proved incompatible. After Mao Zedong’s death, the “Gang of Four” lost the struggle to the state institutions – the party and the army that supported it.

In the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of the Party Since the Founding of the PRC, adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the Cultural Revolution was described as a “turmoil instigated from above by the leader’s fault,” a “grave leftist error”7; in speeches by CCP political leaders of the same period, it was assessed even more harshly – as “pseudo-socialism,” a “catastrophic disaster,” a “fascist dictatorship,” and so on.

After the Cultural Revolution and the restoration of normal socio-political life, the most important task of the Chinese leadership – many of whom had personally suffered during the 10 years of turmoil – was not only to expose the excesses of the previous period but also to create mechanisms to prevent their recurrence. An important role in shaping attitudes toward the legacy of the Cultural Revolution was initially played by the fact that its official conclusion was not accompanied by its condemnation; on the contrary, at the 11th CCP Congress (1977), the possibility of its repetition was discussed.

The movement at the “Democracy Wall” on Xidan Street (1978-1979) played a significant role in shaping the final assessment of “great democracy,” revealing its existential danger. Although the movement was generally not directed against the CCP, some participants advocated for a “fifth modernization” – i.e., deep political reform, the abolition of the CCP’s monopoly on power, and a transition to democratic governance – thus demonstrating the danger of mass political movements not only “from the left,” as during the Cultural Revolution, but also “from the right.” Largely influenced by the Xidan Street Democracy Wall, Deng Xiaoping came to recognize the necessity of placing the ongoing economic reforms within strict ideological boundaries and in March 1979 put forward the “Four Cardinal Principles.”

Fears of a recurrence of the Cultural Revolution’s chaos – sparked by individuals expressing personal opinions – prompted the CCP not only to ban the posting of dazibao and shut down underground journals, but also to launch a systematic campaign against manifestations of “great democracy.” At the second session of the Fifth NPC in 1980, the “Four Great Freedoms” were removed from the Constitution. The 1981 Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, alongside its condemnation of the Cultural Revolution, recognized the non-class nature of socialism’s principal contradiction, which implied a significant softening of social contradictions, as well as changes in their forms and scale. Having first appeared in the 1975 Constitution, the “Four Freedoms” were not included in the 1982 Constitution, marking the CCP’s gradual rejection of mass socio-political campaigns as a tool of domestic governance.

Political Participation and Consultative Democracy

The main reason for ending the period of “great democracy” was the fear of renewed social instability and a repetition of the Cultural Revolution’s chaos. All party-state documents from the first half of the 1980s emphasized this aspect of political transformation.8 However, the existing practice and the accessibility of “wall-based” communication methods meant they remained widely used in the pre-digital era. This created a contradiction: Mass socio-political campaigns were the principal method of socialist construction, but after the Cultural Revolution, it became clear that such campaigns risked escalating into uncontrolled, spontaneous movements. Despite losing their constitutional status, the “Four Freedoms” continued to be widely used in everyday life. Since no official locations were designated for posting dazibao, university campuses periodically saw them appear alongside various handwritten materials – criticizing students’ material conditions, the system for assigning university graduates, bureaucratic abuses, and more. In the winter of 1986-1987, student protests that began with the posting of dazibao led to the resignation of General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who had supported them.

Nonetheless, the idea that economic reform needed to be deepened and accompanied by corresponding systemic political reform continued to prevail within the party leadership. Under the chairmanship of Zhao Ziyang, a commission on political reform was established to address issues such as the division of functions between the party and the government, intra-party and socialist democracy, and other matters. Solving these issues depended directly on determining the party’s role in society – a question stemming from the broader policy of separating party and government functions.

The Political Report to the 13th Party Congress concluded that it was necessary to gradually extend intra-party democracy to all of society as a model for resolving non-antagonistic contradictions, and to make consideration of public opinion a means of developing socialist democracy. The lessons of the Cultural Revolution were reflected in the principle that socialist democracy and socialist legality are inseparable. It was explicitly stated that “great democracy” was unacceptable: “In the face of complex social contradictions, a stable socio-political environment is necessary,” and under no circumstances “should there be a resurgence of ‘broad democracy,’ which undermines the rule of law and social stability.”9

Nevertheless, the inertia of the previous period was difficult to overcome – especially since the Communist Party itself continued to employ political campaigns during this time, such as those against “bourgeois liberalization” and “spiritual pollution.” The student demonstrations in the spring of 1989 in Tiananmen Square, and their support by Zhao Ziyang, confirmed that broad political participation by the population corresponded to the views of part of the party’s top leadership regarding the nature of political reform. The events of 1989 brought an end to the understanding of political transformation strategy as a path toward expanding political freedoms. The pause in political reform that followed the Tiananmen events was interrupted by the beginning of a new stage linked to the course toward building a market economy.

The report to the 14th CCP Congress included a provision on building socialist democratic policies with Chinese characteristics (有中国特色社会主义民主政治) – a phrase that lacked clear substantive meaning but signaled that the CCP continued to keep political reform on its agenda. However, at the 15th Congress, the goal was proclaimed of building a socialist rule-of-law state and governance according to law. This demand was primarily intended to create favorable conditions for the operation of market economy actors, ensure their confidence in the legal protection of their interests, and guarantee their independence from party interference, thereby advancing the policy of separating party and administrative functions. Political reforms were subordinated to economic ones and became a direct extension of them.

The idea of “governance according to law” offered a fundamentally different method for resolving social contradictions – not through class struggle and “great democracy,” but through legal mechanisms, “according to law,” devoid of class and political bias. The legal character of the socialist state contributed to socio-political stability and further narrowed the party’s powers, limiting its interference in economic activity.

The subsequent introduction of the “Three Represents” theory was another step toward the construction of a rule-of-law state. The legalization of the entrepreneurial class, resulting from a revision of Marxist tenets on the social structure of socialist society and the dominant social relations within it, definitively marked the end of the era of class struggle. Hu Jintao’s later promotion of the concept of a “socialist harmonious society” laid the groundwork for a new phase of democratization and the expansion of political participation.

From the late 1990s to the early 2010s, under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China actively opened up to the outside world, widely adopted market mechanisms and legal regulations. The integrity of the new social system was embodied at the 16th CCP Congress in the adoption of the concept of political civilization (政治文明) created by building a material and spiritual culture that integrates legal principles into the people’s democratic dictatorship state. At the same time, a transition to active social policy began. The Congress set the goal of “comprehensively building a xiaokang [moderately prosperous] society,” and in Jiang Zemin’s report, the “special importance of fairness” in redistribution was mentioned for the first time. The entire 2000s were marked by increased attention to social issues and the individual. This was reflected in the 2004 constitutional amendments, which equalized public and private property and guaranteed “respect for human rights.” The principle of “people as the foundation” and the concept of a “socialist harmonious society” defined the theoretical contours of the humanistic nature of transformations.

Implementing these tasks in practice required the creation of appropriate political institutions to ensure feedback between the population and the state. This period saw the numerical growth of the small democratic parties and the beginning of the institutionalization of a consultative democracy system. At the 17th CCP Congress (2007), the need was expressed to expand forms of political participation by citizens, trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation in governing society and delivering public services.

Immediately after the resumption of the activities of the CPPCC and democratic parties during the reform period, their supervisory and consultative functions were mostly decorative and auxiliary in nature. However, their role gradually increased. It was believed that these political institutions would assume some functions previously performed by the CCP and would contribute to improving the effectiveness of state governance. In the early 21st century, their significance grew further, allowing this system to be classified as “consultative democracy” and to be considered one of the main forms of socialist democracy in China.

To maintain socio-political stability, institutional rather than individual participation by citizens in their interactions with state authorities was preferred, as individual participation created conditions for the emergence of spontaneous protests. Institutional participation meant that the population was engaged through permanent channels and political institutions operating within the legal framework and under state supervision. Such institutions already existed in the PRC. The CPPCC, democratic parties, and public organizations served as a natural foundation for new state-society relations and could replace one-time political campaigns with ongoing structures. The onset of the construction of the market economy and the shift in views regarding the class nature of the state significantly reduced the relevance and scope of ideological and educational work. Ideological challenges characteristic of the era of class struggle lost their intensity, and with them, the importance of mass campaigns diminished; they became categorized as propaganda rather than ideological-political work.

All of this created additional conditions for the increased activity of mass socio-political organizations, whose numbers also began to grow noticeably.10 During this period, they gained the ability to use new mass communication tools for collecting and processing public opinion. To prevent the emergence of unsupervised civic associations, China took preemptive measures and established strict Internet controls,11 including restrictions on forming online communities of more than 50 people.

The state system for collecting and systematizing information and transmitting it via centralized channels to government bodies became the framework of consultative (deliberative) democracy, which came to be regarded as “an important component of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics.”12 The concept of consultative democracy aligned with contemporary Western conceptions of democracy, which assessed the effectiveness of a political regime in terms of its responsiveness to public demands. The Chinese political system managed to establish effective mechanisms, “resulting in a higher level of responsiveness to the population’s needs under conditions of limited procedural democracy.”13

It is noteworthy that none of the models of political development, including consultative democracy, included the media, which plays a central role in ensuring state-society feedback in the West. In China’s political system – like in other Soviet-style republics where power was gained through armed rather than parliamentary means – power-sharing is not customary. Not only was there no division into branches of government, but the existence of independent political institutions such as a “fourth estate” was also deemed unacceptable. The mass media in the PRC is controlled by propaganda organs, and attempts to create independent media were suppressed during the Democracy Wall movement and have not been revived since. Mass public organizations functionally replace the media and hold several advantages over it: They systematically collect information, cover all areas of state and public life, involve the most competent specialists in their work, and operate non-publicly, so they do not directly provoke social instability.

From Chinese Characteristics to a Chinese Foundation: Whole-Process Democracy

Since the beginning of the reforms, China’s political system has evolved toward a rule-of-law state, the separation of party and government functions, and the distinction between government and administration. In the 21st century, this process expanded to include the separation of functions among the party, the state, and business. The election of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee coincided with a slowdown in economic growth and a shift in the economic model. The search for a new development concept required increased attention to issues of social justice. But unlike in the 2000s, these issues no longer concerned fairer distribution of the income and benefits generated during the period of rapid economic growth, but rather stricter measures against all instances of abuse and corruption amid significantly slower income growth. The scope of the problem that emerged revealed that corruption had penetrated all organs of power, including the CPPCC and mass public organizations.

To formulate and implement a new course, intra-party consolidation was needed above all. A similar scenario had been followed in the late 1970s to prepare for the launch of reforms, when the process of personnel cleansing and renewal took place in parallel with the articulation of a new concept of socialist construction.

Xi Jinping believed that through the revitalization of the state and party apparatus, most of the country’s acute socio-political and economic problems could be resolved. Starting in 2012, the fight against corruption remained the main focus of domestic policy for nearly a decade, encompassing all organs of power and areas of public life. To conduct it more effectively, the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) was established as a constitutional body to monitor the economic and political elite, combining party resources with state-administrative powers. The NSC became not only a tool for strengthening supervision of the behavior of party members and state officials, but also one of the first indicators of a new institutional merger of party and state – of administrative and political authority.

Successes in the fight against corruption contributed to the consolidation of power and simultaneously strengthened Xi Jinping’s personal position. At the 19th CCP Congress, he became the author of a new ideological-theoretical doctrine and was recognized as the core of the Central Committee and the entire party. Following this, amendments were made to the Constitution, enshrining his special role in shaping party ideology and in the construction of socialism at the current stage, and removing term limits for the office of President of the PRC – thus ruling out of the emergence of a new power center or potential political competitor.

In the development of political culture following the 18th CCP Congress (2012), the focus of attention gradually shifted from consultative democracy – which had been the official line of domestic policy in the preceding phase14 – to party-building and strengthening the rule of law. At the same time, the trend toward reinforcing the legal character of the state and the rule of law persisted. In Xi Jinping’s keynote article15 and the Resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee (2014),16 the expression “a comprehensive process of law-based governance” (依法治国全过程) was used. Increased attention to the law as the primary tool for resolving social contradictions was supported by a large-scale anti-corruption campaign, which – unlike the mass socio-political campaigns of the 1950s-1980s – was conducted mainly by state and party bodies.

The concentration of power in Xi Jinping’s hands and the recognition of his central role in the party and the state contributed to the strengthening of the party’s role in society. Xi Jinping reversed Deng Xiaoping’s policy of separating party and administrative functions and of reducing the party’s involvement in everyday economic affairs, returning it to the center of public life, including the market economy.17

This led to the dismantling of the political system that had developed over the years of reform. Such a reconfiguration of the political landscape required the creation of new political institutions and evoked clear parallels with the Mao Zedong era, when concentration of power in the hands of the top leader was accompanied by “great democracy.”

At the 20th CCP Congress (2022), the task of renewing the political system was clearly formulated. This included reforming the party and advancing the program for building whole-process democracy (全过程民主). The first task was closely tied to strengthening the party’s role amid the search for a new development model and external challenges. The task of self-revolutionizing the party, set forth at the Congress, confirmed that China’s political development would not proceed through competition among different political forces, but through a process of internal self-improvement.

Despite a significant increase in CPPCC activity within the framework of consultative democracy, the CCP did not raise the status of this institution of interparty cooperation and political participation by the democratic parties. Beyond the fact that public organizations and parties were affected by corruption and that many of their members pursued self-serving goals – discrediting the system of consultative democracy – other factors may also have been considered. For example, the experiences of Poland in 1989 and East Germany in 1990, where the junior partners of the ruling communist parties participated in free elections and in the peaceful transfer of power during the “velvet revolutions,” demonstrated the practical potential of “dormant” political actors. By proclaiming, in addition to the principle of “criticism and self-criticism,” the principle of self-revolutionization, the CCP clearly defined the role of other political forces in public life as auxiliary. Unlike the market, which over the course of the reforms evolved from a supplement to the socialist economy into a decisive factor in economic development, the democratic parties never became full-fledged participants in the political process.

Throughout the reform period, the search for a new political model that met the challenges of contemporary China was influenced by the outside world and the dominant values and ideas it promoted, including those concerning democracy. At the same time, beginning with Mao Zedong, the factor of China’s cultural heritage became firmly entrenched in the ideological-theoretical discourse; its influence steadily grew and ultimately led to the formulation of Deng Xiaoping’s “theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics,” followed by Hu Jintao’s innovation of giving China’s social order a new name – “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义). Xi Jinping’s new concept of “building socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” which strengthened the formation-based content of Chinese socialism at the 19th Party Congress, was balanced at the 20th Congress by the provision on integrating Marxism with traditional Chinese culture.18 The significance of this provision has gradually extended to the political system as well.

In recent years, the development of China’s political system has taken on an increasingly national character. A key feature of these processes is not the Sinicization of Western state institutions but a reassessment of contemporary global experience and the development of China’s own concepts of political organization.

Against the backdrop of crises in the West and rapid domestic economic growth, China’s confidence in its historical correctness and strength has solidified. In 2013, with the rise of Xi Jinping, China again began to speak of the need to “restore morality,” to “govern by both law and virtue.”19 At the celebration of the 95th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, Xi Jinping for the first time proclaimed the “Four Confidences”: confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics.20 In contemporary Chinese discourse, the choice between morality (virtue) and law, ethics and legality reemerged in the resolutions of the 19th CCP Congress.

Ahead of the 20th Congress, in his speech on July 1, 2021, marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP, Xi Jinping introduced the term “whole-process people’s democracy” (全过程人民民主).21 This type of democracy is not limited to democratic elections (选举), democratic consultation (协商), democratic decision-making (决策), democratic administration (管理), and democratic supervision (监督); it envisions public participation at all stages of public policy implementation. This is expressed in the population’s ability to respond to all violations of the principles of social justice, to immorality and abuse among officials – not just to the actions of party-state institutions.

In effect, this signifies the introduction of a system of bottom-up oversight, which represents not only the political embodiment of the principles of social justice, but also an effective form of public supervision of officials – implemented both through the state’s oversight system and with the participation and assistance of the people.

Thus, the two types of supervisory authority – executive and directive (CCDI, NSC, Ministry of Supervision) and consultative and supervisory (CPPCC, NPC) – are now supplemented by a third: the supervisory authority of the populace, extending to all levels of state administration.

This system has several advantages. First, the CCP retains not only a monopoly on power but also on political initiative, denying other socio-political institutions – democratic parties and mass organizations – the right to act independently. Second, it involves the entire population in the continuous oversight of officials; the system of control becomes universal, encompassing even the supervisory bodies themselves. Third, it realizes the principle of social justice in non-economic areas, thereby securing broad popular support for the sole leader of the party and the state. Fourth, the system of broad political participation takes on institutional forms, providing an alternative to mass socio-political campaigns. In form, whole-process democracy is direct democracy – a democracy of universal participation; in function, it is supervisory democracy, which does not extend to political initiative.

It is still difficult to speak of the final contours of whole-process democracy. It is worth noting that the chairman of the CPPCC National Committee is Wang Huning, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee, who over the past 30 years has earned a reputation as a bold theorist and successful politician. It is therefore possible to suppose that “supervisory democracy” may succeed consultative democracy, distinguished by its broad involvement of the population in monitoring the work of state authorities and officials. A similar configuration existed during the brief period of Qin Shi Huang and the dominance of Legalist thought and was later adopted by the Communist Party in its initial response22 – now, it has entered a new stage of development.

* * *

Democratization in China has always taken extreme forms: either a leftist, ultra-socialist revolt or rightist, anti-socialist chaos. At a systemic level, the CCP has not succeeded in controlling this process through democratic means and has always been compelled to resort to force, inevitably exacerbating social upheaval. This is one of the reasons why “color revolutions” – against which the Chinese political system has no antidote – elicit serious concern in China. Under these circumstances, the CCP’s chief task is to eliminate the very possibility of socio-political instability. To achieve this, it is necessary to legally restrict the right to political initiative and to complement these restrictions with a system of public oversight that is highly responsive to all signs of popular discontent.

In Western societies, oversight of government activity is carried out at the institutional level through a system of checks and balances among branches of government and state institutions. Western democratic systems embody the consensus of state institutions born of representative democracy. In China, a different mechanism for maintaining stability is being formed – through limiting the autonomy of officials and the executive branch both from above and from below. In terms of political process, whole-process democracy in China represents the continuation of the mass socio-political movements of the PRC’s early period, outside the bounds of organizational institutionalization.

NOTES:

1. At the 15th Congress, it was stated as necessary to “create a system of responsibility for mistakes in decision-making,” including collective ones. The reason for such abnormal phenomena as individual decision-making, the cult of personality, the “unanimous” commission of mistakes, and then their “unanimous” correction, was the lack of democratic control over power.

2. 邓小平文选. 第三卷 [Deng Xiaoping. Selected Works. Volume III], 人民出版社, 1993年, 第164页.

3. Korolev A.N. “Sotsial’naya effektivnost’ politicheskikh rezhimov — imeyet li znacheniye demokratiya?”[Social efficiency of political regimes: does democracy matter?], Rossiya v ATR, No. 3 (2016), pp. 82-105;Korolev A.N.“Nuzhna li Kitayu politicheskaya reforma dlya dal’neyshego ekonomicheskogo rosta i privedet li dal’neyshiy ekonomicheskiy rost k demokratizatsii politicheskogo rezhima KNR?”[Does China need political reform to further its economic growth, and will further economic growth lead to democratization of China’s political regime?], 3-y plenum TSK KPK: novoye rukovodstvo i strategiya reform (Moscow, 2014), pp. 1-16; Korolev A.N.“Reagirovaniye politicheskogo rezhima KNR na bazovyye nuzhdy naseleniya”[The response of the political regime of the PRC to the basic needs of the population], Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, No. 2 (2015), pp. 90-107.

4. For example, events in Hong Kong in 2014 and 2019 showed the significant potential for domestic political challenges. Of particular importance was the strengthening of separatist tendencies in Taiwan, which indicated the formation of a new political and cultural identity and had a powerful impact on the socio-political situation in Hong Kong, as well as on relations with the US.

5. Markova S.D. Kitayskaya intelligentsiya na izlomakh XX veka: (ocherki vyzhivaniya) [Chinese intelligentsia at the turning points of the twentieth century: (essays on survival)] (Moscow: Gumanitariy, 2004), p. 339.

6. Istoriya Kitaya s drevneyshikh vremen do nachala XXI v.: v 10 t. T. 8. Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika (1949–1976) [History of China from ancient times to the beginning of the 21st century: in 10 volumes: Volume 8: People’s Republic of China (1949-1976)], ed. Yu.M. Galenovich (Moscow: Nauka, 2017), pp. 262-282, 309-330.

7. Resheniye TSK KPK po nekotorym voprosam istorii KPK so vremeni obrazovaniya KNR (Pekin: Izd-vo lit. na inostr. yaz. 1981), pp. 37, 42. In the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party Over the Past Century (adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Committee on November 11, 2021), the assessment has not changed: the Cultural Revolution is characterized as “10 years of domestic turmoil which caused the Party, the country, and the people to suffer the most serious losses and setbacks since the founding of the People’s Republic. This was an extremely bitter lesson.” See: 中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议（全文）[Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the main achievements and historical experience of the party over the past century], 中国政府网, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021–11/16/ content_5651269.htm (retrieved on July 7, 2024).

8. “Guaranteeing stability is the key to successful modernization. This principle cannot be shaken; if it is shaken, China will slide into division and chaos, and modernization will be impossible.” See [2], pp. 267-268.

9. Dokumenty XIII Vsekitayskogo s”yezda KPK [Documents of the 13th National Congress of the CPC] (Beijing, 1988), p. 46. Zhao Ziyang’s report uses 大民主 in Chinese.

10. See [3], Korolev A.N. Reagirovaniye…, pp. 102-103.

11. Afonina L.A., Vinogradov A.V. “China’s Social Credit System,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2023), pp. 26-45.

12. 杨德山：中国特色社会主义民主理论的历程及经验研究 [Yang Deshan. Research on the history and experience of the theory of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics], 北京, 2019年. 第7页

13. See [3], Korolev A.N. “Reagirovaniye…,” pp. 91-92.

14. See [3], Korolev A.N. “Reagirovaniye…,” p. 100.

15. 习近平：加快建设社会主义法治国家（二〇一五年一月） [Xi Jinping. Accelerate the construction of a socialist state based on the rule of law (January 2015)], 中华人民共和国海事局, 2022年, https://www.msa.gov.cn/html/ztlm/sihuajianshe/xinwendongtai/20220217/9B1DD4C7-F9CB-42F3-A89C-C5B1E6CB0B49.html (retrieved on November 7, 2024).

16. 中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定 [Decision of the CPC Central Committee on some important issues of comprehensive development of the rule of law], 人民网, https://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c70731-25926879.html (retrieved on November 7, 2024).

17. At the 20th CCP Congress, he promised to “keep income distribution and the means of accumulating wealth well-regulated” and “adjust excessive income.”

18. “Roundtable ‘The 20th Congress of the CPC,’ ” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2023), pp. 1-33.

19. In 2014, the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee confirmed that “governance based on moral standards” was equal to “governance based on law.” 人民日报. October 29, 2014. 第1–4页.

20. Subsequently, this provision was included in the Central Committee’s report to the 19th Congress. 中国共产党第十九次代表大会文件汇编 [Collection of documents of the 19th national congress of the CPC], 北京, 2017年.

21. Lomanov A.V. “Innovatsiya i traditsiya v traktovke demokratii v sovremennoy ideologii KPK” [Innovation and tradition in the interpretation of democracy in the modern ideology of the CPC], Polis: Politicheskiye issledovaniya, No. 5 (2023), pp. 88-105.

22. Goncharov S. “ ‘Escaping the historical cycle’ and the construction of a new ideology at the 20th CPC Congress,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2023), pp. 34-60.