From Republic, Oct. 5, 2026. Condensed text:
Editors’ Note. – The Russian regime is becoming more brutal. A few days after the so-called elections, political analyst Aleksandr Kynev was arrested in Moscow on drug trafficking charges, and his leg was broken. In Izhevsk, activist Dmitry Morozov, who tried to hold a rally against [electoral] falsification, was also detained on “drug trafficking” charges. In Moscow, police detained several dozen people at an authorized RFCP rally [see the first article under Political Parties/Blocs]. Republic asked political analyst Aleksandr Morozov what else the Kremlin had postponed until after the voting, and what we should expect to happen now in domestic and foreign policy.
* * *
Question. – Russia has for more than two weeks now been living in a “postelection” regime. Many expected something terrible to happen, since there would be nothing to restrain the Kremlin anymore. How do you see [the situation developing during] this period?
Answer. – For starters, it needs to be said that aesthetically, these elections were incredibly monumental. For example, 20,000 people submitted applications for United Russia primaries. In other words, that number of people wished to become State Duma deputies via United Russia. They want to build their careers in the state apparatus, undergo all checks and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) [vetting process] and become Class A officials.
Furthermore, tens of thousands of party deputies from all parliamentary parties in various regions [and] legislative assemblies were mobilized for these elections. The parties and the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) mobilized 380,000 observers. This is a colossal number.
A multilevel system was worked out. It is difficult to compare it to anything, since the system involved the use of all possible forms of voting, [including] on tree stumps [used as tables]. Special polling stations were set up for early voting. Voting was organized in occupied territories and frontline areas. Online voting was actively developed. Furthermore, special tools were introduced for the three-day vote to ensure that on the first day United Russia would show some figures, with the help of administrative mobilization, that in the following two days would serve as guidelines for political spin doctors.
In short, it was a wide-ranging scheme. It is aimed at, first, preserving the difference between establishment and so-called nonestablishment parties so that the latter never make it into the State Duma. Second, the entire system is designed to demonstrate the so-called Putin majority regardless of party affiliation. And every time, the Kremlin’s political managers succeed in doing so.
Meanwhile, State Duma elections as such tell us absolutely nothing new about the political course or about what [the situation] will be like in the next several years. Why? Because the State Duma is tightly built into the system of state institutions. Decisions are made by the government and federal agencies together with the presidential administration, with Putin personally. These decisions take the form of strategic plans or [presidential] decrees. And then the State Duma simply follows these strategies, passing laws that are drafted by this collective Putin. So it’s not like we’re ever going to find out anything that we did not know before the elections.
However, what is important to note here?
First, there is a need for some economic drivers. These drivers are essential because there are no foreign investments and there won’t be any, so it is necessary to get the public involved in investment activity. Simply put, it is necessary to get people not just to keep their money in bank accounts, but to [use that money to] fund some industrial projects – through a system of government debt instruments, treasury bonds or something like that.
Second, it is imperative to keep manipulating tax policy in one way or another to replenish the treasury.
Third, it is necessary to continue to promote the patriotic narrative.
All these three things are serving the war. In other words, the new Duma will serve the war, just as the previous one did. This is why all active prowar policy advocates have made it into the new State Duma. Plus, now there are also other figures known for their hawkish position.
Now they will collectively uphold [this position] within the State Duma. It is essential to stress here that they are important not as lawmakers, but as public speakers who regularly appear in the media and at all sorts of conferences organized by the Kremlin. They are also writing books and articles, and even participating in compiling textbooks. This is more or less the picture.
Q. – This State Duma differs from the previous one in that Putin’s idea has been put into practice: The “new elite” – special military operation (SMO) veterans and participants – has made it [into the Duma]. According to media reports, there are 46 SMO veterans or participants [in the Duma now]. How will this factor influence the State Duma’s activity?
A. – SMO [veterans and] participants are in the State Duma on Putin’s orders. Needless to say, this quota will also be increased in the [2027] elections to regional legislative assemblies. The presidential administration and the parties have shown that they are implementing this directive. . . .
The most important thing is that all of [these veterans] will in one way or another join the old party of war in the State Duma. . . .
Furthermore, I would like to say that from my perspective, Yabloko was lucky not to participate in these elections – it was registered, but then disqualified. This is very good for Yabloko, because the party died standing, so to speak. Even supposing that it got into the State Duma, it would have been in a terrible situation there. However, it was ruthlessly but heroically removed from the ballot. And in this respect, Yabloko’s entire long political history ends in the best possible way, because otherwise its deputies would have found themselves surrounded by a huge mass of predators, and their situation would have been extremely dubious. As it stands, they have died a heroic, worthy death.
Q. – This [Duma] will serve for five years. A lot may change during this time. In your opinion, could dissent be brewing somewhere [in the Duma]? What if, for example, [this happens] within Noviye Lyudi or the RFCP? After all, sometimes such things happen as the situation in the country deteriorates and problems grow.
A. – The fact is that these parliamentary parties have faithfully carried out the presidential administration’s instructions to conduct a low-key election campaign – under no circumstances increasing so-called public anxiety. In this respect, it was the quietest campaign ever. In other words, the RFCP, the LDPR and A Just Russia – absolutely all of them completely abandoned their usually sharp criticism of the government [and their] focus on specific social problems. They met this demand from the [presidential] administration.
Once the elections were over, Putin stated in no uncertain terms that there were two important requirements. First, [the deputies] must work for victory in the war against Ukraine. There can be no other concepts. In other words, these deputies cannot advocate for either a ceasefire or any search for solutions. They must firmly adhere to the position of victory in this war.
Second, Putin stated bluntly that there must be no populism, meaning that [the deputies] must not raise social issues or rock the boat. That’s all. They all heard him loud and clear, and will act in this vein.
Therefore, I believe there can be no opposition in this State Duma under any circumstances. On the contrary, the Kremlin has built a situation where these deputies must wholeheartedly support the conflict with the West and the war with Ukraine. Even if the Kremlin’s position in this war deteriorates. All parliamentary parties are agreeing to his demands.
Yes, in better times they could criticize the government and draw attention to social problems, but they still always had to stress that Putin is a great leader, that there is no one better than Putin, [and] that Russia would perish without Putin. This is the rhetoric of the Communist Party, [RFCP leader Gennady] Zyuganov, [and] the LDPR, not to mention A Just Russia. As for Noviye lyudi, they have no other option but to follow the strategy formulated by Putin. Yes, of course, they may make some critical remarks regarding some government projects, but that has always been the case, and it has never changed anything in this political system. Nor will it change anything now.
Q. – United Russia has already drafted 85 bills, [Russian Deputy Security Council deputy chairman] Dmitry Medvedev told us. In light of what’s going on, this sounds disturbing. We have already learned about some of these initiatives from the government, [including] a new increase in taxes and other fees. What’s next?
A. – Needless to say, the bills that Medvedev mentioned were drafted by the presidential administration long before the elections – i.e., throughout 2026. And they simply pertain to the implementation of Putin’s “May decrees” [relating to Russia’s strategic development]. There are no “May decrees” now, but the logic is the same. Putin signs decrees, so I think these bills are related, first, to the Russian language. Putin and the government have drawn up programs to promote Russian.
Second, they include draft laws pertaining to migration control, since the issue of labor resources is very important to the Kremlin: The Russian economy is currently experiencing acute personnel shortages.
Third, some bills concern the regulation of benefit payments for war participants.
Fourth, we have draft laws regulating what is known as a plan to reduce the shadow economy’s share in the national economy, since the Kremlin stated even before the elections that the shadow economy accounted for about 15% [of the national economy] – in other words, it was not paying taxes. So the Kremlin declared this procedure of reducing the shadow economy’s share as a strategic goal. This will apply to certain groups of people – private tutors [and] other self-employed individuals who are still working in the shadow sector. They will be subject to certain restrictions.
In addition to that, we will most likely see draft laws incentivizing the population’s financial activity. Initial statements to that effect have already been made. First, restrictions on taking cash out of Russia will be tightened. Cash payments will likely be limited. Some form of a government borrowing program is possible. This is roughly what should be expected.
Furthermore, I believe legislation is pending that will reduce the number of university students [and] develop the specialized vocational education system to address the problem of military deferment for a lot of students, which prevents them from being drafted for the war. Active efforts will be made to this end, since the Kremlin desperately needs to get students to sign [Army] contracts and go to the front instead of pursuing further studies.
Q. – Do you think the makeup of the cabinet of ministers measures up to the regime’s current military-political situation and Putin’s whims? Or do you believe some officials should be prepared to lose their jobs?
A. – I don’t think any major reshuffles should be expected, because Putin is indicating that he is satisfied with the performance of the Central Bank [and] the government as a whole, as well as with the way the government is finding a balance amid an acute budget deficit and the need to fund the war. Therefore, there is currently no reason to change the government.
In fact, this was clearly evidenced by the fact that Vyacheslav Volodin stayed on as State Duma speaker, and the heads of the State Duma’s main committees are practically the same. By all indications, the same goes for the government.
Of course, some minor reforms can be expected – primarily downsizing the government and ministry apparatus. This periodically happens. . . .
If Vladimir Putin were to declare a holy war and a general mobilization, pledging to break Ukraine within five months, and commit suicide if that didn’t work, then yes, in that case a change of government could be expected – to include representatives of the military-industrial complex. Then the government would be led by a general. But there is none of that.
Putin is still not talking about any specific time frame for ending the war that he is waging. And the current government is using all available resources to wage this war. . . .
Q. – What is your take on the mobilization process? Everyone expected that right after the elections, nothing would stop the Kremlin from declaring [a general mobilization; see Vol. 78, No. 39, pp. 9-12]. However, nothing is happening yet. Even Professor [Valery] Solovei, who had talked about it throughout the summer, said that it was put on hold.
A. – I think that mobilization talk was entirely a media phenomenon. The Kremlin intends to keep enlisting contract soldiers, bleeding the population dry. The logic is very simple. Putin would like people to sign contracts and thus assume responsibility for their own decisions.
As for the mobilization of conscripts, it is an extremely bad move, since conscripts feel coerced. So when we talk about mobilization, it is important to bear the following in mind: Yes, of course, a covert mobilization is under way and it will continue, but through contracts. In this respect, students can expect to be more actively manipulated into signing contracts. More contracts may become available for women. It is possible that the Kremlin will actively work to enlist foreign citizens from Central Asian countries for contract service – maybe not only from Central Asia, but from Asia in the broad sense.
So in my opinion, there have been no mobilization plans, and there will be none. More importantly, let’s imagine for a moment that the Kremlin conducts a [general] mobilization and fails to achieve any results on the battlefield. After that, Putin will have no hopes left. And such a situation is quite possible. There are no guarantees here. When it comes to war, it is entirely possible that even if you conduct a mobilization and enlist 500,000 to 600,000 more service personnel who are poorly trained and poorly motivated, you will achieve no result. Putin understands this. So there are no mobilization plans, but there are plans to intensify attacks against Ukraine, its territory and infrastructure, in order to crush the Ukrainian people’s resistance. Putin will not achieve that now or at the end of the winter or in the early spring of 2027. Nevertheless, the strategy is clear.
On the front line, the offensive that the Kremlin planned to mount in the fall has apparently stalled. It was thwarted largely by the Ukrainian Army’s preventive tactical operations. In response, the Kremlin is escalating [missile] attacks.
This is why the important thing for Putin now is not mobilization, but the military-industrial complex’s ability to make more and more missiles of various types, as well as jet-powered drones.
Q. – What about escalation? Now Putin has once again started talking about infringement on the rights of Russian speakers in the Baltic countries, which some media outlets and experts are interpreting as laying the groundwork for an invasion. Meanwhile, the Baltic countries are preparing a plan for a mass evacuation in case of Russian aggression.
A. – I think the situation is as follows: No doubt, we will see the Kremlin take very aggressive actions against European countries in 2027-2028. However, these will come in the form of sabotage and cyberattacks. This has happened before, but the difference is that in the past the Kremlin sought to dissociate itself from those actions – in other words, not to claim responsibility for what it did. But now, on the contrary, the Kremlin is openly showing that its people are behind it. . . .
As for a direct invasion of NATO countries, I believe that the Russian General Staff is still acting on the assumption that [NATO] would retaliate with a massive strike against Russia, and that would really mean entering a new war.
However, right now Russia is hardly capable of waging such a war and dealing with its consequences. So I think that things are currently headed for an escalation of sabotage and cyberattacks.
Q. – What do you think about the nuclear strikes that Putin mentioned once again, speaking at the Valdai forum?
A. – Putin’s speech at the Valdai forum sounded weaker than the budget news [see Vol. 78, No. 40, pp. 11-12]. This is a two-year war budget. All of Putin’s attempts to manipulate the issue of negotiations and convince the forum participants that he was not the one who started the war [and] that Russia needs firm “security guarantees” – all that is pure hypocrisy. The reality is that the war is escalating and expanding in all directions, and the Kremlin is the author of this war. Those who watched Putin’s three-and-a-half-hour speech saw the rhetoric of political suicide, an act of buffoonery by a pathological liar headed for self-destruction.
Q. – [US President Donald] Trump keeps talking about some deal [and] peace talks. Media reports say that the US wants to hold talks with Ukraine and Russia in Abu Dhabi in October. One proposal is for a mutual halt to strikes against Russian and Ukrainian energy infrastructure. In your opinion, what might come of this?
A. – Unfortunately, all of Washington’s mediation efforts over the past two years have brought no tangible results. Despite the [US presidential special envoy for the Middle East Steven] Witkoff- [Trump’s son-in-law Jared] Kushner group’s numerous meetings and contacts in Moscow, no realistic negotiating plan has been worked out. So the current situation is as follows.
All sorts of consultations in both trilateral and bilateral formats may go on indefinitely. Shuttle diplomacy may also continue. But the war will continue regardless of all this. Strictly speaking, negotiating efforts in their current form are leading to neither a ceasefire nor a long-term solution.
Therefore, I believe that trilateral consultations will most likely take place, because there are always some issues, including humanitarian ones, that need to be discussed. This applies to prisoner swaps, the status of civilians and so on. As for talks on ending the war, Trump’s mediation mission has reached an impasse.
Q. – So what is in store for all of us, then?
A. – Two extremely difficult war years lie ahead. Far more difficult than before. With far more brutality. Because the war has been ongoing for a long time, and its outcome is not clear. Actually, this is primarily why the Kremlin intends to act with greater brutality.
At the same time, Putin’s attempts to break Ukraine will not succeed either this winter or in 2027. Plus, the Kremlin will be clearly unable to undermine support for Ukraine from a large group of countries in 2027-2028. The Kremlin is pinning its hopes on this, but these hopes will be dashed.
The Kremlin will be confronted with a situation where north European countries will pursue a proactive defense policy [and] build up their military capabilities. The Kremlin will get no economic bonuses in the next two years, because even with high [energy] prices, the oil trade is not giving the Kremlin what it is hoping for – due to an array of economic factors. The Kremlin is earning no superprofits from selling expensive oil.
So I think that in two years we will see a situation where Ukraine, regardless of whether it joins the European Union or NATO, de facto becomes part of a major European military-political alliance, playing a significant role in it. As for Russia, it will be rolled back to the status of a country that has lost a mass of opportunities for both technological and humanitarian development. By placing a bet on aggression, Russia has committed political suicide.