From Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 5, 2026, p. 1. Condensed text:

Near-zero growth of gross domestic product, industrial stagnation, a more than 14% decline in investment, annual inflation near 6%, [and] sectoral and regional imbalances, including disruptions in domestic fuel supplies. Such is the backdrop of SPIEF. . . .

The Western economy is in a fever. The economies of China, India and African countries are growing, though. These changes are fundamental. Russia needs to move away from a defensive model with regard to sanctions, stop waiting for sanctions to be lifted, [and] be more proactive in taking advantage of new opportunities. An economic growth model is not something that is set in stone. There is a need for a new investment cycle. Such were the highlights of Russian presidential deputy chief of staff Maksim Oreshkin’s presentation on the second day of SPIEF, the most anticipated session of that day, titled “How to Return to a Trajectory of Sustainable Economic Growth Amid Global Uncertainty.”

Russia’s foreign debt is only 10% of GDP. Soon the country will pay it off: Russia does not depend on foreign financial infrastructure. Russians’ real incomes have increased by over 24% over the past three years, and the Russian economy is already showing “sufficiently steady growth” – about 10% over the past three years. We did not overdo it with taxes. We are constantly bouncing around [between extremes], but we have developed an antidote. The budget and monetary and credit policies are closely intertwined. The budget policy is aimed at keeping inflation within the target and ensuring that interest rates do not deter borrowing. This is what [Russian] Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said at the same session.

Key constraints on Russia’s economic growth include the labor market [and] low unemployment, to which the Central Bank is responding. The contours of a new economic model are already emerging: a strong ruble [and] higher interest rates. The government is implementing a plan for structural changes. It is specifically related to business conditions [and] reducing the shadow economy’s share in the national economy. The subject of investments is more relevant than ever. However, productivity growth depends not only on investments: We have not yet introduced lean production practices everywhere, digitization is not yet complete, [and] AI has great potential. There are things that are more important than economic growth models, namely institutions [like] property rights [and] investors’ rights. [We are] in constant communication with the Central Bank, but [we] would like [to have] more room for easing the monetary and credit policy stance. These were the highlights of Economic Development Minister Maksim Reshetnikov’s remarks.

However, business news watchers have heard all of these narratives multiple times over the past few months or more. Was it worth holding such a pompous event to reiterate them from high rostrums? This is a rhetorical question.

For lack of conceptually meaningful statements, we have to analyze the seating arrangement for speakers or compare the old and new versions of the business program.

For example, Siluanov, a representative of the financial bloc [of the government], sat onstage between the former economic development minister and the current one – i.e., between Oreshkin and Reshetnikov. However, it is a moot point who has an edge in this lineup of forces, even though [Russian] Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina was not among the speakers. She was originally on the list, but then she dropped off it (according to the official version, she was on sick leave).

The fact that the physical absence of a speaker is one of the forum’s top news stories – not somebody’s statements or the announcement of breakthrough transformations or the signing of an industrial supercontract – is eloquent testimony to the “significance” of the discussions that took place according to schedule.

There were high, if not heightened, expectations for the forum, which were strongly encouraged by its organizers, who published a headline-grabbing report criticizing the current monetary and credit policy with calls to change it by reviewing the approach toward inflation – specifically, excluding the special military operation (SMO) factor from price growth metrics.

This is an ambitious goal. It brought into sharp focus the impact on the Russian economy not only of sanctions or “black swans,” but also of the SMO, which Russian industrial enterprises have been increasingly citing as a crucial factor in their investment plans. However, is it up to economic  ministers or the Central Bank chief to discuss such a subject?

Despite the speakers’ attempts to show off their wit, presentations at the most anticipated session on the second day of the forum sounded rather dull and lethargic. Meanwhile, the circumstances under which the SPIEF is taking place this year no longer allow for idleness or procrastination: On the contrary, there is a pressing need for a prompt and efficient analysis of measures taken by the economic authorities, their effectiveness and consequences, and there is a need for [government] agencies to synchronize their watches [and] do an honest postmortem.

On June 3, the Economic Development Ministry released the latest statistics. From January through April, inflation was 5.8%. Meanwhile, Russian GDP showed near-zero growth during the same period – 0.2% year on year. Industrial production is stagnating, with 0.7% growth during the same period. Construction was down by about 8% during the period under review.

Experts are already warning about the imminent risks of stagflation (economic slowdown or even decline amid growing inflation) in Russia.

Sectoral imbalances and debacles are leading to the problem of regional budgets, as evidenced by another session on the SPIEF’s second day with Siluanov’s participation (“Regions Amid Global Challenges”).

“The situation in various regions is different, especially in regions with a large share of revenues from sectors such as the coal industry, metallurgy [and] the woodworking industry,” the minister said. He enumerated the most problem-ridden sectors in the current economic period.

Most importantly, according to the Economic Development Ministry, investment in fixed assets nosedived more than 14% year on year.

“We are relying on figures,” Reshetnikov stressed at the forum, immediately adding that the Economic Development Ministry took a “cautious” view of those numbers: The ministry saw a discrepancy between GDP trends and the investment decline.

In other words, there is currently a certain misunderstanding not even between various blocs of the government, which have different tasks, but within one ministry over the figures that it uses in all its calculations – calculations that underlie official forecasts and influence the budget policy, and hence the monetary and credit policy.

An enumeration of banalities; misrepresentation by omission regarding the ongoing economic processes and their causes; inconsistency of statistical data; a lack of transparent and in-depth analysis of measures and their consequences; [and] extreme fatigue with the discussion of a new economic growth model (these discussions have been ongoing for over a decade) – this is not what the country’s main forum should be like. To draw final conclusions, we need to wait until the SPIEF’s plenary session on June 5.