From Izvestia, May 16, 2026. Complete text:
According to reports, the meeting between US and Chinese leaders Donald Trump and Xi Jinping was being planned as early as February. However, the conflict in the Middle East has had an impact. It was clear that, given the ongoing military operation in a region that is sensitive for both countries, any discussion would inevitably devolve into an exchange of mutual accusations.
The overall strategic context of the recent summit boils down to a mutual search for a manageable model of confrontation. Neither side is under any illusions that the other party is a strategic competitor and adversary; however, each country has an interest in minimizing the economic damage and strategic risks that an escalation could cause.
For Washington, an escalation of the economic conflict with China – and certainly the military-political one – risks, at the very least, weakening its own economy. The volume of bilateral trade in 2025 amounted to $414 billion, with Chinese exports to the US accounting for nearly three-quarters of that total. Under these circumstances, a forced restriction on exports from China could lead to rising inflation – a battle that brought down the previous Fed leadership. The current administration clearly does not want to return to the high inflation rates that the US economy has experienced. Especially if it hopes to keep the White House in Republican hands in 2028.
Moreover, the US remains vulnerable due to its critical dependence on Chinese supplies of rare earth metals. The latest round of trade and economic tensions, launched by the Trump administration immediately after taking office, ran into this asymmetrical response from Beijing. Given China’s monopoly on rare earth metal supplies, Washington is seeking alternative sources, but it will take years to reduce dependence on China in this area. For now, the US has to put up with this weakness it has.
Beijing is also disinclined toward a direct confrontation with the US. The Chinese leadership appears to believe that maintaining an acceptable rate of economic growth – within the range of 4% to 5% of gross domestic product – is the foundation for the country’s development, security and international standing. The efforts made by China’s leadership over the past decade to build a domestic-demand-driven economy have yielded some results, but growth remains heavily dependent on exports. Under these circumstances, Beijing is prepared to firmly defend its interests in response to pressure, but it has absolutely no interest in taking the initiative to undermine bilateral relations.
The recent summit should be viewed as another key step toward establishing a new status quo. The leaders of the two countries effectively confirmed a number of agreements aimed at limiting further escalation of the economic standoff. It is unlikely that we will see another sharp increase in tariffs; this paves the way for cooperation among businesses, which are naturally wary of further escalation risks. In an effort to deescalate the trade dispute, the leaders of the two countries agreed to establish a “board of trade” – a consultative forum for discussing trade-related issues and opportunities. This is a clear signal to businesses in both countries: The economic war isn’t just on hold – it’s over. At least for now.
Against this backdrop, it is telling that Trump’s delegation included a whole host of prominent business leaders and corporate executives. Among the big names are [Tesla et al. CEO] Elon Musk, Nvidia CEO Steven Huang [sic; Jensen Huang – Trans.] and Apple CEO Tim Cook, each of whom has extensive interests in the Chinese market. All of this suggests that the second half of Trump’s presidency will be more stable for US-China relations, with a focus on operating within a new framework following the latest wave of tensions.
That said, the actual economic results of the visit so far appear to be far more modest than one might have expected. The Trump administration reported that Beijing is prepared to purchase Boeing aircraft (worth $10 billion) and agricultural products, discuss with US officials the “unfair trade practices” that concern Washington, and step up cooperation with American companies. All of this, however, still sounds either trivial or too vague, and it pales in comparison to the trade deals Trump has struck with allies [like] the European Union and Japan. It should be noted that the agreement included commitments not only to increase purchases of American goods, but also to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the economy. These are very specific and well-documented achievements.
Washington had evidently expected more from China as well. In launching the latest trade war, the Trump administration apparently expected that victory in this war would ultimately take the form of a deal similar to those reached with the Europeans and the Japanese: a radical increase in purchases of American goods, investments in the US economy (but without the right to extract any significant profit) and a curtailment of Chinese business ambitions to penetrate high-tech markets. None of this has been achieved in the current phase of the confrontation.
Washington’s negotiating position has been seriously undermined by a number of external and domestic factors. Domestically, the Trump administration has been dealt a blow by its own judicial system, which has severely limited the government’s ability to further escalate tariffs. On the international stage, Washington has found itself entangled in the Iran conflict, which has clearly displayed the limits of American power. All of this has seriously undermined the Trump administration’s image as an aggressive force, ready to go all the way, corner its opponents and get its way. Engaging in dialogue from a position of strength is counterproductive in this context. Trump’s conciliatory rhetoric in light of his trip to China – in some ways even overly so – serves as a clear illustration of this.
The main outcome of the summit, therefore, can be described as a new phase in relations between the US and China, which have finally become equal in stature – at least in economic terms. This has effectively resulted in a stalemate following the price war that began in 2025.
It is hard to say how satisfactory this situation will be for both sides in the long run. The status quo that has taken shape before our very eyes is likely to hold at least until the end of the ruling administration’s current term, although, given the current highly volatile international situation, further escalations can never be ruled out. Over the long term, though, the current model of US-China relations may prove to be unsustainable.