‘Death Sentences, Reprisals and Even Mass Executions Have Never Stopped the Iranian People’

From Republic.ru, Jan. 21, 2026, https://republicmag.io/posts/116979. Condensed text:

Editors’ Note. – What is happening to the Iranian people and the Iranian regime right now? Is there a real threat to the rule of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei? Might the protests resume? And should we expect [US President] Donald Trump to keep his promises? To find answers to all these questions, Republictalked to Eastern Studies expert Ruslan Suleimanov.

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Question. – What do we know about the current situation in Iran? Have the authorities suppressed the protests? Or are they still ongoing?

Answer. – Iran remains under a communication blackout, with Internet and phone services largely disabled. All we have are scraps of information. But it is clear that protest intensity has diminished from its peak in late December and early January [see Vol. 78, No. 1-3, pp 11-14]. The death toll is huge. It’s simply unprecedented.

Q. – The opposition reports that approximately 20,000 protesters have been killed.

A. – It’s hard to get the exact number, and it’s hard to verify these reports. But it is true that we have never seen so many people killed in the history of the Islamic Republic. There were incidents with dozens or even hundreds killed, but the death toll never ran into the thousands. Still, this does not mean that the protests have been quashed and that Iranians are not going to protest any more. Death sentences, reprisals and even mass executions have never stopped the Iranian people. This is not something that can make them give up and go back to their homes. At the same time, this brutal crackdown has had its effect on the people. I mean, people are in despair. They no longer believe that they can achieve anything by going out into the streets, that there is unity among them, or that there are some external forces that will come to their support.

Initially, many of them had huge expectations for Donald Trump and a US intervention, because, as we all know, he did promise to launch an attack against targets in Iran. But then nothing happened, and many people were disappointed. In fact, from the very start Iranians did not have a clear understanding of what they were trying to achieve with their protests. It was as though each person was protesting on their own. Each person had their own idea of what had to change in Iran. Some people wanted economic reforms, while others wanted competitive elections, and still others wanted the regime to be fully dismantled.

This lack of organization, compounded with the blackout, with people being unable to call each other and find out what was going on in a neighboring province or even on a nearby street – naturally, all this caused the protests to subside. But I repeat, the protests broke out spontaneously, as they always do in Iran. There was no clear leader, no coordinating center. Hence, the events followed roughly the same scenario as in 2019 and 2022 [see Vol. 74, No. 42, p. 17-18] – high intensity at the beginning and gradual decline afterwards.

But we cannot say for sure that the protests won’t reignite with the same intensity a week or a month from now. Funerals and memorial services are very important in Iranian culture. So, we don’t know what might happen, say, when families of the victims observe the 40th day since their killing. Back in 2022, it was on the 40th day after the death of Mahsa Amini that protests resumed with renewed vigor. So, while we can talk about some preliminary results, it is too early to draw final conclusions about the current protests.

Q. – Perhaps you are right, and it’s not over yet. There has been a recurring pattern of protests in Iran in recent years. The Iranian authorities are probably aware of that. Perhaps they are taking some steps to prepare ahead of time?

A. – Despite the blackout, Iranian government media remain active on social media – on X and Telegram. There have been numerous reports about rallies in support of the regime. Indeed, there are people in Iran who are willing to support the regime. They were demonstrating in the streets with proregime banners, denouncing the US and Israel. The official narrative claims that the authorities are fighting terrorists and that the recent events were orchestrated by Israel or some other external forces. What sets these protests apart from all the previous ones is brutality on the part of some of the protesters attacking security forces. We have never seen so many security officers killed during protests. The authorities use this to paint all the protesters as terrorists, although these were ordinary people. In some cases, entire families would go out to protest together. . . .

Q. – What is the key factor behind the brutality with which the Iranian regime has been acting lately? Is Ali Khamenei personally responsible for that? Or is it a systemic problem? Can we say that this brutality can be attributed to him personally – and thus, once he is out of the picture, we can expect the regime to soften up?

A. – I think this is something that has its roots in Iranian history. For instance, Ali Khamenei saw how the 1979 revolution unfolded and what it resulted in. Many in today’s Iranian elite believe that the shah’s regime fell precisely because it was not cruel enough. When it finally resorted to reprisals, it was already too late – even though they still managed to kill a lot of people. To this day, the memories of major crackdowns, like when protests were broken up, or when people were executed on the shah’s orders, remain an important element in the Islamic Republic’s ideology. It is perceived as a sign of weakness that at some point the shah agreed to make some concessions. For example, the ban on portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini was lifted in 1978. Based on certain leaks and comments by people close to Khamenei, we know that he does not want to repeat the shah’s mistakes. Also, perestroikain the Soviet Union had a profound effect on him. He saw how liberalization and advance of civil liberties resulted eventually in the collapse of the whole system. Khamenei certainly fears that the same can happen in Iran. So, his extreme cruelty that we observe these days is rooted in his personal experiences of the past.

Q. – After the Mahsa Amini protests, the authorities agreed to a minor, if informal, concession. Basically, women are no longer punished if they refuse to wear a hijab. Does this count as an example of the regime becoming more liberal?

A. – Yes, we can say that this was one of the gains made after the previous wave of protests. But the regime simply switched to other methods. The morality police no longer patrol the streets, because the authorities don’t want to create tensions. It is true that today a woman can go out without a headscarf and nobody will rebuke her for that. But the only reason the authorities have agreed to that is because they want to calm things down and to avoid new protests.

At the same time, they are introducing new control mechanisms – for instance, smart surveillance cameras. Women who appear in public without a headscarf, even if they are merely driving a car, receive fines in the mail later on. The rules about the hijab have never been dropped officially or legally. Basically, the current arrangement is a kind of compromise. But the most conservative circles, including the people close to Khamenei – and probably Khamenei himself – do not agree with it. Perhaps it was a certain segment of the Iranian elite that persuaded him to accept this arrangement.

Q. – If the authorities realize that unarmed people won’t be able to topple the regime as long as it is willing to use violence in order to cling to power, what could make Ayatollah Khamenei step down? Is it external pressure – from the US or Israel? Certain moves by Donald Trump? Or is it primarily domestic factors, like a conflict within the elites, some sort of plot, some infighting?

A. – Discussions on what will happen after Khamenei have been going on in Iran for a long time. They started long before the current wave of protests. Everybody understands that Khamenei won’t rule forever. He is already 86. So, debates on what Iran might look like after Khamenei have been going on for a number of years now.

At the same time, it is implied in all these debates that the coming transfer of power will happen within the bounds of the Islamic Republic. In other words, even if the Supreme Leader is no more, that does not mean that the regime, or the entire system, will collapse. No, power will be transferred to a new supreme leader. There is a special body, the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member council that brings together the most prominent theologians and jurists. The assembly will pick a new supreme leader, just like they did in 1989, when Khomeini died.

So, like I said, even if Khamenei is out of the picture for whatever reason – due to a natural cause, as a result of a plot or even if he is removed from power by force, that would not mean the entire system will break down. . . .

Q. – How much do Iranians want the current regime to go and be replaced with democracy? Would they be open to considering restoration of the monarchy – for instance, through the return of [Crown Prince] Reza Pahlavi, who currently resides in the US?

A. – There are still a significant number of people in Iran who value the gains of the 1979 revolution. These are people who have gone through the revolution itself, the Iran-Iraq War and some regional campaigns, including the one in Syria. These are people in the security apparatus, public officials and clerics, as well as rank-and-file regime supporters with high ideological motivation. These are people who are ready to defend the regime and even fight for it, if need be.

Obviously, these people are a minority, but this minority is still strong enough for now to keep the regime in power. A retired Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general once told me that, in a country of almost 90 million people, all you need for the system to endure is 500,000 to 1 million loyal people. As long as the nation remains consolidated – if not around Khamenei personally, then at least around the idea of an Islamic republic and theocracy – the regime will endure.

Also, it is important to realize that Iran basically does not have an alternative plan for the future. There is no government-in-exile, no clear vision of a “different Iran.” This idea of restoring the monarchy has a number of supporters, but it is certainly not dominant. Many Iranians are saying that they did not oust the shah back in 1979 just to reinstate monarchy half a century later. Besides, many people dislike Reza Pahlavi – for instance, because he maintains close ties with Israel and he welcomed Israeli air strikes against Iran, which, according to Iranian authorities, killed around 1,000 civilians.

Without a realistic alternative, without a vision of what Iran might look like once the regime is gone, many people, even among the regime’s critics, prefer to keep the existing system rather than openly oppose it. So, hypothetically speaking, even if there is a plot against Khamenei, it would still probably be something within the confines of the Islamic Republic, something based on the same ideological foundations.

The situation probably won’t change until a force arises that offers a convincing alternative scenario for Iran, a structured force with institutions and a claim to legitimacy. In this respect, Iran is very different from Syria, for example, because for a number of years Syria had an alternative government in Idlib, and later on it simply moved to Damascus. In Iran, we haven’t seen anything like that so far.

Q. – In recent weeks, people have been posting a lot of old pictures on social media, showing Iran back in the 1970s, before the Islamic Revolution: a secular urban lifestyle, women wearing skirts and makeup, fashionable clothes, supermarkets, cars, etc. How do people in Iran feel when they look at those pictures today? Do they feel nostalgic? In general, how do people in Iran feel about a secular lifestyle?

A. – Indeed, this kind of sentiment is present, primarily among older people. But it is not the shah’s regime that they are missing, because the shah’s regime was pretty cruel as well. It had its own repressive apparatus, including, for example, SAVAK, the secret police. What people feel nostalgic about is the times when they were young. They miss the times when they were coming of age, falling in love and living freely, without the current restrictions. It is only natural to have this kind of sentiment.

But what is really interesting is that these photographs are popular among young people as well. The new generation of Iranian youth, including Zoomers, have no emotional connection with the ideology of the ayatollahs. On the contrary, many of them openly despise it. When they look at those pictures, they don’t see the past; they see an alternative version of Iran, what Iran may look like in the future. And, naturally, they find this alternative more attractive.

But it is important to understand that all this is only happening in virtual reality, on social media, in pictures and videos. And, to be fair, we should mention that this is only part of the picture. Not everybody was secular back in the 1970s. There were a large number of people who, on the contrary, were very religious. To them, religion was a form of protest against the shah’s regime and aggressive Westernization. Under the shah, this was called the “white revolution.” On the one hand, those reforms really improved life for some of the people. On the other hand, they resulted in greater inequality. The gap between the rich and the poor grew wider. Restrictions were introduced against traditional religious practices and rituals. And, mind you, religion and religious traditions are often important even to secular Iranians. There were certain restrictions under the shah, which triggered a backlash. In addition to women wearing skirts and jeans, you could see a lot of women wearing hijabs. This, too, was a form of protest. This is why mosques became hotbeds of the anti-shah movement, and clerics became the leaders of the revolution.

Today, there are people who feel nostalgic about the secular Iran of the past, but also there are those who still treasure the gains of the 1979 revolution, those who think that theocracy, Wilayat al-Faqih, i.e., the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, is the only proper model of government. . . .

Q. – Why did Donald Trump choose not to support the protesters, breaking the promise he gave them earlier? There were reports in the media that the United Arab Emirates and some other regional powers did not want the Iranian regime to fall and persuaded Washington to refrain from such actions. Others say this was because of public opinion at home, because people don’t want the US to get involved in yet another conflict. Which factor played a decisive role, in your opinion?

A. – I think that Donald Trump simply did not have a winning scenario. There was no scenario where he would provide real support to the protesters and help them win and topple the regime. He could only launch a strike for show, a limited attack, perhaps even kill the key figure, but, as I explained earlier, that would not have automatically resulted in the collapse of the entire system.

What’s more, such an attack could have triggered a response from Iran. For example, an attack against US military bases in the region. This is what Arab countries were afraid of. This is why they were doing their best to talk Trump out of using military force. And yet, I believe that the key problem lies elsewhere. Trump talked too much and promised too much, and he failed to carry out his threats.

Even a symbolic attack against Iran with minimal damage to the regime would have been a show of force and a sign of support for the protesters. But Trump did not do even that. This is primarily why people in Iran are criticizing him. Not because he failed to topple the regime, but because he promised a lot and in the end, he didn’t do anything.

Perhaps Trump considered all the pros and cons and decided that it would be better not to intervene in this situation. An intervention could have resulted in major problems – including for the protesters themselves, because the regime could have responded by becoming even more brutal and unpredictable.

Q. – On the other hand, there are reports about the US deploying major forces to the region. Also, many people point out that we saw something similar in the past on a number of occasions: Before attacking Iran or snatching [detained Venezuelan president Nicolás] Maduro in Venezuela [see Vol. 78, No.1-3, pp. 3-7], Trump pretends to back off – and then launches a surprise attack. Is it possible that it will the same this time, and he is currently planning some sort of attack?

A. – Anything’s possible. We can’t get into his head. But the big question is: What would be the objective of such an attack? And what would Trump present as a result? Trump loves quick impressive moves, so he can immediately declare himself the winner, the king and a great strategist. But it’s not clear what victory might look like in this situation.

Even if you manage to kill the supreme leader, that will most likely only result in further escalation. The regime will become even more brutal, there will be even more reprisals, and the whole situation will become even more volatile. Like I said, currently Trump claims that the Iranian authorities agreed not to execute around 800 people – even though the Iranian authorities publicly denied any plans for mass executions. Perhaps that’s the best Trump could do under the circumstances.

Frankly, I don’t see what Trump could get out of a military intervention. Also, it’s not like executions are not happening in Iran. It’s just that we are not aware of a lot of things. But here is an important detail: It is uncommon for the Iranian authorities to deny preparations for executions. This time, though, they did make a statement denying such plans, and at least we didn’t see any public executions.

It is true that many people were shot dead in the streets. Essentially, one may say, this is a form of execution. But if we compare the current situation to 2022, this time we didn’t have exemplary executions, with people hanging from cranes. In 2022, that was part of the intimidation campaign. During the current protests, we haven’t seen such exemplary executions – at least, not yet.

Q. – Does it seem to you that the Iranian regime is on its last legs? Or do you think it may remain in power for a very long time?

A. – At this point, I don’t see an alternative to the regime. I see no indication of the regime being on the ropes. A transformation, a transfer of power – these are all possible scenarios. In fact, the sooner Khamenei is out of the picture, the quicker this transformation will happen. But at this point, it looks like all the changes will happen within the boundaries of the Islamic Republic. We don’t see any alternative version of Iran in front of our eyes right now.