Peace in Ukraine Is Closer Than It Seems

From Republic.ru, April 30, 2025, https://republic.ru/posts/115631. Complete text:

Editors’ Note. – Russia does not want the war to drag on – despite pessimistic predictions by experts and the Kremlin’s incessant rhetoric. The latest signals from Moscow, surprise statements by Russian officials and the realistic demands that both sides are currently putting forward – all this indicates that talks between Russia and Ukraine are bound to start within the next few months. In this op-ed, Aleksandr Zhelenin explains what factors are pushing Moscow in this direction and why the issue of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) may become the biggest stumbling block in the way of securing peace.

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It’s amazing how the same experts and journalists who categorically ruled out the possibility of a war between Russia and Ukraine in the run-up to the full-scale invasion are now absolutely convinced that the war will go on forever.

In reality, though, a peace deal is closer today than ever before – and not just because of the May 8-11 ceasefire declared by Putin. In fact, there is a very simple explanation for the ceasefire: The dictator just wants to make sure Ukrainian drones and missiles won’t disrupt the Victory Day parade on May 9, which is important to him for propaganda purposes.

Zelensky said as much in his response to Putin’s initiative. “Today, we saw another attempt to manipulate the narrative. For some reason, we have to wait until May 8 to cease fire, so Putin can have a calm day for his parade. We care about people’s lives, not about parades. That’s why we think – and the world thinks – that there is no reason why we should wait until May 8. And we don’t need a short-term ceasefire just for a few days, after which killing will resume. We need an immediate, comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days,” Zelensky said.

Also, peace is not close because of Putin’s goodwill. When dealing with Putin, there is no such thing as goodwill. Putin and goodwill are incompatible. No, the actual reasons, as I am about to show, are entirely different.

The first thing we should mention is that we have observed recently how the leadership of the aggressor state has been sending signals that it may be open for talks and may even be willing to compromise on certain issues.

For example, speaking on April 26, after the latest meeting between Putin and Trump’s envoy [for the Middle East] Steve Witkoff, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Russian ruler was ready for talks with Ukraine “without preconditions.”

On April 27, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took it a step further. Responding to a CBS reporter who said Russia was not willing to make any concessions on Ukraine, Lavrov said, “I have made it clear on numerous occasions that we are willing to look for a balance of interests – both with respect to Ukraine and with respect to our strategic relationship with the US.”

It has been a very long time since Moscow used this kind of language.

On April 28, Peskov reiterated that Putin was ready for talks “without preconditions.”

However, the same day, it turned out that the Kremlin did have some preconditions after all – and they were the same as a few months earlier.

In an interview with Brazilian right-wing conservative newspaper O Globo, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rattled off the same old list of Moscow’s demands: “Kiev must abandon its plans of joining NATO. . . . Ukraine must rectify the consequences of the rule by the neo-Nazi regime that came to power in Kiev after the February 2014 coup, including its efforts to wipe out – both legally and physically (! [Zhelenin’s emphasis – Trans.]) – all things Russian – the Russian language, the Russian-language media, Russian culture, Russian traditions and canonical Orthodoxy.” Of course, Lavrov also added that “the international community must recognize the Crimea, Sevastopol, the Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics, and Kherson and Zaporozhye Provinces as Russian territories.”

On the last point, Lavrov and Putin don’t need to worry, of course, because “international recognition” can be easily arranged through a number of wonderful countries like Nicaragua, Venezuela and, of course, Abkhazia. . . .

“Demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, lifting the sanctions, revoking arrest warrants and lawsuits (for war crimes and destruction), and unfreezing the Russian assets seized by the West” are also part of the Kremlin’s agenda [according to Lavrov].

Interestingly, it has been a long time since Russia brought up the subject of its frozen assets. It seemed that the Kremlin was willing, under certain conditions, to give up these assets as a form of compensation for all the people it has killed and all the destruction it has caused to Ukrainian cities, roads, industrial and energy infrastructure, as long as the sanctions imposed on Russia are lifted. For example, Margarita Simonyan, one of the Russian propagandists closest to Putin, floated the idea back in the early months of the war.

But apparently, the recalcitrant position taken by the Ukrainian president made Putin angry, so on April 28 the Russian foreign minister once again put Russia’s maximalist and completely unrealistic demands on the table.

But Vladimir Zelensky has reasons to be obstinate. He can’t possibly negotiate with the aggressor while Ukrainian cities are being bombarded daily. Here are just a few of the latest examples of such attacks:

– April 23: A Russian drone attack on the town of Marganets left nine people dead and almost 50 injured.

– April 24: Russia attacked Kiev with a large number of drones and missiles, killing 13 civilians, some of them children, and injuring 86.

– April 25: Russia attacked Pavlograd, Dnepropetrovsk Province, killing three and injuring 15.

– April 26: A Russian drone hit an apartment complex in the town of Kamenskoye, Dnepropetrovsk Province, killing a man and injuring four more people – an 11-year-old girl and three women.

– April 27: A married couple and an older man were killed in the town of Konstantinovka, Donetsk Province, as a result of Russian air strikes. Four more people were injured. The attack left 21 single-family homes and two cars damaged, UNIANreports.

Prior to that, there were massive Russian air attacks against the cities of Krivoi Rog and Sumy, again resulting in numerous civilian casualties. . . .

Putin is pragmatic in his sadism. If Ukraine agrees to engage in peace talks while Russia continues to pound Ukrainian cities daily, Putin will sell his atrocities to his supporters as a “peace enforcement campaign,” and this will make him a “tough guy” in their eyes.

Conversely, if Putin agrees to negotiate without killing more people and wreaking more havoc, in his own opinion and the opinion of the “Russian World,” that will make him look weak, [as though he is] yielding to pressure from the accursed Americans.

In the meantime, Ukraine and Europe formulated their terms for ending the bloodshed on April 23. According to Reuters, the key elements are as follows:

– A comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire on land, at sea and in the air.

– No restrictions on Ukraine’s military or on its allies deploying their troops or weapons on its territory.

– The US provides Ukraine with security guarantees akin to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, even though the issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO remains unresolved.

– Ukraine regains control over the Zaporozhye NPP, the Kakhovka Dam and the Kinburn Peninsula. Ukrainian ships can freely navigate the Dnepr River.

– Territorial issues will be discussed only after a sustainable ceasefire agreement is reached, and the discussion will start with demarcating the areas controlled by each of the parties.

– Russia’s frozen assets will be used as financial compensation for Ukraine.

– The sanctions imposed on Russia will be lifted gradually, and only after a sustainable peace deal is made, with the understanding that the sanctions may be immediately reinstated if Moscow violates the agreement.

As we can see from Lavrov’s interview, Moscow has reverted to a tough stance. But talks between Ukraine and Russia are inevitable – and not just in some remote future. They will happen within the next few weeks or months.

I know this does not sound very modest, but I would like to offer a quote from myself. Just a few days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 [see Vol. 74, No. 8, pp. 9-13 ], I wrote on Facebook that, given the huge losses that the Russian military sustained in those early days, history teaches us that, should this war continue for another 30 to 36 months, Russia’s uncontrolled disintegration will become inevitable.

Let me recap quickly. The Russian Empire started falling apart 32 months into World War I. The only reason the Soviet Union endured four years of war is because it was fighting on only one front, while Germany had to fight on four fronts: in the east, in the west, in northern Africa and in Italy. In addition, the Soviet Union received a huge amount of military aid from the US through Lend-Lease free of charge, whereas today Russia has to pay for all the “aid” it receives from its allies – China, Iran and North Korea. It pays either in hard currency or by providing them with certain goods in exchange.

It is true that Russia has taken unprecedented measures to shift to a wartime economy. But everything comes at a price.

According to The Economist, Russia’s economic growth dropped last year from 5% to zero. This is confirmed by recent reports by Goldman Sachs and Russia’s own VEB [Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs]. Russia’s Central Bank reports “plummeting demand” in a number of sectors. The newspaper lists a few factors behind this slowdown. First, Russia has completed the process of militarizing its economy, which means that the period of splurge government spending is over. Other factors include high inflation due to “gung-ho military spending,” a shortage of labor, and falling oil prices caused by Donald Trump’s trade war, which hit Russia’s stock market and its budget.

Also, we should not forget about the idea to “utilize” (which is a nice way of saying “expropriate”) the savings of the Russian people, floated some time ago by Aleksandr Shokhin, one of Putin’s favorites and the head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Obviously, you don’t come up with ideas like that when you’re doing fine.

In addition, Putin does not have enough resources at the moment to achieve a major breakthrough on the battlefield. The Russian military has lost an immense number of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. The Economistwrote last July, citing experts, that if Russia continues to burn through its stocks of old, Soviet-era armor at the same pace, its “tank and infantry-vehicle refurbishment from storage will have reached a critical point of exhaustion by the second half” of 2025. And that’s the point we are approaching right now, I might add.

By the end of 2024, Russia had lost over 3,000 tanks and 9,000 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers [respectively] in Ukraine – and that’s only verified losses. The Ukrainian General Staff believes that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged over 10,000 Russian tanks and over 22,000 armored vehicles. At the same time, Russia can only produce about 200 new tanks – or, to be more precise, modernize old Soviet tanks – per year.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet basically no longer exists as a combat force. Whatever is left of it is hiding from Ukrainian sea drones in the port of Novorossiisk behind barges and civilian ships.

Russia has lost 370 warplanes in the course of the war. Considering that it had 500-600 of them before the war, and that the remaining Russian jets don’t even dare to approach the Ukrainian border for fear of being shot down by Ukrainian air defense, and that Russia can only manufacture a handful of new fighter jets per year, this is certainly another disaster. These days, Russia is using its strategic bombers only to attack Ukraine with long-range missiles. But this is not how you win a war, especially against such a powerful nation as Ukraine has become.

We should also mention another important factor: After more than three years of war, the Russian people are tired. Plus, Russia has sustained immense casualties – about 300,000 soldiers killed. If you add the wounded, the total number may be in excess of 1 million.

At one point, it seemed that Russia had limitless human resources, especially compared to Ukraine. But today, Russia is running out of men. Russian society has changed a lot compared to the early days of World War II over 80 years ago. Back in those days, the Soviet Union had almost 150 million uncomplaining serfs laboring on collective farms who could be sent to the slaughter by the millions. Modern Russia does not have these kinds of human resources. We ran out of serfs last century, and Putin will not dare declare general mobilization. Besides, even if he were to mobilize millions of men, he would have to feed them and provide them with uniforms and weapons. That would be a pretty costly and senseless proposition. Even “partial” mobilization did not work out, resulting in hundreds of thousands of young Russians fleeing the country [see Vol. 74, No. 38, pp. 3-6]. Can you imagine what would happen if Putin declared a general mobilization?

In the meantime, the number of Russians willing to enlist has been steadily decreasing despite huge sign-on bonuses. That’s why Putin had to bring in 12,000 troops from North Korea [see Vol. 76, No. 47, pp. 19-20]. However, even this source of manpower will soon be exhausted, it seems. [North Korean leader] Kim [Jong-Un] is not going to send one division after another to Russia. He seems to have some ideas of his own – and they involve South Korea. . . .

Of course, we may still see some intensification at the front line. Both sides will probably seek to gain some last-minute advantages on the ground. That’s what happened in the Korean War – and the current conflict is likely to follow the Korean scenario. In other words, the disengagement line is likely to be drawn largely following the current front line.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Russia-Ukraine war is coming to an end. Talks will probably start within the next few weeks or months (six months at the most). Based on what Lavrov said in his penultimate statement, and what Ukraine and Europe proposed in their plan, the issue of the Zaporozhye NPP may become the biggest stumbling block. Ukraine insists on regaining control of the plant. Putin will never hand it over. To him, this largest nuclear station in Europe is one of his top trophies, a major asset, and a consolation prize for losing the war. This is why there are only two scenarios where Russia may give up control of the Zaporozhye NPP. First, Russia may do it voluntarily at some point in the future, after its dictator dies. Second, Ukraine may regain control of the station using the only language Putin understands – that of military force.

The future of the Zaporozhye NPP is currently the biggest sticking point in the potential negotiations. As for all the other arrogant, ridiculous and foolish demands put forward by Putin and Lavrov, they will inconspicuously drop them one after another over time.