Russia and the Middle East OUR LATEST TITLE HOT OFF THE PRESS—GET 20% OFF UNTIL LABOR DAY!

Editor(s): Fyodor Lukyanov
Pages: 382
Publication Year: 2019
Price
  • $49.95
ISBN: 9781879944756

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As Putin’s Russia ended its retreat from Great Power politics and challenged the dominance of the US in the Middle East, pundits in the West have struggled to understand Moscow’s motives… This is the place to start to sort through the confusions that have obscured understanding of the stakes for Russia and the US in that vital region.
Ronald Grigor Suny
William H. Sewell Jr. Distinguished University Professor of History, The University of Michigan


A rewarding and revealing collection of essays from Russia’s most authoritative commentators outlining Russian views on the Middle East, contemporary warfare and international affairs since 2005. Anyone wishing to understand Russia’s activities in the contemporary Middle East and its outlook on the region and international affairs needs to read this.
Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council
Co-author, Russia in the Middle East  (Jamestown, 2018)

This collection of articles and essays paints an intriguing portrait of Russia’s Middle East vision and how it has developed over the last two decades. Carefully selected by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of the acclaimed journal Russia in Global Affairs, many of these pieces are written by officials who played a direct part in crafting Russian policy in this dynamic region: from the late Yevgeny Primakov, prime minister under both Yeltsin and Putin; to longtime Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN adviser Vladimir Orlov, and Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak.

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST  also features contributions from reputable scholars on a range of topics that include regional conflicts, the Arab Spring, terrorism, Islamic doctrine, demographic trends and much more. These experts, diplomats and state leaders address challenging, relevant questions such as:

■  Why did Russia choose Syria as the place to reassert itself as a superpower?

■  How do Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East coincide and conflict with those of the West?

■  What repercussions has the Arab Spring had on the region and the world as a whole?

■  How can the global community address the problem of terrorism?

■  What economic opportunities does this region offer?

■  Does the Middle East hold the key to a “new world order”?

The issues examined in this collection will engage a wide audience of researchers, students and policymakers who have even peripheral interest in the Middle East, the Muslim world, and Russian geopolitical perspectives.

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: VIEWPOINTS, POLICIES, STRATEGIES

 

Part 1. Strategy: Regional Problems in Global Perspective


  1.1. Decades of International Insecurity

    Yevgeny Primakov.  The United Nations: Challenges of Our Time

    Yevgeny Primakov.  The Fundamental Conflict

    Aleksandr Dynkin, Vladimir Pantin.  The Modern Era and the Crisis of the 1970s

    Vladimir Orlov.  The Glass Menagerie of Non-Proliferation

 

  1.2. Islam and Islamist Movements

    Aleksei Malashenko.  Landmarks on the Road to Jihad

    Rafael Khakimov.  The Modernization of Islam: How Plausible Is It?

    Aleksei Malashenko.  Islam as We See It

    Vasily Kuznetsov.  The Islamic State: Alternative Statehood?

 

  1.3. Energy and Natural Resources

    Andrei Baklanov.  Oil Prices: Action Strategy Needed

    Aleksandr Novak.  Old Goals, New Tasks

    Anastasia Likhachova.  Water and Peace

 

Part 2. Tactics and Interactions: Falling Into the Same Traps


  2.1. Countering Terrorism

    Anatoly Adamishin.  Learning to Fight International Terrorism

    Yevgeny Satanovsky.  A No-Compromise War

    Anatoly Vishnevsky.  Demography and Terrorist Threats

 

  2.2. à la guerre comme à la guerre (Military Analysis)

    Aleksandr Golts.  Warfare Against the Rules

    Aleksei Arbatov.  Winning a War Without Losing the Peace

    Ruslan Pukhov.  A Proving Ground for the Future

    Prokhor Tebin.  The Limits of Capabilities

 

Part 3. The  Middle East as a Factor of World Order (and Disorder)


  3.1. The Arab Spring: Democracy and Revolution

    Yevgeny Satanovsky.  Revolutions and Democracy in the Islamic World

    Veronika Kostenko, Eduard Ponarin, Pavel Kuzmichov.  A Different Democracy

    Aleksandr Aksenyonok, Irina Zvyagelskaya.  Listening to the Music of the Revolution?

 

  3.2. Prospects for Stability in the Region

    Sergei Lavrov.  Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order

    Pyotr Stegny.  The Middle East: à la Versailles or à la Westphalia?

    Yevgeny Satanovsky.  Between Crisis and Catastrophe

    Andrej Krickovic, Yuval Weber.  Harass and Hold Out

 

  3.3.  Emerging Geopolitical Balances

    Dmitry Yefremenko.  By the Waters of Babylon

    Andrei Kortunov.  Russia: The Power Broker in the Middle East?

    Fyodor Lukyanov.  Will US Pullout From Syria Increase Risk of Conflict With Russia?


PREFACE

 

In autumn 2015, just over two weeks after the start of the Russian military operation in Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the annual Valdai International Discussion Club forum. A Russian participant asked the head of state whether it made sense to get involved. After all, the risks were high, losses inevitable and combat actions unpredictable. In addition, there was no exit strategy, which could entail long-term negative consequences. “Fifty years ago, the streets of Leningrad taught me one rule: If a fight is inevitable, you have to strike first,” Putin responded without missing a beat.

 

This quip was later often cited as a typical example of how the Russian leader understands political actions and the essence of international politics. However, it is equally important to note that it was said specifically about the Middle East.

 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that region remained on the periphery of Russian diplomacy for a time. Foreign policy was so focused on trying to make Russia a part of the “expanded West” and integrate it into the “community of civilized nations” that it simply retreated from many parts of the world (both intentionally and due to a lack of resources). This was especially true of regions that had been an area of stiff competition between the USSR and the West. The Middle East was not only one such region, but was perhaps the most important arena of ideological and geopolitical confrontation, second only to Europe. And it is fairly symbolic that the Syrian conflict became a pretext for Russia’s military-political return to the international arena as a full-fledged superpower and top player. This has been a Russian foreign policy goal – at times tacit, then openly declared – since the early 1990s.

 

The Great Game of the second half of the 20th century played out to a considerable degree in the Middle East. It was not a periphery, since it was close to Europe, the main arena of a systemic confrontation between the East and West. Meanwhile, decolonization had created almost limitless possibilities for competition between the new “masters of the world” – the USSR and the US. The sociopolitical systems that the leaders of the regional states embraced (capitalism or socialism) did not play a principal role – both were given a markedly local flavor. However, competition for geopolitical loyalty oriented toward either Moscow or Washington took on very harsh forms. The region was rocked by political cataclysms – coups, wars, religious and ethnic persecutions. However, despite it all, this bipolar confrontation paradoxically ensured a kind of stability. To be more exact, the dividing lines were clear, and were enforced not so much by the [local] governments as by the “big brothers.”

 

The Middle East was supposed to be the beginning of a “new world order” as envisioned by optimists at the end of the cold war. The first proving ground was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, which was met with unprecedented rejection by the entire global community. For the first time (which turned out to be the last), Moscow and Washington acted together in favor of an international military operation to liberate Kuwait and punish Iraq for its aggression. Operation Desert Storm in early 1991 seemed to mark a new era of postconfrontation, ushering in a joint approach to solving global problems, including through force. Even a few years earlier, such a thing was impossible in principle: The region, and in fact the entire world, was divided into spheres of influence in which the global patrons guaranteed military and political protection to their protégés against their opponents and the opposing superpower.

 

Routing Iraq from Kuwait did not usher in an era of new global politics, for the simple reason that the system of two superpowers ceased to exist when one of them disappeared. The balance of forces that had determined the situation in the world for more than four decades was suddenly replaced by the dominance of the US, the only “hyperpower” (to use the terminology of French politician Hubert Védrine). Russia, the legal successor of the Soviet Union, withdrew from the competition. Meanwhile, the Middle East was left hanging: The powerful wave of democratization that shook the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Eastern Europe, Central Eurasia, the Far East, Africa, Latin America) essentially passed this region by.

 

However, stability [in the Middle East] turned out to be illusory. The disappearance of the cold war hastened what Zbigniew Brzezinski called a global awakening. The rise of international terrorism, whose most obvious roots can be traced to the Middle East, combined with the hobbling of the entire system of regime-states born of decolonization in the early and mid-20th century to turn the region into a ticking time bomb and then an inferno of global significance. After Sept. 11, 2001, events began to develop incredibly quickly. In the 15 years between 2001 and 2016, the Middle East experienced just about all forms of turmoil – outside interference, civil wars, an explosion of religious extremism, the collapse of political systems and the disintegration of entire states. As has always been the case historically, these changes were largely driven by the great powers. Their interventions – especially those undertaken by the US – destroyed the existing order and provoked a chaotic and practically uncontrollable transformation.

 

Why was the Middle East the specific place where Russia returned to the stage as a global player? There are several reasons. The first is Russia’s vulnerability to the threat of the Middle East’s radicalization – something that Russia, given its large Muslim population, has faced since the 1990s. In this sense, Putin’s aforementioned remark easily fits the logic of countering distant threats before they inevitably reach Russia.

 

Moreover, the Middle East is the region that best fits Russia’s foreign policy “toolkit,” so to speak: i.e., sufficiently effective modern Armed Forces and the ability to use them (especially after the reforms of the late 2000s and early 2010s); a solid knowledge of the region gathered during the Soviet Union’s activity there; a strong and professional diplomatic tradition; the Middle East’s weariness of unopposed US dominance, which had become increasingly dysfunctional since the start of the 21st century; post-Soviet Russia’s lack of ideological dogmas that would limit room for maneuvering; and an adherence to realpolitik, which suits the Middle Eastern states much better than any other approach.

 

All these factors came together in the mid-2010s, when all the concepts that various players had been trying to implement in this part of the world simply fell through. Meanwhile, the region itself had descended into the chaos of deconstruction, with the possibility of a complete loss of control. Russia unexpectedly became a game-changer that altered the dynamics of the situation.

 

Of course, only time will tell whether it changed or simply stalled that momentum. Six to eight years ago, it seemed that the Middle East was a festering wound in an otherwise steadily developing world. The feeling is different today – the Middle East is both a reflection and the quintessence of the highly complex changes affecting the entire world order.

 

This collection of articles presents views and findings from the best Russian experts, standing diplomats and statesmen, prominent politicians and public figures. Contributors include the late Yevgeny Primakov, dean of the Russian diplomatic and intelligence corps; current Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov; current Minister of Energy Alexander Novak; Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; Members of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and others.

 

While each article in our collection deals with a specific issue or element related to the Middle East in general and Russia’s foreign policy in the region, in their entirety they provide a window into the dynamic evolution of attitudes and views espoused by the Russian expert community and policymakers. They fit together within a comprehensive system of analysis, forecasts and scenarios of foreign relations in the region and beyond.

 

Fyodor Lukyanov

Editor in chief, Russia in Global Affairs

Chairman, Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

Research Director, Valdai International Discussion Club