


FROM THE CURRENT ISSUE OF



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BOOK REVIEW

А. ЯКОВЛЕВ. Перестройка: 1985-1991.
Неизданное, малоизвестное, забытое.
А.А. Яковлев (составитель), М.,
Международный фонд Демократия, 2008, 872 с.
(Россия, XX век. Документы)

A. YAKOVLEV. Perestroika: 1985-1991. The Unpublished, Little Known, Forgotten.
Compiled by A.A. Yakovlev, Moscow,
Democracy International Foundation, 2008, 872 pp.
(Russia, 20th Century. Documents)

The book has been published by the Democracy International Foundation. It may well be the most important corpus of sources relating to the history of perestroika in the Soviet Union that has appeared in recent years. The book contains documents from the personal archive of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev (1923-2005), a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the “architect of perestroika.” The book has been compiled by his son Anatoly and his widow Nina Yakovleva. After the death of Yakovlev Sr. most of the documents from his personal archive were handed over to The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). The documents that appear in the book are from that archive. Anatoly Yakovlev is certainly praiseworthy: he has prepared them for publication and supplied them with competent comments. However, it is impossible to understand either from his preface or his comments what criterion he has used to choose documents for publication and what documents have not been included in the book.

The book contains Aleksandr Yakovlev’s analytical notes, letters from politicians and cultural figures, shorthand records of selected speeches, private discussions with his participation, and protocols of his meetings with representatives of foreign political and cultural elites or reports on such meetings written by Yakovlev for Politburo members.

Yakovlev himself made public some of his notes—in full or in part—in numerous books published in the 1990s and in the early 2000s: *The Torments of Reading Reality* (1991), *Foreword. Collapse. Afterword* (1992), *The Cup of Woe. Bolshevism and Russia's Reformation* (1994), *The Whirl of Memory* (2001) and others. But texts in those books were elements of collages built by the author to argue a particular ideological “message.” Therefore the collection under review became a notable event not so much because it contained thitherto unknown texts (although they form the bulk of the book) as because of the context resulting from a chronological presentation of very diverse documents in terms of genre and genesis.

If we are to appreciate what seems to be an insignificant novelty we need to remember that Yakovlev's biography and the evolution of his political views have not been adequately studied. Key events of his life story are well known, but only those starting from 1972. I am now going to give a brief exposition of some of the main ones.

In 1972 Yakovlev was the acting head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. In an article titled *Against the Anti-Historical Method* published by *Literaturnaya gazeta* he lashed out at growing nationalist and anti-Semitic tendencies in Soviet official culture. Mikhail Suslov¹ and other Politburo members responded with a sharp reaction. After that Yakovlev was “exiled with honors” to Canada as Soviet Ambassador. In May 1983 Yakovlev met with Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a member of an official Soviet delegation visiting Ottawa (they had met before, but, according to Yakovlev, those were purely formal encounters). The two politicians found out they had close views on the political problems confronting the Soviet elite. Shortly after that meeting Yakovlev was recalled to Moscow and appointed Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences (as we shall see later, the appointment was made in a nontrivial manner). Yakovlev recalled that in 1985 he acted as middleman at secret talks between Andrey Gromyko and Mikhail Gorbachev resulting in Gorbachev agreeing to Gromyko's suggestion that he be nominated as a candidate for the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

After Gorbachev came to power Yakovlev became one of the key political figures. In 1991 he publicly declared his disagreement with Gorbachev on the current political situation. He issued several warnings about an impending coup d'état and finally left the CPSU. In the 1990s, unlike most members of Gorbachev's former “team,” Yakovlev remained an influential figure in Russian politics: in 1993-1995 he was head of the Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting and also headed the Ostankino state-owned television company. For a brief period of time he was chairman of the board of directors of Russian Public Television. For many years he headed the commission for the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions under the President of the Russian Federation and was president of the Democracy International Foundation under whose aegis some thirty volumes of unknown documents relating to 20th-century Russian history were published. He founded the Social Democracy Party, but it could never become a real political force. Shortly before his death in 2005 Yakovlev joined the supervisory board of Open Russia, a Yukos-sponsored organization.

I want to stress again that all those facts are on public record, but we still do not have the answers to key questions relating to Yakovlev's role in Russia's modern history. Yakovlev suited the role of ideologist in the 1980s and later more than any other

functionaries “summoned” by Gorbachev. Nevertheless, the sources and meaning of the political concept he consistently advocated in the post-Soviet period have not yet been analyzed. At first it was called social democracy but later (in the 2000s) it was referred to as social liberalism. If Yakovlev was indeed “the architect of perestroika” what sort of ideas was he going to implement during the transformations? Why did a man who called himself a social democrat constantly invoke the name of the authoritarian modernizer Pyotr Stolypin? According to Anatoly Yakovlev, his father developed his political concept in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but had to wait for one and a half decades until the time when he could make it the basis of his political actions.² But it is still unclear what inner transformation (apparently a radical one) Yakovlev went through in the late 1960s. It resulted in the unusual political position of a liberal-enlightener, a downright dissident position by Central Committee standards.

In the 1950s and 1960s Yakovlev was making a very good bureaucratic career. He was part of a neo-Stalinist group of “Komsomols” which had crystallized around Aleksandr Shelepin, the then chairman of the Soviet KGB. Its members played an active role in the toppling of Nikita Khrushchev. Since Yakovlev was in good standing with Suslov he was entrusted with writing key programmatic and ideological texts such as a Pravda editorial condemning Khrushchev’s political sins. He authored Leonid Brezhnev’s address to cosmonauts, the first speech in his capacity as General Secretary. In 1968 Yakovlev was sent to Czechoslovakia as part of an ideological “landing party.” That country had just been occupied by troops of member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The “landing party” was headed by Kirill Mazurov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and member of the Politburo. Yakovlev was deputy head of that delegation. The Shelepin group was routed in the late 1960s (Brezhnev did not want to be dependent on people who had brought him to power; by all indications, Brezhnev’s inner circle had been doing all they could to set Shelepin against the KGB Chairman Yury Andropov who was appointed to that post in 1967). Members of the Shelepin group were sent to a number of countries as Ambassadors. Yakovlev maneuvered to ensure his continued membership of the Central Committee albeit as “acting functionary.” He subsequently returned to political life following an about-face in his views, although almost none of the members of the Shelepin team did. It is highly surprising that his return to Moscow from Canada in 1983 was authorized by Andropov and Chernenko.

If indirect evidence is anything to go by, Yakovlev’s views underwent change under the influence of several factors, but all of them were the result of “the tightening of the screws” that happened round about that time. First, it was the suppression of Novy mir magazine. Yakovlev must have been deeply sympathetic to its editor-in-chief Aleksandr Tvardovsky for many years. Like Yakovlev he was born into a peasant family, was a World War II veteran and made a successful Soviet career from scratch. Second, Yakovlev was stunned by the strong protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia in stark contrast to the jubilant welcome its people gave to Soviet soldiers in 1945. Third, in the late 1960s he was tormented by the uncertainties of his official capacity and political status. The Israeli political scientist Ilya Zemtsov says as much in his memoirs. He was in touch with Yakovlev for many years. He claims that he talked with him at crucial moments in his life. Many of the facts cited in Zemtsov’s memoirs need to be critically verified, but some of Yakovlev’s remarks quoted by Zemtsov are similar to those cited by

the politician in his own memoirs or documents first made public in the volume under review. When Yakovlev was Ambassador to Canada Zemtsov arranged an informal channel of communication between the governments of Israel and the Soviet Union.³ According to Zemtsov, this is what Yakovlev told him at the time: "...Basically, I never fitted into the Party Apparatus. I was stand-alone and independent. My downward slide began when my boss (Leonid Ilyichov) was forced to resign as head of the propaganda division (1965). They wanted to figure out whether I would be suitable for his job. They put out feelers. They found out that I was ready to serve, but was not ready to be a servant. I was kept on tenterhooks for four years... It was then that I realized that I would be unable to cling to the Central Committee for much longer. So I decided to resort to a method I had widely used while in the Army—to preempt the strike by speaking out against doublethink."⁴ In an interview for Hedrick Smith, a well-known American journalist, Yakovlev points to yet another factor that prompted him to "join the opposition"—he was expected to take part in the campaign to glorify Brezhnev "on Stalin's model" (p. 355). The interview appeared before the book under review was published. Part of it has been published in Russian translation.

A combination of those processes may have prompted Yakovlev to take the view that what he had learned at Columbia University in 1958-1959 could be used to analyze the crisis of the Soviet system as well as the US defense doctrine.⁵ It was then that his doubts about the regime's just character came to the fore. Most likely they first surfaced after the 20th Convention of the CPSU, but in the early 1960s they were still living side-by-side with the routine cynicism of an apparatchik. By the late 1960s and early 1970s they had provided the basis for the formation of a frank and consistent world outlook although outwardly it looked very eclectic.

This curious picture can be reconstructed from other sources, but the new book adds a few very important themes that cannot be restored by other means. For instance, the collection makes it possible to build a detailed picture of Yakovlev's role as mediator between "the Gorbachev team" and Western political elites (especially American) who catered to the foreign-policy interests of the Soviet Union during perestroika. On the one hand, Yakovlev tried to sound out the mood of Western elites and build bridges to those of them who regarded contact with the Soviet Union as beneficial to themselves (he was one of the first Soviet leaders to meet with George Soros—the book contains the minutes of their conversation). On the other hand, foreign politicians and businessmen probed Yakovlev on details of plans and forecasts made by the Soviet leadership.

Yakovlev's reports on his talks with Western public figures suggest that some of his vis-à-vis were long-standing and ardent allies. For instance, the well-known US political scientist of Polish extraction Seweryn Bialer (born in 1926) regularly and frankly informed Yakovlev (who passed the information on to Gorbachev) about the mood of the Congress and among top officials of leading US political parties. Although Yakovlev's reports do not contain his comments on his contacts with Seweryn Bialer those conversations may have prompted Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum to compile a collection of articles titled *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy*.⁶

Yakovlev's efforts to ensure the restitution of the patrimony of the Russian Orthodox Church are yet another theme of the book. It is a fact that in the 1980s and 1990s nationalists and fundamentalists heaped abuse on Yakovlev. Against that background a letter addressed to him by "cultural patriots" such as Valery Ganichev,

Valentin Rasputin and Georgy Sviridov (one of the signatories was Ivan Kozlovsky, a singer who did not belong to “the Russian party”) is incredibly touching. In it they warmly thank him for helping the return of the Optina Pustyn (monastery and hermitage) to the Russian Orthodox Church. It also contains a request for adding one more hermitage to the new patrimony. That letter was written on December 19, 1989, and on February 3, 1990, Rasputin sends Yakovlev a new message informing him that the hermitage and the Shamordino nunnery were incorporated into the Optina Pustyn. The letter says in part, “Aleksandr Nikolayevich, please accept gratitude from me and many others who can understand what generous and useful deeds are. Our job is to help those who do not yet understand it” (p. 402). Oh yes, like hell they did help...⁷

The book published by the Democracy Foundation shows Yakovlev’s figure not only as an ideologist but also as a nontrivial political expert. He was a far better expert than Gorbachev because his analyses of the situation were rational. He supplied Gorbachev with his conclusions, but his patron always intuitively felt “where the wind was blowing” and never wanted to make any intelligible comments on his real intentions and tasks.⁸

It becomes clear from the book that Yakovlev used different rules and different modalities to analyze the situation in the Soviet Union and outside it. This circumstance says a good deal about Gorbachev’s world outlook as well as Yakovlev’s, considering that Yakovlev sent his conclusions to Gorbachev.

Yakovlev treats events outside the Soviet Union, especially the events associated with the United States which was the object of his professional interests, in a strategic context and gives long-term, well-conceived forecasts. For instance, he wrote this as he briefed Gorbachev before his first meeting with Ronald Reagan (1985): “...Reagan’s anticommunist dogmatism is not the only factor. The US tough line is dictated by the character of the transition period—from absolute domination of the capitalist world to a dominating partnership and subsequently to relative equality... The painful character of the process will have a lasting effect on foreign policy”⁹ (p. 12).

Yakovlev mostly takes a short-term view of events inside the Soviet Union. He tacitly recognizes the fact that no forecasts are possible. Commenting on growing tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Yakovlev sets out his views on the situation and urges Gorbachev to take action in a letter dated January 1988: “Some mathematical problems defy solutions—they cannot be solved... By the same token the Karabakh issue cannot be resolved today. Any conceivable decision today would be unacceptable to one of the two sides. This means it is necessary to stop wasting time on the search for a decision and instead find a way out of the existing situation by lowering the level of overstrain...”¹⁰ (p. 165).

The fewer people Yakovlev addresses the more pessimistic he sounds. Addressing a party meeting at the propaganda division of the Central Committee on August 29, 1985, he minces no words to stun the audience: “We have missed one and a half decades. The country is growing weak. By the year 2000 we will be a second-rate power. The prime objective now is to convince people they should work while at work! That’s all there is to it!” (p. 14). Speaking before Soviet media executives only half a year later, on December 6, a cheerful Yakovlev is full of official optimism as he demands stepped-up efforts to intensify anti-American propaganda and expose the SDI program (pp. 15-27). Documents drafted in different conditions and addressed to different people are useful precisely

because they make it possible to realize what a sophisticated apparatchik Yakovlev was and how carefully he formulated his views depending on the audience (in his memoirs and later interviews he repeatedly said he had had to lie a good deal and be hypocritical during perestroika).

In memos addressed to Gorbachev in the late 1980s Yakovlev suggests progressively more radical political and economic measures. Some of them were subsequently implemented but they were implemented out of the context in which they had been formulated. In a memo dating from June 2, 1990, he suggested a confiscatory monetary reform almost along the lines of the reform carried by the Valentin Pavlov government in the spring of 1991 (“There is a need to exchange money 1:1 with the exception of 50 and 100-ruble bills. Such bills should be withdrawn from circulation” (p. 475). However, Yakovlev’s other proposals were not realized. He had suggested that unprofitable enterprises should immediately be leased, utilities privatized, free prices set on durables and the network of commercial groceries be dramatically expanded. Those proposals were blocked round about the same time, in the summer of 1990, by Nikolay Ryzhkov publicly promising to raise prices but retaining the state mechanism of their control. Those who were old enough at the time remember that the goods that were still on sale were immediately swept away from the shelves following Ryzhkov’s live television appearance.

Finally, the collection makes it possible to understand some special aspects of Yakovlev’s behavior in the 1980s: in a curious way it reflected the behavior of a Soviet apparatchik and that of a Western-type politician. Yakovlev resembled outstanding Western politicians in his noninstrumental attitude to values. To put it simply, over several decades he sincerely believed in certain political ideals which he thought were important to Russia and was ready to voice and champion them in public. Those were not ideas of expansion or hegemony: Yakovlev was keen to become a modern politician and hoped to modernize Russia. For instance, in his analytical reports dating from the 1980s he describes theories of postindustrial and information society to Gorbachev.

But Yakovlev also had a different side to his character—“the hostage syndrome” characteristic of Soviet apparatchiks. He maintained albeit unconsciously that he needed to keep to himself his own program as long as it differed from anything supported by Gorbachev and his “team.”

The discrepancy is obvious in one of the book’s key texts—hitherto unpublished minutes of an informal meeting between Yakovlev and Zbigniew Brzezinski (who co-chaired a consultative group on national security under US President George Bush, Sr.). It took place on October 31, 1989 (pp. 372-387). Brzezinski upbraids Yakovlev because he says Gorbachev and his team have no “project of the future.” He points out that in Poland and in Hungary people are being inspired by the belief that Soviet influence has come to an end; they are hoping for the introduction of a modern parliamentary system, that the market mechanism will be developed and the Western model will be copied. But the situation in the Soviet Union is different. The present-day educated Soviet individual still does not know what the future holds out for the country. What is going to happen when perestroika takes root? You talk about socialism with them, but they themselves know what socialism is about. They have known about it for seventy years. That is why people in the Soviet Union have no sense of stability or confidence in the future.

Yakovlev did not seem to be ready to defend socialism, nor was he ready to go along with Brzezinski's antisocialist declarations. He simply had to acknowledge the fact that the Gorbachev team had indeed no project for the future. "Sometimes we are treated with skepticism, sometimes we are trusted. But after people spend more than three hours standing in line for milk they instantly go to listen to Yeltsin. Nobody will believe us as long as there is not enough milk, meat and housing in our country... One cannot say that nothing has been done over these [Soviet] years. We are proud of what has been done. But we are being told that since you have ruined everything you have to do the restoring."

It is interesting to read what followed that exchange. As soon as Brzezinski eased the psychological pressure (clearly, he was now trying to collect his thoughts before addressing Katyn, the subject that he regarded as being of paramount importance to himself), Yakovlev began setting out his personal project for the future, but his modality was not quite clear: "We should be thinking about the development of the individual's normal, reasonable requirements. Incidentally, Western countries too need to think about it. I suppose it was you who wrote about convergence. Z. Brzezinski: I said then this would not happen.¹¹ A. Yakovlev: ... After all, not everything in the world has a class character. You and we are bound to move toward a healthy, moral society anyway."

Yakovlev's vague statements resembling Gorbachev's rhetoric can only be fully appreciated in retrospect by comparing them with his later texts, primarily his book called *Towards Social Democracy*, his principal manifesto¹² (1996). Yakovlev was one of the few people in Soviet and post-Soviet elites to believe in earnest that reforms "from above" must have ethical objectives and have their own ethical content. They should not be treated as a purely technological issue. As early as December 1986 Yakovlev realized that the need to overcome the "technological" approach to reforms was a challenge to the centuries-old inertia of Russia's forcible modernization: "The point at issue is not only the dismantlement of Stalinism but also the replacement of the thousand-year-old model of our statehood," he said in an analytical report for Gorbachev¹³ (p. 65), something that he reiterated in his book *Towards Social Democracy* in 1996.

During the perestroika years Yakovlev was evasive on the issue of what ethical values could provide the basis for reforms. He defined them in a somewhat concrete albeit utopian form later when he was no longer bound by the duties of a functionary of "the Gorbachev team": "Stand up, Russia! For the time being you walk limply, you waddle and you shuffle in a Parkinsonian manner. Let labor make you sweat! Nothing but labor will give you freedom and prosperity."¹⁴

Here we see Yakovlev's incredibly eclectic and anachronistic language: contextually those slogans clearly appeal to Weber's ideas of "Protestant ethics" but grammatically they are a replica of an aphorism by German lawyer Rudolf von Jehring. In Russia his aphorism is known as the slogan of the Socialist Revolutionary Party: "You shall gain your right in struggle." Yakovlev "turned" Stolypin with as much inspiration as he did the Socialist Revolutionaries. In 1985 he addressed the following phrase to Gorbachev: "We want everyone to have great civic duties, but this is only possible if they have great civic rights" (p. 35). It is suspiciously reminiscent of the well-known slogan about great upheavals and great Russia. In his 1907 speech Prime Minister Stolypin urged Duma deputies to be ready for protracted and gradual work to cultivate ideas of private ownership among the peasantry.

Yakovlev had no language to express his political positions either during perestroika or even in the 1990s. For that reason he picked up bits and scraps wherever he could. The fact of the matter was that he was committed to some values, but had no language of his own to express them. But he did have an elaborate language to express an expert opinion prepared for Gorbachev or a narrow circle of experts. The problem was that there was no language for public political debates in the mid-1980s. This would not have been a big problem but for the fact that in the late 1980s Yakovlev chose Bolshevism as the main target of his criticism. Initially discourse on it was eclectic.¹⁵ In a bid to rout opponents “on all fronts” Yakovlev was compelled to create a “bricolage” rhetoric to match it.

Even so a positive program shows through Yakovlev’s chaotic allusions—it is left-wing liberalism of the North-American rather than European type. It becomes obvious in documents dating from the late 1980s that his left-wing liberalism meant reliance on petty proprietors and civil servants in the low and middle tiers, appeals to civil society and human rights and the idea of evolutionary development.

Most likely Yakovlev’s views took final shape in the 1970s when he was Ambassador to Canada. At that time he experienced a good deal of influence from Pierre Elliott Trudeau,¹⁶ the Canadian Prime Minister of the day, one of the most outstanding liberal politicians of the Cold War era (1968-1979, 1979-1984). Yakovlev repeatedly called Trudeau one of his closest friends. Judging from the cordial letter of October 17, 1986, published in the book under review, the Canadian reformer had a good understanding of his Soviet counterpart. Commenting on *On the Edge of an Abyss: From Truman to Reagan...* (Moscow, 1985),¹⁷ seemingly a patently propaganda book written by Yakovlev in the spirit of the Cold War, Trudeau notes a good measure of affinity between it and *The Cycles of American History*¹⁸ (p. 63), a work by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. It had not been published by that time, but Trudeau had read the manuscript. Yes, in a way Yakovlev had much in common with the adept of Roosevelt’s New Deal. He might have certainly subscribed to the following phrase from *The Cycles...*: Ideology does not fit into history. It thrives on models replacing reality. Ideology extracts issues from the whirlpool of reality and tackles them in isolation from the constant maelstrom of life.¹⁹

The similarity could not have been accidental: in the 1980s Yakovlev’s views were in many ways similar to Schlesinger’s. Moreover, they may have experienced a direct impact by the US expert (a reminder that *The Cycles of American History* was written on the basis of articles published in the US political and scientific press of the 1950s through the 1980s. I am sure Yakovlev was familiar with them²⁰). He was the Soviet leader whose views were closest to Schlesinger’s. More than anyone else he shared the idea of the US analyst to the effect that Reagan’s foreign policy being dependent on a neoconservative ideology was mainly fraught with a “symmetrical” strengthening of “hawks” in the Soviet leadership and reanimation of outdated Soviet expansionism.²¹

Few latter-day Soviet politicians and post-Soviet politicians have been consciously committed to political values and ready to defend them. Yakovlev used such values as a basis for compromise rather than for maneuvering unlike Gorbachev who was a grandmaster of maneuvering. As far as can be seen, Gorbachev has always had political values, but up until the end of his political career he made a point of keeping apart the values he believed in and routine political practices.

There is no doubt that Yakovlev was the most demonized Soviet politician during perestroika and even in the 1990s—certainly in the conservative and conspirological press. His psychological mindset prevented him from becoming a public leader. Rather he was an ideological analyst and in that role he matched Brzezinski but unlike Brzezinski he had the specific experience of work as an apparatchik in the Soviet Communist Party. In any authoritarian society such a person is inevitably treated as a “grey cardinal,” especially if he deliberately measures out the degree of frankness in his public speeches and even in official memos as Yakovlev did.

The collection of documents published by the Democracy Foundation makes it clear that it is essential for anyone wanting to understand perestroika as a historical period to study Yakovlev’s political concepts as well as the levers of his political influence. He spent a lifetime trying to implement a well-defined “positive program” although his contemporaries primarily saw him as a critic and exposé.

NOTES

1 In the last versions of his memoirs Yakovlev unequivocally says that Suslov got angry with him because of his freethinking “libertinism.” Brezhnev backed Suslov on that. The reason he got angry with Yakovlev was that he had breached the unwritten rules that an apparatchik was supposed to follow: Yakovlev was one of Brezhnev’s speechwriters. He published a keynote article on the eve of a major “guideline” report presented by General Secretary Brezhnev. The speechwriters had no right to behave like that—it was assumed that by so doing they would “expose” ideas meant for the “leader” by revealing their names.

2 In reporting this Anatoly Yakovlev refers to a set of documents from his father’s archive, but he in no way characterizes the source or tells about its content: GARF. F. 10063. Op. 1. D. 68.

3 Following the Six Day War (1967) the two countries broke off diplomatic relations.

4 I. Zemtsov, *Faces and Masks*, in 2 vols., Moscow, 2008, vol.1, p. 76 (in Russian). I wish to thank Nikolay Mitrokhin who drew my attention to that source and gave me advice and consulted me during my work on the review.

5 Yakovlev analyzed it in his dissertations for the degree of Candidate of Sciences and Doctor of Sciences he defended in the 1960s. His findings were summarized in his works: A. Yakovlev, *The American “Empire’s” Ideology*, Moscow, 1967; Idem, *Pax Americana: Imperial Ideology. Origins. Doctrines*, Moscow, 1969 (both in Russian). Today’s anti-American campaigners in Russia might do well to pay attention to those works, considering that they believe the description of the United States as an empire is the latest achievement of the world political science.

6 *Gorbachev’s Russia and American Foreign Policy*, S. Bialer, M. Mandelbaum (eds.), Westview Press (with The East-West Forum), 1988.

7 See this, for instance: “it seems to me there was fresh air in literature in the 1970s. Those years were not easy ones. Aleksandr Yakovlev presented his anti-Russian letter; there were other repressions, but all the same I found it easy to write books. And I was not alone in that. (V. Rasputin, “Talent Should be Aided”: a speech at a jubilee meeting in the House of Nationalities, *Zavtra*, 2007, April 25). Also see Rasputin’s interview for Savva Yamshchikov, *Zavtra*, March 30, 2004.

8 I find it difficult to resist the temptation of quoting the psychological portrait of the Gorbachev of the mid-1980s painted by Yakovlev in his book *Twilight* (Moscow, 2005, in Russian): “Sometimes he became a slave of his own logic. It dictated the course and content of the conversation while he was only a witness to it as it were. But this problem is largely functional: he could skillfully hide his real thoughts and intentions behind a verbal fence... It seemed to me

sometimes that he was afraid of getting a glimpse of his inner self... He was apprehensive of learning something about himself he did not yet know himself or did not want to know.”

9 Hereafter all italicized quotations correspond to underlined typewritten or handwritten text authored by Aleksandr Yakovlev. The quoted memo had earlier appeared in Yakovlev’s *A Whirl of Memory*.

10 According to Zemtsov, though, in the 1970s Yakovlev made an almost identical comment on the Mid-East conflict that was unfolding outside the Soviet Union: “Issues are not resolved, certainly not under external directions—they are overcome. When the time comes” (I. Zemtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 75). If that is what Yakovlev really said it could be assumed that he regarded the situation over Israel in the early 1970s as the model of a sociopolitical conflict that could not be resolved in the short term.

11 “Then” means in 1964 in a book written jointly with Samuel Huntington: Z. Brzezinski, S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, 1964, p. 436: “Soviet and American political systems are quite successful, each in its own way. For that reason they are unlikely to undergo significant change. For convergence to take place the way of development of each of the countries will have to go through a process of considerable correction—a revolution from a historical point of view. The two systems’ evolution rather than their convergence is what we believe to be the most realistic scenario of future development” (quoted from V. Yevgenyev, “Images of USA and Soviet Union in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Concept of World Politics,” *POLIS*, 2003, No. 1. (<http://www.politstudies.ru/N2004fulltext/2003/1/16.htm>)). The book under review contains no comment on Brzezinski’s remark.

12 A. Yakovlev, *Towards Social Democracy*, Moscow, 1996 (in Russian).

13 Earlier this memo was published in part in A. Yakovlev, *The Whirl of Memory: from Stolypin to Putin*, in two volumes, Moscow, 2001, vol. 1, pp. 367-371 (in Russian). In his books of memoirs *Twilight* Yakovlev claimed he had written it back in December 1985.

14 The final part of Yakovlev’s speech at the constituent convention of the Social Democracy Party in 1995. Quoted from A. Yakovlev, *Towards Social Democracy*, p. 76.

15 This realization came to Yakovlev too late: he writes about the fundamental eclecticism of Bolshevism in his book *A Bitter Cup: Bolshevism and Russia’s Reformation* (Yaroslavl, 1994, p. 451, in Russian).

16 His full name is Joseph Philipp Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau (1919-2000).

17 The book appeared in Russian a year earlier: A. Yakovlev, *From Truman to Reagan: The Doctrines and Realities of the Nuclear Era*, Moscow, 1984. For some reason the Russian edition is not mentioned in the comments.

18 A. Schlesinger Jr., *The Cycles of American History*, Houghton Mifflin, 1986.

19 *Ibid.*

20 For instance, Chapter 3 quoted here is written on the basis of an article contributed by Schlesinger Jr. in the journal *Foreign Affairs* (1983, Fall).

21 A. Schlesinger, *op. cit.*

I. Kukulin