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### **MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE WORLD: THE YEAR 2025**

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Strategic planning is a key to foreign policy successes. No political course, no matter how realistic and geared to success, can be consistently realized without a preliminary assessment of resources and options; positive and negative repercussions of political actions that might trigger possible, probable, or otherwise forecasted events and their temporal continuity. This is what strategic planning is about; it relies on short-, mid- and long-term forecasts of the military-political situation in the world.

The mature democracies make no secret of such forecasts. In the United States, for example, the National Intelligence Council (which brings together the CIA, DIA, the Department of State INR and other structures) is the most reliable source of the documents of this sort; its reports are based on views and opinions of independent experts. The *Global Trends 2025: Transformational World* is the latest document of this sort. Published late in 2008, it served an instruction of sorts to President Obama. In their recent monograph *Budushchee glazami Natsional'nogo Soveta po Razvedke SShA: globalnye tendentsii do 2025 goda 1* (Future as Seen by the U.S. National Intelligence Council: Global Trends until 2025) A. Utkin and V. Fedotova offered their analysis of the document. Here I intend to present my own outline of the short-, mid- and long-term perspectives of the military-political situation in the world.

### **The Crisis of the Contemporary Security System**

Viewed in the military-political context, the next 15 years can be described as the final stage of the strategic pause which began late in the 1980s when the era of bipolar confrontation came to an end. The threats we have been watching to gather momentum in the last decade might acquire a new quality. This means that some time in future the leading powers will be confronted with a strategic decision about the role of the factor of force in the national foreign policies and international relations.

So far, the military-political context can be described as relatively favorable for Russia: military aggression of any of the big powers or a coalition is improbable. Russia has no obvious enemies in the world: there are no potential aggressors even though it has practically no friends. Money- and resource-consuming militarization is no longer needed.

In the world free from bipolar confrontation the states could have moved to constructive cooperation at the regional and global levels, in the UN and other international structures. The world is no longer lingering on the brink of a global conflict of the old type; the system of international relations can still maintain a fairly high (albeit lowering) level of mutual control and confidence in the military sphere.

The leading countries, however, do not haste to discard their obviously superfluous arsenals which are consistently upgraded with new type of offensive weapons. Diplomacy and the commonly recognized international legal principles and norms have not developed into the main international security instruments.

The threat of interstate and potentially uncontrolled regional and local armed conflicts is mounting. This is true, first and foremost, of the Greater Middle East, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. The number and violence of domestic conflicts might also increase; this is true of the Middle East; the Balkans is dotted with seats of potential conflicts. The same is true of the post-Soviet expanse: the Ferghana valley, the Crimea, Transnistria, Javakhetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (the latter two have already been involved in armed conflicts) and some of the African countries.

The world, which is obviously moving toward polycentrism, will become a multilayer and highly mobile international and inter-state rather than a classical multipolar system. Confronted with global problems it needs new multisided mechanisms and institutions to avoid destabilization or even chaos.

The conflict potential is mounting; the international community is forced to accept the hypertrophied importance of the factor of force. In 2000-2008, the United States vehemently insisted on its right to unilateral strategic decisions in world politics. The practice of unilateral and illegitimate (from the point of view of international law) actions pursued by certain powers determined to enforce their interests in disregard of the legal interests of others has undermined, to a great extent, strategic stability in the world. It seems that the new U.S. Administration has learned the lessons yet its ability to move, as has been declared, to the multisided approach in international relations remains to be seen.

It has become abundantly clear that practically all post-World War II mechanisms as well as those created by the Cold War era (the UN, NATO, OSCE and others) are no longer adequate to the threats and challenges of the early 21st century. Attempts at reforms have failed; so far, there is no political will and determination to set up new international security structures; the international crises and processes are growing increasingly unmanageable.

So far, everything what Washington was doing, with the help of military-political instruments, to remain the world's only leader and to resort to unilateral actions in crisis situations has failed. Globalizing economy has downplayed the effects of economic domination while the political dividends of the nuclear power status per se are no longer obvious. It is much harder today to put conventional arms superiority to political or

military use. The recent events demonstrated that America's policies may breed conflicts. Washington's complete failure in Iraq followed by a possible failure in Afghanistan is a sure sign that America, which relies on high precision conventional weapons and information technologies, has not yet mastered the art of warfare of low intensity and high selectivity.

The Asian-Pacific countries, China in the first place, are moving into the limelight; this adds vehemence to the already obvious contradictions; creates new problems and intensifies rivalry with possible reliance on military force.

International stability is endangered by national and socioeconomic problems in all corners of the world, regional conflicts, regional arms race, WMD proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, and other challenges. Mounting national and religious extremism (which is especially obvious in some of the Islamic regions) threatens regional and international stability.

Globalized economy and informatization of international relations offer unprecedented development chances and make the world system even more vulnerable to terrorism, WMD and information weapons.

A fierce energy-related rivalry pushed the military-political factor to the fore: it spurs on, albeit indirectly, arms race and much more energetic efforts of the resource-rich states determined to defend their wealth. The consumer states are toying with the idea of using military-political instruments to gain access to energy sources by force (an "Energy NATO").

Uncontrolled arms race has swept the world; it has already reached a qualitatively new level; in certain regions it has dwarfed the highest figures of the Cold War era. The global and regional arms control regimes are degrading while the world, its conflict zones in the first place, are rapidly militarizing. In an absence of international control over trade in conventional weapons they are spreading across the world and among criminal structures. The threat of the so-called destabilizing weapons, small-capacity nuclear charges and strategic missiles with non-nuclear warheads is more real than ever.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2008 the planet spent nearly \$1.5 trillion on armaments; today, the aggregate annual military spendings are rising faster than in the Cold War (by 6 and 2.5-3 percent respectively). The Middle East, some of the CIS countries (Azerbaijan and Belarus) and Georgia are spending much more on armaments than before.

Accelerating destabilization of international relations and the still felt inertia of the "enforcement of peace" and "imposing democracy" pursued by the previous U.S. Administration (the new administration has publicly renounced this politics) is one of the main reasons of the new global arms race. The America-initiated armed conflicts in Iraq and former Yugoslavia showed all and everyone that the international security guarantees could not be relied upon. In response all states began building up their armed forces to defend their sovereignties; this is true not only of openly anti-American regimes which are now importing much more armaments than before; the same applies to countries with no military-industrial complexes of their own, such as Malaysia, Vietnam and UAE: they are arming themselves just in case. An absence of the nuclear umbrella which offered safety to the Soviet and American satellites and a weaker containment power of nuclear potentials of both countries can be described as important arms race factors which

convinced many countries that there was no alternative to self-reliance in the defense sphere.

The United States can be described as the leader of the global arms race where the quality and quantity are concerned; the “catch-up with the leader” race offers no chances: today the U.S. military budget is about half of what the rest of the world spends on defenses. In 2009, for example, America spent over \$700 billion; the bulk of the money was spent on innovations such as new weapon types based on new physical principles — geophysical, ionosphere, EMI weapons, etc.

The following trends should be taken into account when talking about the nuclear factor:

- So far nuclear weapons have retained their importance in world politics even though the favorable international climate has practically ruled out big wars and military conflicts between the great powers. (This trend will survive for the next 15 or 20 years yet if nuclear proliferation gathers momentum nuclear weapons might regain their importance in another “nuclear century.”) The unprecedented scope of terrorism and the new threats coming to the fore are pushing the world closer to the dangerously low threshold behind which the use of nuclear weapons is not ruled out; there is a much greater possibility of their use and of their uncontrolled escalation. Proliferation of WMD and their delivery means increases the danger.

- Technological breakthroughs and the results of demo testing of ABM components (achieved despite the recent cut-down R&D funding) accumulated in the United States testify that in the mid-term perspective (five to ten years) it will unfold a limited anti-missile system with the gradually increased density. It will hardly threaten Russia’s interests in the next 15 to 25 years especially if the Russian Federation goes on with modernizing its strategic nuclear potential. The deployed American ABM system, however, will probably force the other states to re-target their nuclear forces from the American to other (probably Russian) objects upsetting the global strategic balance.

The vast scope of transnational terrorism can be described as extremely dangerous; the special services and military intelligence of the Russian Federation regularly receive information about foreign support to some of the terrorist groups operating in Russia.

### **The Short-Term Challenges and Threats**

In the short-term perspective (3 to 4 years) global instability caused, on the one hand, by the much more pronounced traditional and new challenges and threats and, on the other, by the decline of the international regional and global security institutions (the UN, NATO, OSCE, etc.) will increase.

“Centralized” weapons control which so far ensured, on the whole, predictability of the military-political situation and ample strategic warning thus ruling out the danger of a sudden attack, will continue degrading. The START-1 Treaty expired on 5 December 2009; The Moscow Treaty will expire in 2012; inspections under the ISRM Treaty were discontinued in May 2001 together with the expiry of the 13-year-long period of inspection activity (the ban on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles remains in place because of the Treaty’s unlimited duration). The CFE Treaty will be probably completely destroyed by the continued NATO eastward expansion. The U.S. and NATO

will do their best to avoid new binding agreements. The future of the Test Ban Treaty ratified by three nuclear powers — Russia, the U.K. and France — is still vague despite President Obama's promise to insist on its ratification, mainly because China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and some other nuclear states oppose it.

The new START Treaty between Russia and the United States will probably slow down nuclear proliferation but will never offer a radical solution: both countries are hardly prepared to insist on a nuclear-free world. The talks will hardly go on once the new START Treaty is signed. Further reductions will be realized, at best, through simultaneous unilateral steps or probably outside mutual agreements; each of the sides will independently identify the technical and economic expediency without bothering to consult the partner. It remains to be seen how this will affect international security, strategic stability and bilateral relations.

According to available information the U.S. prefers to keep its hands free from any serious legally binding and controllable arms limitation and reduction agreements. In the last nine years, 65 members of the UN Disarmament Conference passed no decisions of importance. Washington and London stand practically alone against global talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

Washington's resolve to insist on its global military-political domination in the 21st century has political, technological and economic dimensions closely connected with the interests of the American military-industrial corporations and the U.S. leaders' firm intention to upgrade the scientific and technical level of national industry through lavish funding of large-scale military-technological programs.

According to Russian experts, Russia still has 15 to 25 years to feel safe from the challenges of the above and to work on adequate counter-measures to rely on when and if America unfolds its strategic ABM system.

In the next couple of years Americans will hardly pull out of Iraq which means that they will hardly plunge into a military venture of a similar scale. One cannot exclude, however, the use of force against Iran in the form of high-precision strikes at the country's nuclear complex and other military objects and infrastructure. The new administration might probably be forced to do this to compensate for the defeat in Iraq.

In any case, a possibility of local military conflicts in the Middle East (similar to the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese clash) between two or more countries, including Israel and Iran, cannot be ruled out. They might start very much as before: with Israel's attempt to squash transnational terrorist structures sheltered by some of the Arab states on their territories. In fact, Americans' continued presence in Iraq will add vigor to terrorist activities. When the United States, having failed to democratize or stabilize Iraq, pulls out it will set loose tens of thousands of fighters whom the war in Iraq made professionals in terror; Russia will not avoid its share of the "Terrorist Internationale." The Islamic community will become even more radical which will raise the level of terrorist danger all over the world. An upsurge of anti-Western and anti-American sentiments (Russia will not escape this fate either) cannot be avoided; there will be a growing conviction that the United States proved to be a lousy "world policeman." The country will plunge into the "Iraq" (similar to Vietnam) syndrome which will do nothing good to world security. Its vacuum will only grow. One should be prepared to face the worst of the options: Iraq which will fall apart; mounting Islamist terrorism; Washington's inability to oppose it coupled with its desire to prove to all and everyone that it is no "paper tiger."

So far, the Islamic world is best described as a virtual civilizational subject: hundreds of millions of Muslims tied together by their religion are politically disunited by their belonging to different political schools, their attitude to the nature of political power, history of Islam, the Islamic regimes, etc. In the strategic perspective, however, the Islamic community might close ranks to oppose the new world order if it continues to ignore its interests. Islamic extremist trends might gain momentum in the Islamic world deprived of due respect. This is fraught with “clashes of civilizations”; the prospect looks real since Islamic extremists themselves do not know what they mean by “due respect.” The worst possible scenario: Islamists come to power in Pakistan either by regime change or through elections to get access to the country’s nuclear weapons.

The widening gap between the super-poor and super-rich countries which push to the roadside vast regions rather than states and the strengthening Weimar syndrome in the Islamic world will escalate transnational terrorism against the countries of Greater Europe (and Russia as its part). In any case, the threat of international terror will not drop below the 2001-2009 level; in an absence of coordinated radical measures (the use of force is not excluded) it might even go up in the coming decade.

This brings into bolder relief the fact that the international community is unable to cope with the failed states problem.

The Russian Federation is exposed to the danger of armed conflicts along its borders and of being drawn into some of them. There is a danger of unfriendly military-political neighbors, the problem created by the unrecognized states and NATO eastward expansion to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia. These plans were pushed aside but not abandoned as the new NATO Secretary General said in Moscow.

The NATO membership for Ukraine is especially dangerous: it will create a salient of mini-crisis with some of them locally provoked, push back Ukraine and create serious problems for Russia and Europe. Seen from Russia this might look like a declaration of another cold war and an open provocation. Expansion to Ukraine which remains on the NATO agenda is one of the most serious military-political challenges of the coming decade. The still pending problem of the unrecognized states might trigger conflicts (the Caucasus is especially vulnerable to this danger) in the next couple of years.

These regional and global trends related, to different extents, to Russia’s national security should not hide the fact that the Russian Federation is threatened in the South, in the first place. In the next five or six years the mounting Islamist extremism might cause grave instability in Central Asia. Indeed, if confrontation with the Islamic world is not defused by political means, contradictions with some of the Muslim states seeking domination over a vast expanse from Bosnia to Tajikistan will aggravate and Central Asia might be destabilized. The southern part of the former Soviet Union holds little promise for Russia which means that it should avoid excessive involvement in these marginally important regions to concentrate its material and intellectual resources at more promising directions.

### **Decline of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is in a crisis; the North Korean nuclear test of 2007 spelt a huge defeat of the international community because:

- It demonstrated that the political and military means the Six employed to resolve the North Korean problem and to check nuclear proliferation were inadequate. This will encourage the so far non-nuclear states to move into the nuclear league.

- The nuclear weapon domino effect in the Far East and Southeast Asia, the region where several countries have adequate technological capability has become even more real;

- Iran and the other threshold countries will be probably moving much faster to the nuclear status. The Greater Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and several other countries) might join in the process.

In the last few years the United States delivered several crippling blows at the non-proliferation regime.

First, it pulled out of the 1971 ABM Treaty which upset the system of agreements painstakingly created throughout the Cold War years.

Second, the new American nuclear doctrine has not merely lowered the threshold of a possible nuclear strike – it has pushed nuclear weapons from the sphere of political containment to the sphere of warfare (one cannot exclude a possibility that Russia's nuclear doctrine is drifting in the same direction without much ado).

Third, the de facto recognition of India's nuclear status and an agreement on wide-scale nuclear cooperation buried the last political and moral non-proliferation arguments. Today, the threat of the use of force, the only available argument, failed to impress North Korea.

It is commonly believed that the de facto violation by the official “nuclear club” members (the U.S, U.S.S.R./Russia, U.K., France and China) of Art VI of the NPT which said that “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” shattered the non-proliferation regime.

An absence of the so-called negative guarantees the official nuclear powers were expected to extend to the non-nuclear states-members of the NPT is believed to be another obvious reason of the regime failure. Vague and scattered statements made by the UN SC permanent members in 1995 (Russia was the first, followed by the U.S., U.K., France and China) are a pale copy of such guarantees. Russia and Great Britain were the only countries which supported the suggested convention on legally binding full-scale security guarantees for the non-nuclear NPT members.

The above cannot be described as the main cause of the non-proliferation crisis. The failure of the UN SC permanent members to agree on the measures to be applied to the actual and potential violators of the non-proliferation regime did much more harm. Indeed, they never reached an agreement on efficient political, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran which allowed Tehran to consistently ignore the resolutions of the UN Security Council by skillfully playing on the contradictions among its permanent members.

The world is sliding into another nuclear era, an era that is much more dangerous than the previous one: instability which started in the late 1940s was cut short in the early 1960s. Later, the growing nuclear arsenals held no threat to stability: the system of mutual nuclear containment between the United States and the Soviet Union proved its efficiency. Today, the potentially nuclear countries have no political, historical, military,

technological or moral experience of the old nuclear powers which learned their lessons in the mid-20th century. This means less maturity and less responsibility. The resultant anxiety and military-political instability will make preventive strikes too tempting to be ignored; the United States will add another argument to its arsenal of arguments in favor of a global space-based ABM system. Other countries, including Russia, will have to contemplate regional ABM systems. This might trigger another round of arms race.

During the Cold War, membership in the “nuclear club” was prestigious; those who joined it could not aspire to contain the Soviet Union or the United States (China could not seriously contemplate this in relation to the United States; France, in the relation to the Soviet Union). Membership added to the country’s international prestige; in Europe it tied the U.S. to European security: the West European nuclear forces were intended, in theory, as a safety fuse that kept the American and European nuclear forces together and added to the regional containment potential.

Today, everything has changed. Prestige is no longer important: nuclear weapons are seen as the only guarantee of national sovereignty and civilizational choice (that is, national identity). The difference between “nearly nuclear” North Korea and non-nuclear Iraq is glaring. The United States has opted for diplomatic means when dealing with the former and military force when dealing with the latter. The choice for many countries is obvious, and the proof is Iran. The North Korean nuclear problem permits cautious optimism about the outcome of the talks. The Iranian nuclear file offers no such hope: the crisis is developing with no possible solution in sight. In fact, despite the international efforts Iran will become a de facto nuclear power or will be able to reach the stage of “five-minute readiness,” at least to resort to political blackmail as it sees fit.

The rapidly spreading transnational terrorism added urgency to the WMD and missile proliferation issue: in the wrong hands they will cause dreadful havoc. The military and the political community should start looking for new approaches; the passive classical non-proliferation measures might be combined with reliance on military force. In its turn, the use of force (nuclear force in particular) might become probable cause for regional and, possibly, global destabilization. There is another equally dangerous and equally real possibility: terrorists might use the so-called dirty nuclear bombs, nuclear charges and radioactive materials bought on the “black market” of nuclear technologies.

If the developed powers (the G8 and three of four other countries) remain passive (it looks like no urgent measures are planned for the next five-seven years) the non-proliferation regime will go on eroding. In the same period the nuclear club (five veterans and de facto Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) will be joined (almost certainly) by Iran and (possibly) by South Korea and Japan. In this case several other countries, in the Greater Middle East and Southeast Asia in the first place, might make the fact of their nuclear programs public to blackmail the world community, to say the least. If the IAEA regime is not modernized progress in nuclear energy production will push nuclear proliferation further. Likewise, if the missile technology control regime (MTCR) is not tightened missiles and missile weapons will spread far and wide. The new nuclear powers will acquire intermediate range missiles which can potentially reach Russia, which, in its turn, will have to build up a regional anti-missile system; we still have 10 to 12 years before this happens.

Under the worst possible scenario the above factors will result in a qualitatively new geostrategic situation in the Asian region stretching from Japan to the

Mediterranean, the seat of the most serious threat of proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

### **Challenges and Threats — 2025**

If in the next three to four years the responsible members of the world community fail to effectively address the above threats and challenges or at least alleviate them they will pile up. They have to be addressed now to avoid the need to pour much more resources and to resort to much more strenuous and possibly useless efforts to avert the catastrophe.

By 2025, three to six nuclear (at least de facto) powers will join the already existing ones.

By 2015, Iran's nuclear status will crumble the NPT. Under the worst possible scenario, in the next ten years more countries might acquire nuclear weapon capability including those which might revise their present non-nuclear status (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina.)

In some 8 to 12 years, Russia and the rest of the world will probably have to cope with a string of nuclear crises and landslide nuclear proliferation to many, including failed, states in which the demands of safe storage of nuclear weapons, blocking unsanctioned access to them and preventing their use cannot be fulfilled. The threat of nuclear terrorism coming to the fore at the regional and global level will push all other threats and challenges (ecological, energy, etc.) to the backburner.

Having failed in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States will probably reshape its global ambitions and switch to a more or less isolationist course only to find out that is hardly possible.

The Greater Middle East will experience large-scale destabilization with a couple of local wars on the scale of the Israeli-Lebanese clash. Iran and Israel might be involved.

New challenges may spring into existence in the West and the East yet a direct military threat from any of these directions is hardly possible. In an absence of real partnership between Russia and NATO (so far, the progress is unimpressive) and if the Alliance remains a closed military bloc with infrastructures pushed close to the Russian borders (rather than being transformed into a peacekeeping structure with Russia's participation) the situation might be much worse. This variant will not lead to an effective Euroatlantic, and hence, global security, which means that the worsening relations between Russia and the West and the mounting alienation between them should be described as one of the main threats to national and international security.

In the Far East China will probably step up its efforts to return Taiwan under its jurisdiction which might bring in a grave Chinese-American and Chinese-Japanese crises. Russia will hardly profit from this: the resultant destabilization of the entire APR might become unpredictable.

If no regional security systems are put in place in Greater Europe and the APR and, most important, in Central Asia and the Middle East, to tighten the global security mechanisms under the auspices of modernized UN, then by 2015-2020 stiff rivalry between the new centers of power typical of any polycentric system of international relations cannot be excluded. They will seek domination over the regions of vital importance for Russia or even parts of the Russian Federation itself.

## **Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime**

To preserve the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all interested powers and international organizations should act together in a radical and resolute manner to tighten up its institutes and norms. For geostrategic reasons Russian needs this more than any other actor and can do much more than it is doing now.

This is true of the other UN SC permanent members as well: they should work hard to push forward the stalling nuclear reduction talks and to extend the legally binding nuclear safety guarantees to the non-nuclear NPT member states. For obvious reasons, in an absence of such guarantees extended by the nuclear states still relying on nuclear weapons for their security the threshold countries (with nuclear industries and nuclear weapon capabilities) will go on with their own nuclear weapon programs.

To avoid this, the nuclear powers should move in the following directions:

- Stronger and much more respected non-proliferation regime in general and the NPT, IAEA, MTCR and the Wassenaar Agreement in particular;
- Agreements on tighter export control at the national level;
- A Data Bank and an International Non-Proliferation Agency set up as part of the UN Secretariat to identify possible violators of the non-proliferation regime and to prevent and cut short illegal actions acting jointly with other international organizations;
- All UN members, the U.S. and China in the first place, should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the key link which keeps nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation together;
- The World Disarmament Conference should promptly resume the talks on the stage-by-stage ban on production of fissionable materials for military purposes as an another link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
- The countries which have so far failed to sign and ratify the 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol to the IAEA guarantee agreement should do this to confirm the comprehensive IAEA guarantees. The NPT withdrawal procedure should become much more regulated by creating a legal base for the IAEA to control the technologies and materials acquired within the NPT; their conservation, removal and return to the suppliers under the Agency's supervision should be envisaged. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee should join forces to promote the process;
- Physical safety, inventory and control of fissionable materials and accelerated utilization of highly enriched uranium in the form of low-enriched uranium for peaceful uses on the basis of the successful U.S.-Russia HEU deal as wide-scale preventive measures should be urgently achieved in the face of the mounting threat of nuclear terrorism;
- Non-proliferation safeguards should be brought into strict conformity with international law related to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials (PSI in the first place); the UN SC should enjoy wider powers in intercepting illegal freights; it should be more actively involved in the consolidated activities related to Arts 41 and 42 Chapter VII of the UN Charter (consistent tightening of sanctions in case of direct regional and global threats) as applied to the violators of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- Russia should invite the U.K., France and China to consultations on limiting their nuclear forces by the present level and on applying the acceptable for them part of

control and confidence-building measures currently existing between Russia and the United States;

- Russia should initiate consultations on transforming the MTCR and The Hague Code of Conduct as well as nuclear exports control within the NSG into multisided conventions. It should work harder toward international negotiations on the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

### **Russian-American Cooperation in Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

It is generally recognized that Russia and the United States can and should cooperate in the sphere of non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. Neither of them can cope with the task single-handedly; this is accepted even by the most inveterate foes of partnership between the two countries. Indeed, Russia and America have shared practically identical concerns; cooperation on many issues is going on in the diplomatic sphere, in the first place; they coordinate their diplomatic efforts to settle regional conflicts and crises, which breed the threat of proliferation.

The importance of coordinated individual work with potential “proliferationists” – North Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Israel, etc. – cannot be overestimated. Moscow and Washington could initiate elaboration of a regime of economic, political and military sanctions.

They should work together on other important issues: the stimuli of possessing WMD and missile capability should be lessened by political means including crisis and conflict settlement in all corners of the world. Indeed, more often than not, WMD capability is seen as an answer to regional conflicts stirred up by national or ethnic enmity and territorial claims rooted in the distant past. This is especially true for the zones of traditional regional conflicts (the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula) and such motives have grave causes. These countries cannot be persuaded to join the NPT; they will turn the deaf ear to any talks about nuclear-free zones for the simple reason that nuclear weapons there are a not a cause but a result of conflicts. It has become their inalienable part which means that the nuclear-related problems can be resolved as part of a comprehensive political settlement with due account for the interests of all sides involved.

Defense systems, air defense and tactical ABM systems, in particular, can be employed as counter-proliferation measures; this is even more possible when diplomatic and containment measures fail to check missile proliferation. Russia is working on S-300 and S-400 tactical air defense complexes to respond to such crises while the United States can rely on a wider ABM range: modified Patriot and the THAAD air-launched and sea-based systems. Both air- and missile-defense systems will prove indispensable to jointly protect important military objects, troops and fighting equipment, missile complexes and settlements. Russia, however, should be prepared to act on its own.

Air and missile defense systems will come useful if and when any of the regional powers ventures to rely on its missile capability to claim regional domination. In the absence of air and missile defenses political will of the great powers might be paralyzed; they will hesitate to launch a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation. On the other hand, in the presence of such systems which neutralize the regional aggressor’s missile

potential the great powers will be much more determined to move to peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations anywhere in the world.

Offensive counter-proliferation measures (military force) may prove necessary when all other means and methods up to the theater-of-war ABM defenses failed; the following methods can be recommended:

- Surgical high-precision strikes to suppress missile complexes and other military objects;
- Projecting military (nuclear including) might into the region with the help of sea-based and air-launched missiles;
- Landing operations to neutralize the offensive military potential of the objects of WMD and of WMD production; subversive activities by special units trained to use high-precision weapons in conventional equipment as well as penetration aids to destroy underground objects, etc.

Every time military force used for non-proliferation purposes should be UN sanctioned. In future these functions should be transferred to the UN (its Military Staff Committee) exclusive competence.

Time has come to elaborate an integrated long-term non-proliferation strategy; it should be treated as a priority and should include diplomatic, economic and other measures; new global and regional security structures should be developed as well as cooperation between intelligence services and a system of international security guarantees; military operations should be seen as the last resort. The UN SC rather than the Pentagon should busy itself with contemplating the use of force as the last resort of keeping the international non-proliferation regime intact; this alone makes such actions legal.

The world needs a global system of early warning and control (monitoring) for non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery means to achieve coordinated non-proliferation efforts; this requires an automatized system of global nuclear non-proliferation and test control based on similar American and Russian systems used to monitor the land, seas and oceans and near space.

America and Russia are the only two countries with fairly ramified networks operating round the clock to control large parts of the globe. They can be tied into a global network with clearly identified responsibility zones and round-the-clock information exchange to be further developed and improved on a shared technological basis; human and material resources can be likewise unified; concerted efforts will make it easier to develop mathematical and program backup, complex equipment and other costly elements. This is by far the complete list of issues of possible close and businesslike Russian-American cooperation as a potentially stabilizing factor on the international arena.

A collective global security or a global defense system (GDS), a set of political and organizational measures, technical systems of varied (including military) characteristics intended to ensure national, regional and global security can be described as the pinnacle of cooperation. In future, the bilateral global security system can be upgraded with high-tech elements supplied by the other industrially developed countries to set up a security system covering all countries, including those which, unable to contribute to the system, signed corresponding international agreements. This system will be able to provide prompt and objective assessment of the WMD and delivery means

proliferation threats and offer realistic responses based on information about certain countries' nuclear weapon capability as well as the dual purpose materials and technologies proliferation.

The UN, the World Space Organization and other structures can also contribute to this international mechanism.

### **Russia's Strategy in the Face of the National Security Threats**

Today, in the near future and for many years to come (at least, for the next 20 to 25 years) Russia has not, and will have no alternative but to remain a strong nuclear power. We should discuss pros and cons of the resumption of works on effective counteraction to the American ABM system in the form of its overcoming or containing its spread. I have in mind low-angle trajectories, maneuverable multiple warheads, shorter boost trajectory of ballistic missiles, etc.

Russia should use its nuclear shield to modernize its Armed Forces to fit the risks, challenges and threats of the 21st century. The best intellectual forces should be employed in the key directions of scientific and technical upgrading of the means and methods of armed struggle. The fact that Russia is lagging behind the technologically developed countries is not the most serious of the threats; it is much more dangerous to be caught unawares by technological novelties which means that the state should busy itself with forecasting and foresight in this field; high-tech civilian breakthroughs should be moved to the military sphere.

Moscow should concentrate its foreign policy efforts at the measures described above; modernization and strengthening of the mechanisms of regional and global security (including UN, NATO, CSTO, SCO, etc.) in the first place should receive priority attention. We should arrive at a real partnership with NATO and move on to a more efficient Euroatlantic security system. Group 8 with new members (China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) should be vested with the function of a Global Security Alliance or set up a similar new structure. In any case, stronger national security and new challenges and threats call for cooperation with the strongest economic and military powers.

Russia and the West should avoid even the slightest confrontation. Without the latter's participation, regional, global and, hence, Russia's national security is not possible. The 2006-2009 events demonstrated that there are no prerequisites for this confrontation. The West looks at Russia as a much more important partner than the "new Europeans" engaged in fanning security and economic confrontation. Russia has not been strong enough to be involved in confrontation of any sort: its current economic and technological weakness rules out competition with the United States in the military sphere the budget of which is bigger than that of Russia by an order. National modernization requires strategic cooperation with the United States and the key EU countries.

Russian diplomacy should work toward real rather than declared partnership with the United States and the leading West European countries; this partnership should receive real substance and effective mechanisms of its realization.

Russia's foreign policy should rely on the balance of aims and means principle. Russia's security and development strategy call for well-considered and rational resource

policy that will make Russia's foreign policy more successful and will boost Russia's efficiency as a state, the competitiveness of its national economy, individual branches, private companies, innovation systems and of everything else in the globalized world. This is one of the main prerequisites of national security and successful development.

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NOTE

1 Utkin A.I., Fedotova V.G, Budushchee glazami Natsiona'lnogo Soveta po Razvedke SShA: globalnye tendentsii do 2025 goda, Moscow, 2009.

Key words: strategic planning, conventional armaments; WMD, START-1, the Moscow Treaty, ISRM Treaty, non-proliferation regime